ELECTIONS AND PEACEBUILDING IN ZAMBIA
ASSESSMENT FINAL REPORT

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Executive Summary

From July 8 through 14, 2011, Creative Associates International (Creative) and Pax Mondial, Limited (Pax) conducted a study in Zambia to assess the current political environment and its impact on peaceful elections. The objective of this study was to establish a profile on potential threats to electoral peace and to make recommendations on promoting a secure environment for the 2011 Zambian national and sub-national elections. The study was conducted by a four-person team, each of whom focused on one of the following areas: 1) governmental; 2) civil society; 3) political; and 4) security. The methodology employed by the team involved desk research and field interviews with Zambian and international stakeholders involved with administering, securing, observing, adjudicating, or providing education surrounding the 2011 elections. This methodology reflected the approach found in the Electoral Security Framework, developed by Creative for the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The report is organized into six content sections. This Executive Summary reviews the findings from each of these sections in order.

The first section identifies underlying structural vulnerabilities for electoral conflict that may place a peaceful election at risk. The main structural vulnerabilities that pose risks to holding a peaceful 2011 election include Zambia’s status as a transitioning democracy, political finance, as well as the presidential form of governance and associated electoral system that contribute to a “winner-take-all” scenario and accompanying heightened political stakes.

The lack of any political finance legal framework and enforcement mechanism embedded in the country’s constitution has contributed to an environment in which rumors circulate surrounding the sources of funding and the ruling Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD) party uses its control over key government agencies and ties with banks to place pressure on opposition parties and reduce funding to them. Equally important are the intersecting issues of high levels of poverty and unemployment and the ‘youth bulge’ that characterize Zambia’s demography. Poverty renders individuals more susceptible to vote buying as well as offers of cash from (mainly) political parties in exchange for perpetrating violent acts to achieve among other objectives intimidate voters. On this latter point, youth remain particularly vulnerable and have in the past in the form of youth party cadres (mainly by the MMD and Patriotic Front (PF) party) been deployed to harass and intimidate opposition voters. Although of lesser importance, the issue of Tribalism in general and in particular the corruption of tribal chiefs is an underlying area of vulnerability, as these individuals are believed to heavily influence the voting patterns in their communities. The final structural vulnerability is history of electoral conflict, which can be a predictor of future conflict in profile and location. In the case of Zambia,

1 Biographical information on the team members and the organizations they represent can be found in Annex I.
Election Day has generally remained peaceful while violent acts (albeit low in number) have mainly been perpetrated in the pre- and post-election phases.

The second section outlines vulnerabilities specific to the 2011 electoral cycle that may present risks to a peaceful election. Among others, six stand out. First, there is mistrust of the independence and competence of the Electoral Commission of Zambia (ECZ) to administer free and fair elections. This mistrust is fueled by reports of pre-voted ballots, ballot box stuffing, registration of foreigners (refugees), voter impersonation, and manipulation of election results announcements. The appointment of all ECZ members by the president has fueled further speculation about the structural and behavioral independence of the Commission. Second, further contributing to an increasingly politicized environment, the issue of the Parallel Vote Tabulation (PVT) has become a source of division between the MMD and PF as well as between Zambian and international stakeholders with the opposition and the international community generally supporting the conduct of a PVT. Third, the Electoral Code of Conduct (CoC) lacks enforcement provisions or penalties for violations of the code. As an essentially voluntary agreement, the CoC is unable to prevent malfeasance by parties. Fourth, vote buying is likely to occur in various forms including exchange of cash or foodstuffs for voter card or vote and in various regions.

The fifth and sixth vulnerabilities present the greatest risks specific to this electoral cycle – perceived closeness of the electoral contest and the polarized media environment. Concerning the closeness of the contest, for the first time since the MMD took office in 1991 the outcomes of the presidential contest are uncertain. This uncertainty and political polarization is fueled by various factors, including the perception that the MMD has weakened vis-à-vis the PF and, in turn, that the PF may hold a legitimate chance of winning the poll. This closeness of contests creates further opportunities for grievances over the “levelness” of the political playing field, particularly in light of the aforementioned use of state resources by the MMD and media access and profile of the PF as portrayed in government-controlled media. Regarding the media environment, the state and private media have contributed to factors that may add to pre-election violence as well as, depending on the actual outcome, violence following the release of results. Having become the “mirrors of the political parties,” the media has through employing polemical language contributed to creating the existing polarized environment, leading people to gravitate even more strongly toward and support their preferred party (mainly PF or MMD). These factors may lead the MMD to feel more vulnerable and thus use increased violence before elections to intimidate voters and, moreover, people to become enraged should the MMD win by a medium to large margin.

In the third section, existing Mitigating Capacities that may be leveraged to counter these risks are identified. For the 2011 election, the following such capacities exist. First, regarding perceived incompetence of the ECZ and impartiality of the electoral process, recent reforms may enhance the integrity of the electoral process in the eyes of the voting public. The reforms include improved training and selection criteria for poll workers. Poll workers are selected on a merit basis by a panel of five people chaired by the District Electoral Officer (DEO) rather than recruited through a politicized civil service, as previously performed. Other ECZ reforms that may serve to mitigate perceptions amongst the public of impartiality, and thus decrease likelihood of post-election violence
as a result, are the following: posting hard copy election results for each polling station at each polling station; accelerated preliminary election results management; and real-time web site posting of election results. Increasing public awareness about these measures could serve to mitigate conflict surrounding the election. The second form of mitigating capacity is the National Conflict Management Committee (NCMC), which also has District Conflict Management Committees (DCMC) in each of the 74 Districts. Per their mandate and in order to mitigate grievances that may lead to conflict, these Committees can be used to hear complaints over the use of state resources for campaigning, media access, and other fairness questions. The third Mitigating Capacity is the ECZ’s National Voter Education Committee. In general, voter education can be an effective instrument to dispel concerns about such issues as ballot secrecy and dampen the impact of mis-information and dis-information. The ECZ’s initiative can be used to perform such functions before, during, and after the election. And finally, the Zambian military’s reluctance (historically) to engage in politics is by default a mitigating capacity as stakeholders need not realistically concern themselves with the military engaging in the process.

In the fourth section, an analysis is presented of the state and non-state stakeholders involved in elections and peacebuilding. The purpose of this section is to define a profile of potential threats to peaceful elections – those posed by and to these stakeholders. The most pressing threats to this electoral cycle include the following, organized by phase of the electoral cycle: Pre-election, Election Day, and Post-election.

The primary drivers of conflict for the 2011 electoral contest in general, and during the pre-election phase in particular, are likely to be political parties in general and the MMD and PF in particular. The latter two parties have in past elections, including the recent by-elections, shown to be the prime drivers of conflict through the actions of their cadres, individuals dispatched by parties to confront political opponents. These constitute the primary threats during the pre-election phase. Parties are said to pay unemployed youth and ferry them to other locations where they harass opponents. The motive of these actions is to intimidate opposition party voters to either not vote or vote for the threatening party’s candidate. The use of youth as “tools for violence” has been more common in by-elections, given that the MMD and PF have been able to focus their resources on these specific areas. Nonetheless, the parties are likely to use these tactics in the pre-election phase. The MMD is more likely to employ these tactics and will do so in rural areas onto the PF and United Party for National Development (UPND) supporters.

The PF is known to establish “campaign centers” manned by hired youths in school houses known to be designated to be used as polling stations during elections. The party engages in this activity in order to intimidate people from going to vote on Election Day – having been harassed by these youths in the run up to the election, they are less likely to re-visit these locations on Election Day.

The Election Day phase is expected to largely be peaceful. However, the current circumstances may prompt actions on Election Day to disrupt voting at polling stations perceived as strongholds for a particular party.
In the Post-Election Phase, the following areas can be considered at risk: Lusaka - Matero Compound (both parties represented here), Garden Compound (police no go area), Chawana Compound, and Bauleri Compound; Copperbelt - Ndola and Kitwe.

Regarding the post-election phase, depending on the closeness of the results and given the reasons outlined above (media environment in particular) there may be some post-election protests that devolve into violence. The probability that such actions would devolve into full-scale riots is increased due to two factors linked to the Zambian Police Service (ZPS). First, the ZPS lacks the training and capacity in how to deal with and disperse large crowds. Specifically, it lacks training in matching proper degree of force with perceived threat level (tending to use too much force, which may exacerbate violence). And second, the ZPS does not at the time of this writing have an electoral security plan that details how the ZPS would respond to incidents before, during, and following the election.

Having presented this profile, the fifth section outlines current electoral peacebuilding initiatives by civil society, political parties, government, and security organizations that are addressing some of these threats.

The sixth and final section puts forth an Electoral Peacebuilding Framework that cross-references the cited vulnerabilities (structural and election-specific), existing mitigating capacities, and effective peacebuilding programs and presents short-term recommendations to address immediate peacebuilding issues and longer-term structural reforms to reduce the existent vulnerabilities to electoral conflict. We review the main short-term (election-specific) and long-term (structural) interventions below.

Regarding short-term interventions specific to the 2011 contest, a pre-election agreement among political parties, CSOs, and faith-based organization supporting peaceful electoral practices can be leveraged to dampen conflict and provide a national platform for mediating major electoral disputes, such as the electoral outcomes. However, the situation lacks an overarching “honest broker,” that is, an individual, organization, or group of organizations capable of bringing together and reconciling the differences between the opposing sides. Such an agreement could be internationally-negotiated by the African Union (AU) or the Southern African Development Community (SADC) or led by domestic stakeholders. In either case, it is intended to provide a platform to initiate other measures to prevent, manage, or mediate electoral conflict not found in the current peacebuilding activities. The creation of the agreement should be accompanied by public statements from all political leaders and the president supporting peaceful elections.

Other short-term Framework activities include improvement to the ECZ’s administrative capacity, staffing, and its strategic communications to the voting public on these improvements. The ZPS requires further training on public order management and should be adequately equipped for the potential for Post-Election street actions by supporters of the losing party for presidency. Political party agent training and the development of women political leaders are important capacity development activities. CSOs and faith-based organizations can play roles in “naming and shaming” political party cadres and their tactics, providing electoral peace education, sponsoring candidates conducting domestic monitoring programs, and mediating Post-Election Phase disputes.
Media organizations should be receive better training on covering electoral activities and coordinate their publication of election results with the announcements of the ECZ. And, traditional leaders can be engaged in education, meditation, and mediation activities.

Over the longer-term, the following reforms can be considered to de-conflict aspects in future electoral cycles. These include reforms in the presidential and electoral systems; institutionalizing youth involvement in elections; political finance reform; prohibitions on vote buying; transparency in boundary delimitation; diversifying the ECZ appointment process; and establishing more timely mechanisms for adjudication of disputes over electoral outcomes.

As demonstrated in this report, there are many activities currently underway which should reduce electoral conflict. However, these distinct efforts should be linked with a loosely integrated and coordinated approach to assure that there is sufficient program topical coverage and reach throughout the electoral cycle. With such an approach, the prospects of peaceful elections are increased, the credibility of the election enhanced, and the quality of governance improved in Zambia.
Introduction

From July 8 through 14, 2011, Creative Associates International (Creative) and Pax Mondial, Limited (Pax) conducted a study in Zambia to assess the current political environment and its impact on peaceful elections. The objective of this study was to establish a profile on potential threats to electoral peace and to make recommendations on promoting a secure environment for the 2011 national and sub-national elections. The study was conducted by a four-person team, each of whom focused on one of the following institutional sectors: 1) governmental; 2) civil society; 3) political; and 4) security. The methodology employed by the team involved desk research and field interviews with Zambian and international stakeholders involved with administering, securing, adjudicating, observing, assisting, or providing education surrounding the 2011 elections. This methodology reflected the approach found in the Electoral Security Framework, developed by Creative for the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).4

The report is organized into six content sections. The first section identifies underlying structural vulnerabilities for electoral conflict that may place Zambian elections at risk. The second section outlines vulnerabilities specific to the 2011 electoral cycle that hold the potential of provoking electoral conflict. In the third section, existing Mitigating Capacities are identified that may be leveraged to counter these risks. In the fourth section, an analysis of the state and non-state stakeholders involved in elections and peacebuilding is presented. In so doing, this section also defines a profile of potential threats to peaceful elections. Having presented this profile, the fifth section outlines those electoral peacebuilding initiatives by civil society, political parties, government, and security organizations that are currently addressing some of these threats. The sixth and final section puts forward an Electoral Peacebuilding Framework that cross-references the vulnerabilities (structural and election-specific), existing mitigating capacities, and peacebuilding programs, and presents short-term recommendations to address immediate peacebuilding issues and longer-term structural reforms to reduce the existing vulnerabilities to electoral conflict.

This assessment also contains a section on conflict mapping, both in a hard copy format and through access to an electronic, interactive version. On the former, Annex Five includes maps profiling among issues areas where electoral conflict occurred in the past. Regarding the electronic version, the report includes an account and access information to an on-line interactive version of all mapped information. USAID may use this on-line resource to produce additional maps and resources for use in planning prior to and following the 2011 election. The mapping involves the use of the Ushahidi platform, a crowdsourcing software for crisis mapping. An explanation on the mapping and the hard copy maps are shown in Annex Five.

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3 Biographical information on the team members and the organizations they represent can be found in Annex I.
“Tripartite” elections for the presidency, National Assembly, and local offices have been called by President Rupiah Banda for September 20, 2011. The presidency is a national office elected in a single-round plurality system for a five-year term. The National Assembly is a 158 seat unicameral body (150 elected and eight appointed by the president) also serving five-year terms. Local council elections are held throughout the country in 1,422 wards, which are subdivisions of Zambia’s 150 constituencies.

The conduct of these elections is governed by a legal framework consisting of the following elements:

- Constitution of Zambia (1991);
- Electoral Commission Act Number 24 (1996);
- Electoral Act Number 12 (2006);
- Local Government Elections Act Cap. 282 of the laws of Zambia; and

The legal framework also includes the Electoral Code of Conduct and regulations promulgated by the Electoral Commission of Zambia (ECZ) to implement this legislation.

The ruling party is the Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD), led by President Rupiah Banda. The principal opposition parties are the Patriotic Front (PF), led as presidential contender Michael Sata, and the United Party for National Development (UPND). Other opposition party representatives interviewed for this study included the National Restoration Party (NAREP), Forum for Democracy and Development (FDD), and the Alliance for Development and Democracy (ADD).

I. Structural Vulnerabilities

This study has identified a number of underlying structural vulnerabilities that may place Zambian elections at risk for conflict. These vulnerabilities involve political, social, economic and security factors as described below.

A. Political Factors

1. Regime Type

Research suggests that consolidating democracies may be more vulnerable to electoral conflict than authoritarian regimes, where elections are either not held or conducted to favor the ruling party, or in established democracies where institutions are consolidated and there is a high level of public confidence in the electoral process. Zambia’s positioning on this spectrum can be described by two measures of Freedom House’s Freedom in the World Survey 2010: 1) Political Rights Score; and 2) Civil Liberties Score. In the first case, the score is 3 and in the latter it is 4. Countries are ranked on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 representing the highest level of freedom and 7 representing the
lowest level. Of the descriptions as Free, Partly Free, and Not Free, Zambia is termed as Partly Free.  

2. Executive and Electoral Systems

The presidential election is conducted in a single-round where the victorious candidate may win without obtaining a majority of votes. For example, in the 2006 presidential election, Mr. Levy Mwanawasa won with 43.0 percent of the vote. For the parliament, the electoral system is that of First-Past-The-Post, with single-member constituencies creating “winner take all” incentives and electoral stakes.

Moreover, the electoral stakes of this tripartite sequencing should also be noted in that the stakes, and the potential for conflict, are further enhanced by holding national and sub-national elections on a single day, potentially bringing top-down governance rewards to the most powerful political party.

3. Boundary Delimitation

Current representation by the MMD in Parliament—74 of the 150 elected seats—may suggest that the constituency boundaries were delimited in the ruling party’s favor. Such a districting bias will continue to favor MMD parliamentary candidates despite possible trends in the ascendancy of PF. Under one scenario, the PF could win the presidency and the MMD retain control of the parliament, yielding a divided government. Recent redistricting may also present the potential for conflict. Two new Districts were created (Ikelenge in North Western Province and Mafinga in Northern Province) creating the embedded potential for conflict in those areas that delimitation exercises hold if regarded as unfair or biased.

Under the 2010 draft of the Constitution that was recently voted down in the National Assembly, the number of seats would have been increased from 150 to 225. The draft also designated 30 percent for women where they currently occupy 14 percent of the seats. With constitutional reform, the future boundary delimitation exercise to increase the number of seats holds the potential for conflict if communities perceive that their voting power is being diluted by the new constituency lines.

4. Political Party System and Finance

The electoral legal framework does not contain rules that define the scope, purpose, or registration requirements for political parties. The Electoral Act (2006) defines a political party as “an organisation registered under the Societies Act, the objects of which include any political activity or the sponsoring of candidates for election to the office of President or as a member of the National Assembly.” Political parties are thus required to register with the Registrar of Societies and not with the ECZ. As a result, political parties fall under the purview of the “Societies Act” and are therefore formally registered as “clubs” and subject to the associated regulations for reporting finances.

No regulations exist that govern political party finances and expenditures. Classified as “clubs,” political parties are required to submit “annual return statements” detailing the amount of money received as well as a list of expenditures to the Register of Societies.

5 For further information on factors associated with this score, see www.freedomhouse.org.
6 However, in a public hearing held by the EC there was support to increase the number to 275 seats.
The purpose of the annual return statements is to fulfill registration requirements. The parties are not required to submit documentation, such as bank statements, verifying the amount claimed and the Register of Societies does not attempt nor has the authority to verify reports. Parties tend to underreport assets held. No formal limits exist on campaign contributions from domestic or foreign sources.

The lack of a political finance legal framework also opens the door to divisive rumors about sources of funding and creates relationships between “money and muscle.” It also resources vote buying, which is discussed in its own section below. One example of a divisive rumor is the purported e-mail exchange between two PF parliamentarians, as revealed on the web site Zambia Watchdog, discussing $45 million (USD) in campaign funding coming from sources in Afghanistan and Taiwan. The parliamentarians deny that they sent the e-mails in question. Further, numerous interviewees referenced speculation that the government of China has also given large donations to political parties. Such unsettling reports and the connections between “money and muscle,” as manifested by the political party cadres’ tactics, are in part a direct result of the lack of financial transparency and accountability in political party and candidate activities.

Related to this lack of financial accountability is the use of state resources by the MMD for political and campaign purposes. These resources include land vehicles, air transport, staff, facilities, and office supplies. Parliamentarians lose access, in principal, to these resources after dissolution. It was a reportedly common practice for parliamentarians to engage in campaign-like activities before the official campaign period begins and thus be able to utilize the state resources available to them. The president and vice president offices are not dissolved and their accesses to state resources during the campaign are not disrupted by the closure of parliament. These practices create vulnerabilities for conflict because these resources are perceived to give the ruling party an advantage in campaigning and vote seeking.

B. Social Factors

1. Tribalism

Zambia is unique among many of its southern Africa neighbors for favoring a culture of national integration over tribal and regional loyalties. The country’s motto is “One Zambia, One Nation,” and many Zambians applaud the pivotal role played by Kenneth Kaunda, their first president after Independence from Great Britain, in uniting Zambians by encouraging inter-marriages and sending people from one province or region to work or study in another.

Kaunda served as Zambia’s leader from 1964 to 1991, and with his departure and the end of one-party rule came a multi-party democratic system in which competition for support led to more regional and “identity” politics. Frederick Chiluba became the country’s first president in this new system, serving in office until January 2002. By the end of Chiluba’s decade in power, the Luapola native had started to increasingly favor his own tribesmen, the Bemba. At one point, all members of Chiluba’s cabinet except for one were from his region. People frustrated with this practice responded in kind, and began voting more and more along tribal and regional lines.
In the current electoral environment, the MMD party remains national in character, with the president from Eastern Province and the vice-president from Central, but the other parties have more regional tendencies, with the PF strong in the urban areas of Lusaka and Copperbelt and the UPND dominating in the Southern Province and parts of Central Province.

However, the lack of ‘real’ issues being presented or debated by the political parties may mean voters will be more likely to vote simply on the basis of region and tribe. Political parties tend to manipulate these tendencies to garner more support for their candidates. According to one example provided in a Southern African Center for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (SACCORD) report on tribalism in Zambia: “In the Kasama Central parliamentary by-election of October 2009 there were serious attempts to use ‘tribalism’ by both the MMD and the opposition PF-UPND Pact to outcompete each other. The ruling MMD was reported to have rejected the nomination of the frontrunner in the primaries on account of the fact that his father came from Southern province. The PF-UPND Pact candidate, on the other hand, went on record to appeal to the electorate to vote for him because he was the ‘son of the soil’ whereas his MMD opponent was depicted as coming from a non-Bemba speaking part of the province.”

2. Urban – Rural Cleavages

Urban-rural differences may be exploited by political interests. Most of population resides in the rural areas with 20 percent in Lusaka and 20 percent in Copperbelt. There is 85 percent of the labor force involved in agriculture on small, subsistence plots. There are also related tensions between conservative and liberal forces over such issues as Zambia being constitutionally a “Christian nation” and debate over such social issues as homosexuality.

National development endeavors have also created friction with rural populations displaced by mining, industrial, and agricultural projects. The impoverished populations most affected by these evictions and land disputes generally have limited access to legal aid and national courts.

3. Youth Bulge

In 2006, the total population of Zambia was estimated at 11,502,010 persons and the total Voting Age Population (VAP) was 5,241,627. This means that 6,260,383 persons are under the age of 18 years or 54.42 percent of the population; and 60 to 65 percent are under 21 years of age.

With this abundance of prospects, youth are recruited for the political party cadres to perpetrate violence surrounding the election. According to one interviewee, “the youth of Zambia are being employed as a tool for political violence.” Since 2009, both the MMD and PF have been using young individuals to carry out violent acts against opposition voters in opposition strongholds and predominantly in the Pre-Election Phase. According to interviewees, the MMD has used these tactics more frequently than the PF, in part due to the MMD’s access to state resources to fund these tactics.

The youth ‘ring leaders’ receive payment for their services and proceed to identify young individuals, whom they pay a small amount with funds provided by the party. The amount is said to range from 10,000 to 20,000 Kwachas per individual. The ‘ring leaders’
and party representatives bring the youth to a gathering area where they board a bus, on which there is a large quantity of alcohol. The youth proceed to drink and once intoxicated receive instructions from the ‘ring leaders’, as well as party representatives who are said to be aboard the bus, to “intimidate” and “beat” those individuals “known to support the opposition.” The youth are then released in known opposition areas and, in terms of specific forms of violence, proceed to threaten opposition supporters with pangas (clubs) and, according to one source, axes.

4. Refugees

The influx of refugees who have fled Somalia, Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Rwanda, and Angola is a de-stabilizing social factor. Rumors persist that the MMD registers these refugees to vote even though they are not citizens and thus ineligible to be voters. As of 2010, more than 60,000 refugees resided in Zambia. The majority were from the DRC. Refugees from DRC and Angola have resided in Zambia for years even though the conflicts in those countries ended some time ago.

Advocacy groups have been urging the government to update Zambia’s refugee legislation to better comply with international protection standards and provisions aimed at facilitating local integration. The United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) in Zambia has been pushing for local integration for a small number of Angolan and Rwandan refugees, but a Zambian Ministry of Home Affairs official said in July of this year that the government has no immediate plans for local integration.

Though the refugee situation in Zambia is generally considered stable, in early 2010 a young refugee woman was shot and killed by police brought in to quell a demonstration at the Meheba refugee camp in northwest Zambia. Thirty-six others were deported for being “unruly.” There were also reports in December 2010 of Zambian troops detaining some 700 Somali refugees in Lusaka.

5. Women

Women are identified as a vulnerability factor because of the threats that are specific to them in political activism. Women are often subjected to general discrimination, violence, and a lack of equal access to land, employment opportunities, and political empowerment. In the UNDP’s 2010 Gender Equality Index, which measures overall political, economic, educational, and health factors, Zambia ranked 124 out of 138 nations. But, women’s participation in elections either as voters or candidates subject them to a special array of threats.

Women in politics are subject to threats of sexual assault. For example, there were threats to “gang rape” Edith Mawakwi of the Forum for Democracy and Development due to her anti-MMD comments. And, a July 18, 2011 news report alleged that 100 MMD cadres assaulted an MUVI TV news crew and attempted to rape a female journalist.

Additionally, women are negatively affected by patriarchal attitudes and customs, high economic dependence on men, and inherent institutional barriers, according to a report by the Zambia National Women’s Lobby (ZNWL). Such factors have a dampening impact on women’s participation in governance with the percentage of female members of Parliament is just 14.7 percent, although the trend line trajectory has been positive, and a
only 7.3 percent of elected officials at local government levels. The table below shows the statistics on women elected to the National Assembly since 1994.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>No. of Female MPs</th>
<th>Percentage %</th>
<th>No. of Male MPs</th>
<th>Percentage %</th>
<th>Total Effective Seats</th>
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<td>1978-1983</td>
<td>6</td>
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<td>119</td>
<td>95.2</td>
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<td>1983-1988</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ZNWL and ECZ 2006 (Table provided in ZNWL’s “Women in Politics and Decision Making in Zambia” report).

At this writing, there are only 20 women contesting as MMD candidates for seats in the National Assembly elections this year. Other political parties have not yet announced their rosters.

C. Economic Factors

Research suggests that economic factors can create vulnerabilities for electoral conflict. If the Per Capita Income is less than $2,700 (USD), vulnerabilities may exist – in Zambia, this figure is $1,500. Small economies, those under $100 billion (USD) as measured by the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), may be vulnerable to electoral conflict. The GDP to Zambia in 2009 was $12.81 billion (USD). Finally, the distribution of wealth can be a factor especially in economies where natural resources may be a significant percent of foreign exchange earnings. One measure of income distribution is the GINI Index. In Zambia, that Index is 50.8 and the copper and cobalt extraction industries represent most of Zambia’s foreign exchange. Research suggests a GINI Index figure of 40.0 or more poses an underlying vulnerability for conflict because of economic discontent with the distribution of wealth. And, in Zambia, there is public discontent with the lack of “trickling-down” of wealth from the mineral resources which produce such economic wealth.

D. Security Factors

1. History of Electoral Conflict

A history of electoral conflict can be a predictor of future conflict in profile and location. The types of electoral conflict can vary with different phases of the electoral cycle.
Below are some examples of electoral conflict profiles by electoral cycle phase in past Zambian elections. For the purposes of this analysis there are three electoral phases: 1) Pre-Election Phase; 2) Election Day Phase; and 3) Post-Election Phase.

a. Pre-Election Phase

In March 2001 a PF provincial conference turned violent when MMD cadres arrived to disrupt the proceedings. This kind of Pre-Election Phase violence was also employed by the UPND in 2005 to disrupt ruling party rallies. And, these tactics were again employed in 2009 by MDD cadres in by-elections in Serenje and Central Provinces.

b. Election Day Phase

Generally speaking, the day of voting has been peaceful.

c. Post-Election Phase

In the September 2006 presidential elections, the PF candidate, Michael Sata, had the early lead in official results reported. But, these reports were from PF strongholds in Copperbelt and Lusaka. When the final results were announced, Sata eventually finished in third place. This reversal led to Post-Election Phase violence where PF supporters took to the streets to protest in five Lusaka townships and Copperbelt Province. In April 2010 by-elections, MMD and PF accused each other of violence in the Post-Election Phase while ballot tabulation was occurring in the Mufumbwe constituency.

II. Police Rules of Engagement

In the view of some observers, the Zambia Police Service (ZPS) is a threat to a peaceful electoral environment. They view the police as under resourced, understaffed, poorly trained, and unprofessional. They do not have the resources in the regions to deal with anything beyond local domestic violence or thefts. In the event of larger disturbances, reinforcements are sent from Lusaka; however, these reinforcements often employ heavy-handed tactics and exacerbate the conflict. In the past, such ZPS actions have resulted in civilian deaths. As one example, ZPS fired tear gas into a bar where people were drinking past curfew. This caused the occupants to panic and two people were crushed to death in the rush to evacuate the building.

II. Vulnerabilities Specific to the 2011 Election

The structural vulnerabilities described above can be viewed as embedded and the subject for longer-term reform initiatives and development. This section outlines vulnerabilities that are specific to the 2011 election. These vulnerabilities may be more responsive to short-term programming interventions to prevent, manage, or mediate electoral conflict than structural factors.

A. Electoral Administration

There is mistrust of the independence and competence of the ECZ to administer free and fair elections. This mistrust is fueled by reports of pre-voted ballots, ballot box stuffing, registration of foreigners (refugees), voter impersonation, and manipulation of election
results announcements. The appointment of all ECZ members by the president has diminished public confidence in the structural and behavioral impartiality of the Commission.

However, some of the claims of electoral integrity crimes can be seen as self-serving by the accuser. During elections that occurred in 2008 and 2009, opposition parties made a concerted effort to discredit the performance of the ECZ and the ECZ did not effectively respond to these criticisms. This unanswered criticism has contributed to an environment of mistrust that seems to exceed valid concerns. It can also be anticipated that any flaws, compared with deliberate malpractice, in the conduct of the election may be portrayed as “fraud” for political purposes by the opposition.

The voter registration campaign conducted by the ECZ exhibits both vulnerabilities and mitigating capacities. The vulnerabilities are in the projected number of deceased persons still on the registry – a figure reportedly up to 400,000 names. It is not uncommon for the National Identity Cards of the deceased to be kept by the family member as mementos. This vulnerability in the registry could open opportunities for voter impersonation of the deceased voter. In addition, political parties have expressed concerns that there was not adequate time for the public to verify the accuracy of their personal information on the registry, although 14 days were provided for this process of verification. Instances of incorrect or incorrectly assigned data that result in disenfranchisement could provoke localized conflict at polling stations on Election Day.

**B. Parallel Vote Tabulation (PVT)**

As a measure to assess the veracity of the official vote count, the employment of a Parallel Vote Tabulation (PVT) has been introduced. However, the PVT has become a source of division between the MMD and PF as well as between Zambian and international stakeholders with the opposition and the international community generally supporting the conduct of a PVT and the MMD and its civil society organs publicly opposing it. For example, the Christian Coalition advised the ECZ not to accredit observer groups that support conducting PVTs. The Zambia Peace Foundation has urged rejection of the PVT. And the Mineworker’s Union stated that the PVT is foreign to Zambia and it should be rejected. Given the projected closeness of the race between MMD and the PF, the MMD may view the PVT as a threat to its ability to achieve victory through a manipulation of the ballot count.

**C. Political Campaign Practices**

An Electoral Code of Conduct has been developed; however, no enforcement provisions or penalties for violations of the Code exist. For all intents and purposes, parties ascribe to the Code voluntarily. Linked to the lack of political party finance regulation, the lax enforcement of the Code enables the MMD to use its control over government resources for campaign purposes. Two such examples are relevant here. First, according to UPND, FDD and NAREP, the MMD far exceeds its weekly allowed 30 minutes of television air time for campaign statements. Second, and again linked to the non-existent political finance legislation, according to the UPND and NAREP, the MMD receives funds from
mining companies in the Copperbelt. The MMD in turn uses these funds, coupled with monies from government budgets, to implement development projects in the Pre-Election Phase--actions technically barred by the Code. These behaviors illustrate that although the official campaign period is only eight weeks, actual campaigning by the MMD started many weeks before.

C. Vote Buying

The high proportion of individuals living below the poverty level, 64 percent of the population, according to the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), and the high rates of unemployment, 16 percent of the population, according to multiple sources, create vulnerabilities for vote buying to occur. Vote buying can be considered as a vulnerability for conflict because it implies a form of intimidation and diminishes public confidence in electoral outcomes. Vote buying can take the form of cash payments or other items such as clothing or alcohol. By some accounts, the going rate for purchasing voter cards is 50,000 Kwachas ($10.64 USD). By exchanging a voter card for a sum of money, this transaction disenfranchises the sellers so that they cannot cast ballots for their preferred candidates. Other reported vote buying considerations range from subsidized housing purchases and augmented fertilizer subsidies to gifts of clothing, sugar, food, and alcohol. Vote buying may also be related to perceptions of ballot secrecy. For example, by some reports, party cadres intimidate less educated voters by telling them that mobile telephone present in polling stations will reveal how they voted.

The two main vote buying issues affecting farmers, and thus individuals in rural areas, are fertilizer subsidies and the maize market. The government controls both and, as a result, can exercise economic control over the farmers. For example, the government has announced that it will subsidize fertilizer to all farmers. The normal cost of a bag of fertilizer is 250,000 Kwachas ($53.19 USD) and the government will sell it at 50,000 Kwachas ($10.64 USD). In practice what occurs is that the MMD party cadres tell the farmers that they must commit to supporting the government or they will not be given the subsidized fertilizer. There are an estimated 900,000 farmers who have been affected by these tactics.

Maize is the largest crop produced in Zambia and the government has a contract with farmers to buy all of the maize produced at a price agreed by an independent body. After the crop is harvested, the farmers contact the government agencies and advise on how much product they have for sale. The government then arranges for collection and payment. The control they exercise is through delaying a decision on collection and thereby forcing the farmers to provide storage for the crop, or they delay payment leaving the farmers with no crop and no way to leverage the government for payment. If the government does not move quickly or follow up on their agreement the farmers have no recourse so are either left with a crop they cannot sell, or maneuvered into a position where they must comply with any unofficial ‘conditions’ the government agents might attach, such as voting instructions.
D. Closeness of Contests and Expectations

For the first time since the MMD took office in 1991, the outcomes of the presidential contest are uncertain. This perception is created by, among other factors, the MMD’s losses in recent by-elections and signs that the internal party dynamic is becoming fragmented. Because of this uncertainty, the MMD is experiencing party defections, that is, key supporters switching sides in order to join the party that they see as the likely victor.

The potential for an MMD win is made more uncertain by the increasing number of young voters – according to one source, of the 1.5 million voters recently registered 1 million were under 25 years of age. This bodes well for the PF, whose support has traditionally come from urban areas, highly populated by this demographic group.

This closeness of contests creates further opportunities for grievances over the “levelness” of the political playing field, particularly in light of the use of state resources by the MMD, media access issues, and the negative profile of the PF as portrayed in government-controlled media. Although complaint petitions have been filed with the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) on this issue, there have been no penalties imposed upon MMD for improper use of state resources and media.

E. Constitutional Reforms

After two review commissions and a decade of drafting, the proposed constitution legislation failed to obtain parliamentary approval at the vote held on March 29, 2011. The MMD supported the draft but the opposition did not. The PF abstained from the vote and was joined by the UPND, thus making it impossible to obtain a two-thirds majority for passage. The continuing failure to adopt these reforms creates voter cynicism over the constitutional review process and frustrations with the efficacy of these deliberations. Moreover, the opportunities are lost for reforms that could ameliorate some of the cited vulnerabilities such as political finance reform, the timing and sequencing of elections, and the electoral system among others.

F. Electoral Dispute Resolution

Electoral disputes are adjudicated on two levels: 1) Conflict Management Committees; and 2) High Court (with an appeal process to the Supreme Court on High Court decisions). The High Court will be discussed in this section. The Conflict Management Committees will be discussed in the section on Mitigating Capacities.

Recounts are not legally allowable after the results of the polling station have been concluded. Under the electoral law, the declared winners must be sworn-in within 24 hours of the announced results. Appeals on election results are heard by the High Court after the government is seated. This places a burden on the plaintiff to effectively prove that a reversal of the election outcomes should be considered. Additionally, the Chief Justice of the High Court certifies the winner of the presidential contest. As a result, the High Court could be placed in the position of adjudicating disputes against its Chief
Justice. This lack of a responsive electoral adjudication mechanism reduces the channels for peaceful resolution of disputes.

G. Media Environment

The state and private media reporting are provocative and can contribute to Pre-Election and Post-Election Phase conflict. First, having become the “mirrors of the political parties,” the media has through use of polemical language contributed to creating the existing polarized environment, which has led people to gravitate even more strongly toward and support their preferred party, mainly the PF or MMD. Although the state-controlled media has put forth a pro-MMD agenda and created the expectation that the ruling party may win, civil society organizations (CSOs) have countered this and created some expectations that the PF is gaining ground. Together, these factors may lead the MMD to feel more vulnerable and thus use increased conflict before elections to intimidate voters. On the other side, youth have been quoted on community radio as saying they are “ready to die for Sata,” implying that they would be willing to engage in Pre-Election Phase violence orchestrated by the PF or take to the streets to denounce an MMD win in Post-Election Phase conflict.

According to some observers, the MMD has turned Zambia National Broadcasting Corporation (ZNBC), Times of Zambia, and The Zambia Daily Mail into party propaganda machines in a manner that is clearly unconstitutional. They have used these media houses as campaign tools for their party. They have also been using them to defame, scandalize, and injure the characters of innocent citizens who hold dissenting views. These institutions have also been used to demonize church leaders and genuine CSOs that speak for the voiceless. The private-owned media is not immune, as newspapers such as The Post also ratchet up the hostile rhetoric and blatantly align with specific parties. Currently, MMD has sponsored provocative programs such as “Stand up for Rupiah Banda” and documentaries, such as one by an MMD cadre named Chanda Chimba III called, “Stand up for Zambia”.

H. Social Media

The role of social media in Zambian elections remains a wild card. Internet usage in Zambia increased from 20,000 users in 2000 to 816,700 users as of March 31, 2011 (5.9 percent of population). As of March 2011, 117,520 people used Facebook, representing 0.8 percent of the population. Nevertheless, President Banda launched a Facebook page in early July 2011 with Dickson Jere, the President’s special assistant for press and public relations, citing the examples of successful new media campaigns run by President Goodluck Jonathan of Nigeria and United States President Barack Obama. Close to 1,400 people “like” Banda’s Facebook page, as of July 10, 2011. The President’s Facebook page can be found at the link below:

(http://www.facebook.com/pages/Rupiah-Bwezani-Banda/130153693719287)

As demonstrated by recent events in the Middle East, social media can be employed to assemble “flash mobs” that could disrupt political rallies or form widespread Post-
Election Phase protests. However, monopoly of the Internet Service Provider (ISP) by the government in Zambia provides the government with the ability to shut down Internet service on a nationwide basis.

Perhaps more relevant for Zambian elections is the use of mobile telephones and SMS. Cameras on mobile telephones will be used to take pictures of election results at polling stations and transmit them to a central location for cumulative tabulation. In principle and depending upon the speed and comprehensiveness of the transmissions, political parties could know the election outcomes before the ECZ does, based upon photographs of the results sheets taken at the polling stations.

I. Summary of Vulnerabilities

A summary of the vulnerabilities presented above and their potential impact on conflict is shown in the table below.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Vulnerability Factors</th>
<th>Description of Vulnerability</th>
<th>High Risk for Conflict</th>
<th>Medium Risk for Conflict</th>
<th>Low Risk for Conflict</th>
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<td>Political</td>
<td>Regime Type</td>
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<td>Presidential and Electoral System</td>
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<td>Boundary Delimitation</td>
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<td>Political Party System and Finance</td>
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<td>Election Day</td>
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<td>Post-Election Phase</td>
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<td><strong>Election-Specific Factors</strong></td>
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Creative Associates International
July 2011
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<td>Social Media</td>
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### III. Mitigating Capacities

The structural and election-specific vulnerabilities described above are risk factors for electoral conflict in Zambia; however, there are existing Mitigating Capacities to consider which may be leveraged to dampen the potential for conflict emerging from these risks. These Mitigating Capacities are discussed below.

#### A. Electoral Commission of Zambia.

Recent reforms by the ECZ may enhance electoral integrity in the eyes of the voting public. The reforms include improved training and selection criteria for poll workers. Poll workers are now selected on a merit basis by a panel of five people chaired by the District Electoral Officer (DEO) rather than recruited through a politicized civil service, as previously performed. The poll workers are tested for their knowledge of legislation and procedures after the training program is completed. Other ECZ reforms concern election results management and include posting hard copy election results for each polling station at each polling station; accelerated preliminary election results management; and real-time web site posting of election results. The budget for the election appears to be sufficient at 322 billion Kwacha or $68,510,638 – this is $13.12 per voter. BRIDGE training, a well-respected training program for election officers developed by the United Nations (UN) and other international partners, has been conducted for District Electoral Officers.

#### B. Voter Registration

Political inclusiveness can be leveraged to enhance electoral integrity through participation and the legitimacy in governance that stems from a high voter turnout.
While the vulnerabilities of the voter registry are noted above, the ECZ registered 5,223,316 voters earlier this year, said to be 86 percent of the VAP. Men and women registered in nearly equal numbers – (female) 2,613,655 and (male) 2,609,661. Although mobile registration activities were also undertaken to bring more rural voters onto the registry, Copperbelt and Lusaka Provinces are the largest in terms of voter registration at 463,375 and 425,245, respectively. There were 1,279,181 voters added to the rolls in 2011.

C. Conflict Management Committees

The National Conflict Management Committee (NCMC) is composed of representatives from 24 different state and non-state stakeholder organizations including (state) the ZPS, DEC, and ACC as well as (non-state) political parties and CSOs. Its leadership is appointed by the ECZ. The NCMC generally hears complaints over the use of state resources for campaigning, media access, and other fairness questions. It may also hear unresolved complaints from the District level. District Conflict Management Committees (DCMCs) are present in each of the 74 Districts. Each DCMC is composed of eight appointees. The office of the Town Clerk serves as the secretariat for the DCMCs. In the 2006 elections, the DCMCs adjudicated 76 electoral disputes.

D. Voter Education

Voter education can be an effective instrument to dispel concerns about such issues as ballot secrecy and dampen the impact of mis-information and dis-information. The ECZ has established a National Voter Education Committee to oversee a national team of Voter Education Facilitators who conduct educational dialogues with grassroots community groups. Voter Education Facilitators are recruited on the District level. These Facilitators were deployed to the field on July 1, 2011.

E. Zambian Military

The military apparatus has remained out of politics and elections except for supportive logistical services such as Zambian Air Force transport of sensitive election materials. Reports and experience indicate the military is not likely to become involved in electoral security incidents. As an example of the military’s reluctance to engage in such matters, it refused to participate in an American Department of Defense (DoD) planned training exercise involving all the agencies in the country to deal with civil disorder. The exercise was not specifically related to the elections, but elections were in mind by the DoD sponsors. Because the Zambian military would not participate, DoD cancelled the exercise.
IV. Profile of Electoral Threats

This section describes the threats posed in the three phases of the electoral process.

A. Electoral Threat Profile Summary

The primary drivers of conflict for the 2011 electoral contest are likely to be political parties. Parties, principally the MMD, are said to pay unemployed youth and ferry them to other locations where they harass and assault opponents. During the 2008 by-election, the MMD deployed groups of youth and police officers into opposition strongholds. Upon arrival, the MMD youth supporters hold rallies in areas generally used by opposition party youths for similar gatherings. Wanting to show support for their (opposition) party, opposition youths begin to gather and try to hold a form of rally or other type of gathering. At this juncture, the police, as MMD agents, prevent the opposition youth from holding such a meeting. The PF youth respond by confronting the MMD youth, at times inciting violence.

However, these tactics are also employed by other parties. For example, Pre-Election Phase tactics by the UPND in 2001 included attacks on government vehicles, impounding opponents’ food supplies, and holding meetings without permits. It was termed the “Mapatizya Formula” and was intended to employ violence if necessary to prevent and correct vote rigging by the government. The PF is known to establish “campaign centers” manned by hired youths in school houses known to be designated to be used as polling stations during elections. The party engages in this activity in order to intimidate people from going to vote on Election Day – having been harassed by these youths in the Pre-Election Phase, they are less likely to re-visit these locations on Election Day.

While Election Day has been traditionally peaceful, the current circumstances may prompt actions on Election Day to disrupt voting at polling stations perceived as strongholds for a particular party. Perceptions of electoral malpractice which have influenced electoral outcomes will provoke Post-Election Phase conflict, manifesting itself in street actions by the losing party. Many interlocutors view the PF in ascendancy and an MMD win may, given these expectations, result in PF supporters engaging in Post-Election Phase conflict. A PF win could provoke the MMD to send its cadres into PF strongholds, such as Lusaka and Copperbelt Provinces, to assault PF supporters. Under either scenario, the intensity of the Post-Election conflict could spiral into rioting, looting, and arson with the ZPS capacity in public order management open to question.

B. Stakeholder Analysis

1. State Stakeholders

a. Regulatory Institutions

For the purposes of this study, the principal regulatory institutions are the ECZ and its affiliated Conflict Management Committees. The vulnerabilities and mitigating capacities of the ECZ have been discussed in previous sections and this discussion will serve as a profile of that institution’s role in electoral security.
b. Security Institutions

The enforcement of public order during elections is the responsibility of the ZPS. However, the capacity of the ZPS to maintain public order remains open to question. Moreover, uncertainty surrounding the validity of some arrests of opposition supporters call into question the ZPS’ impartiality in performance of its duties. While the size of the ZPS is said to be 14,000 officers, its effective deployment capacity is perhaps half that number at any given time.

In Post-Election Phase street actions, the crowds can be anticipated to be in much greater numbers than the ZPS and the police response will be dictated by lack of training and intimidation because of the size of the crowds. The ZPS are normally not armed when performing their duties, but in situations when there is a heightened risk of disorder they are issued firearms and tear gas. No clear rules of engagement for the ZPS exist. Moreover, and linked to the lack of this framework, there have been no consequences in the past for the indiscriminant use of firearms resulting in the death of unarmed citizens. Collectively, these factors make likely an unprofessional, undisciplined, politicized, and erratic response by the police to Post-Election Phase public order management.

b. Judicial Institutions

Zambia’s Supreme Court is the nation’s final court of appeals. The president appoints the Court’s nine judges, subject to ratification by the National Assembly. The Supreme Court is comprised of a chief justice, a deputy chief justice and seven judges. According to the 1996 Constitution, judges may hold office until the age of 65. It is, however, possible for the president to dismiss a judge on grounds that (s)he is unable to fulfill his/her duty due to “infirmity of body or mind, incompetence or misbehavior.” The president must obtain approval from a special tribunal, with no less than three members, charged with investigating the case. The Supreme Court will hear electoral dispute appeals arising from the High Court.

The High Court has unlimited jurisdiction to hear civil and criminal cases and holds regular sessions in each of Zambia’s nine provincial capitals. As with the Supreme Court, the president appoints judges of the High Court, subject to ratification by the National Assembly. High Court judges may also be dismissed if deemed unable to fulfill their duties but otherwise may hold office to the age of 65. While Conflict Management Committees deal with the majority of electoral disputes, the High Court will hear challenges to election results, but only after the newly elected government has been seated.

2. Non-State Stakeholders

a) Political Parties

1) Movement for Multi-Party Democracy

The Movement for Multi-party Democracy (MMD) is the ruling party in Zambia. It began to form in 1990, fueled by increasing displeasure with the United National Independence Party’s (UNIP) rule and the one-party state. Following the referendum that altered Zambia from a one-party state to multi-party democracy, the MMD formed as a party and its Presidential candidate, Frederick Chiluba, won the election with 81 percent of the vote, ending the 27 year rule of UNIP’s Kenneth Kaunda. The MMD also won 125
of 150 seats in the parliamentary contest. A self-proclaimed center-left party, the MMD has been in power since, winning the 1996 and 2001 presidential elections. Prior to the 1996 contest, Chiluba pushed through constitutional reforms that essentially disallowed the UNIP’s Kaunda from running in the contest. The election was generally regarded as free and fair. Prior to the 2001 presidential election, Chiluba attempted to push through an amendment to the constitutions to allow presidents to stand for a third term, but backed down in the face of mounting public pressure and deciding instead to nominate a successor presidential candidate, Levy Mwanawasa, who won with 29.1% of the vote. Following Mwanawasa’s death in 2008, presidential elections were held and the MMD candidate, Rupiah Banda, won with 40.09% of the vote. As of July 2011, the MMD held 73 seats in parliament throughout all provinces. According to the party, its main strongholds are in the rural areas.

The party is known to employ its youth cadres in the pre-election phase to disrupt opposition party events as well as intimidate voters (in perceived opposition strongholds) to either not vote for the opposition party or vote for the MMD (the specific tactics are outlined in the section above – Social Factors, Youth Bulge). Due to perceived vulnerabilities of the MMD and ascendancy of the PF, the MMD will likely deploy youths in specific regions in which the PF has historically received strong support or made recent gains to target PF voters in these areas. Due to the fragmentation of the United Democratic Alliance (UDA), the UPND [discussed below] is viewed as the second-most prominent political party. As a result, the MMD may also yet to a lesser extent use its youth cadres to intimidate UPND voters. The MMD is likely to leverage its control over fertilizer subsidies to intimidate rural farmers to vote for the MMD.

Although the specific form of payment cannot be identified with absolute certainty, analysis indicates the MMD is likely to use vote buying – in particular use of food-stuffs, given the need to use government transport to ferry large quantities of sugar and other items to specific areas – both to purchase voter cards and influence voters’ decisions.

2) Patriotic Front

The Patriotic Front Party (PF), founded in 2001, is the most widely supported opposition party in Zambia. The party was formed soon before the 2001 parliamentary and presidential elections by former MMD party member Michael Sata, after he was not selected by then MMD leader Frederick Chiluba to stand as their presidential candidate in the 2001 election (Chiluba nominated Levy Mwanawasa instead). Following the 2006 elections Sata declared that he had won the poll, causing unrest after the ECZ announced the MMD candidate as the winner. According to the PF, its main strongholds are in the urban areas of Lusaka and Copperbelt Provinces. The party currently holds 43 seats in parliament from Northern, Copperbelt and Lusaka Provinces, among others. The PF believes it is well situated to win the 2011 Presidential election and pick-up multiple seats in Parliament.

The party is known to employ its youth cadres in the pre-election phase to disrupt MMD party events as well as intimidate voters (in perceived MMD strongholds) to either not vote for the MMD or vote for the PF (the specific tactics are outlined in the section above – Social Factors, Youth Bulge). However, the PF employs said tactics less frequently as they have fewer financial resources at their disposal to fund the transport, food, alcohol
and other items associated with these tactics. The PF will likely use these tactics during the pre-electoral phase. For the 2011 election, PF events and voters are likely to be targets of MMD intimidation. Although the specific form of payment cannot be identified with absolute certainty, analysis indicates the PF is likely to use vote buying both to purchase voter cards and influence voters’ decisions. The form most likely to be employed is cash, although exchange for foodstuffs is also likely.

3) United Party for National Development

The United Party for National Development (UPND) was founded in 1998, mainly out of displeasure with the way in which the MMD was running government. The UPND currently holds 25 seats in Parliament in Southern, Western, Central and Lusaka Provinces. The party considers its main support to be in rural areas, yet indicates it is making efforts to increase support in urban areas, such as Lusaka. The UPND was a member of the now defunct UDA, noting that the members of the alliance decided to “go their separate ways”, a view divergent from those presented by the other two former members of the alliance. In June 2009 the UPND formed an alliance with the PF, yet the alliance ended in February 2011. The UPND is adamant that it won the 2001 election, which it claims was “rigged” in favor of the MMD.

The UPND is not known to employ violence to intimidate opposition or ruling party voters. However, the UPND may be a target of intimidation tactics by the MMD and perhaps the PF in the pre-election phase. The UPND is likely to use vote buying both to purchase voter cards and influence voters’ decisions. The form most likely to be employed is cash, although exchange for foodstuffs is also likely.

4) National Restoration Party

The National Restoration Party (NAREP) was founded on March 2, 2010. Currently, NAREP has no representation in Parliament but placed third in each of the last two by-elections and plans to field candidates in approximately 50 constituencies for the 2011 elections. The base of the party’s platform, or at minimum two of its key issues, are increasing the “role and voice” of women and youth in the political process. Accordingly, NAREP leadership actively try to promote individuals from the “younger generation” to leadership positions.

The NAREP is not known to employ violence to intimidate opposition or ruling party voters. The party will not likely be a target for intimidation or other forms of violence, either, given its relatively recent rise. Due to low funding levels and other factors, NAREP is less likely than MMD, PF, and UPND to engage in vote buying.

5) Forum for Democracy and Development

The Forum for Democracy and Development (FDD) Party was founded in 2001, by Christon Tembo, a former MMD party member who had a falling out with then President and MMD head, Frederick Chiluba, who decided to seek a third term in office in the 2001 elections. The FDD is a self-described social-democrat party favoring grassroots participation and currently holds two seats (from Eastern Province) in the Zambian National Parliament, down from the 12 it won in the December 2001 elections. The FDD also has representation on local councils in Southern, Northwestern, and Eastern Provinces. In 2006, the FDD joined with the UDA, a coalition of parties consisting of
According to FDD, the now defunct UDA fell apart due to "destabilizing" UPND efforts that led to resentment among the other members, including the "poaching" of votes from its key constituencies. The FDD has a relationship with the Scottish National Party, which provides occasional training to the party in campaign operations and fundraising.

The FDD is not known to employ violence to intimidate opposition or ruling party voters. The party will not likely be a target for intimidation or other forms of violence, either, given that the main parties do not view it as a substantial threat. Due to low funding levels and other factors, FDD is less likely than MMD, PF, and UPND to engage in vote buying.

6) Alliance for Development and Democracy

The Alliance for Development and Democracy (ADD) Party was founded in May 2009 and fully operational in September 2009. The ADD was founded by former members of the MMD and other parties due to their belief that politics in Zambia had become about "power and not issues" and their displeasure with the MMD's failure to address significant endemic problems such as education and high unemployment. The ADD has developed a national manifesto and manifestos and strategic plans for all provinces. In these documents, the ADD outlines its plan for addressing the key structural issues (poverty, education, etc) in each area. The president of the party is Charles Milupi, who holds the only ADD seat in parliament and is a former National Director of Mining for the MMD. The ADD aims to field MP candidates for the 2011 contest in all provinces though not all constituencies. The party will focus its efforts in all provinces aside from Northern province, given lack of resources, and Eastern province, given that the president of ADD hails from this area and is therefore likely to garner support for the party.

The ADD is not known to employ violence to intimidate opposition or ruling party voters. The party will not likely be a target for intimidation or other forms of violence, either; the main parties do not view it as a substantial threat due to its recent establishment and small geographic reach. Due to low funding levels and other factors, ADD is less likely than MMD, PF, and UPND to engage in vote buying.

b. Civil Society Organizations

1) Forum for Leadership Search (FLS)

The Forum for Leadership Search, created in 2004, focuses on leadership development and empowerment for Zambian youth aged 15 to 35. The group’s mission is to identify young talent then provide necessary skills training for professions ranging from politics to carpentry to poultry farming.

FLS, which has 4,000 members and chapters throughout Zambia, is also active in the elections realm. Once campaign season is activated, the group plans to launch activities including the hosting of debates for candidates to discuss social and economic issues; the translation of the Electoral Code of Conduct into seven tribal languages; theatrical performances showcasing effective conflict resolution strategies; and democracy “road shows” with Zambian musicians to encourage youth to be active and peaceful participants in the election.
FLS called for additional support to help hold as many workshops as possible to “sensitize” Zambians on democracy before the elections, and also encouraged professional training for the media and the use of robust opinion polls to capture the mood across the country during election season. Increased capacity building as well as more permanent headquarters and office resources for political parties and NGOs are also needed, FLS said. The group supports having more American youth come to Zambia on cultural exchanges, and also would like to send young Zambians to the United States to witness the upcoming electoral season. FLS is funded by government resources (primarily the Ministry of Youth and Sport) and has previously received international donor money.

2) Foundation for Democratic Process (FODEP)

The Foundation for Democratic Process was founded in 1992 as a consortium of groups helping to coordinate elections and support democracy. This NGO says it was at the forefront of helping promote the electoral code of conflict in 1996. Its membership was 7,500 back in 2002.

FODEP currently works on elections and electoral processes; local governance and development; and human rights. In the electoral realm, the group has focused on advocating electoral and constitutional reform. FODEP supports the progressive provisions that were put forth in the latest version of the draft constitution, including a firm date for presidential elections (proposed for the third week of September) in order to level the playing field; political finance reform; and proportional representation. FODEP defined significant threats to this current election as the media; the lack of inter-party democracy in which politicians are treating each other as enemies rather than colleagues; tribal sentiments; and police behavior. The group criticized the police for succumbing to ruling party pressure to prevent opposition meetings from taking place and prolonging permit issuance for public rallies.

3) Anti-Voter Apathy Project (AVAP) – “Making Every Vote Count”

The Anti-Voter Apathy Project was created in 1995 to address low voter turnout in Zambia. The group mobilizes Zambians to get involved in politics and cast their votes. The project provides voter education in all of Zambia’s provinces via community radio, outreach meetings, and programs targeting youth. Members also train young people interested in politics, providing leadership and critical thinking skills.

The group started doing election monitoring in 1998, and is among NDI’s eight civil society monitors in the upcoming election. Election monitors give Zambians confidence that their vote will be safe, AVAP said. Unlike monitors with the ECZ, who allegedly have helicopters to get around the country, the civil society monitors must travel by land in vehicles, and allotted daily allowances don’t cover the extra time it will take to get to far-flung locations. AVAP also said they like time is running out to conduct all necessary training for the monitors.

AVAP commissioned a study to establish the root causes of voter apathy in Zambian elections in September 2010. The survey identified several causes of apathy including difficulties with voter registration (due to challenges obtaining National Registration Cards in rural areas); elections being held during the rainy season; lack of democratic
processes by which political parties select their candidates; insufficient voter education; vote buying; limited accessibility to polling stations in certain rural regions; and electoral violence.

4) Transparency International – Zambia

Transparency International-Zambia (TI-Z), founded in 2000, is a local chapter of the international anticorruption movement – Transparency International. TI-Z is not for-profit non-governmental organization with a registered office in Lusaka. The focus on TI-Z’s programming is anti-corruption. The organization continues to implement program in the area of Good Governance, Capacity Building, and Research and Advocacy with the overall goal of developing “institutions of integrity” in Zambia. In the context of the 2011 Zambian election, TI-Z has been a strong proponent of the PVT as an integrity-ensuring and potentially conflict-mitigating measure. Regarding programming focused on the election, TI-Z is implementing an Anti-Corruption Civic and Voter Education Campaign, a one year (2010-2011) initiative focused on anti-corruption civic education and empowering campaigns for the electorate and stakeholders before, during and after elections. The project goal is to empower citizens and stakeholders with the necessary civic education on promoting transparency, accountability and integrity in the electoral process which encourages adhering to principles of integrity and an effective electoral system in Zambia.

5) Zambia National Women’s Lobby (ZNWL)

The Zambia National Women’s Lobby promotes women’s participation in politics through lobbying, advocacy, and capacity building. The group has 3,500 members, with representatives from each of the nine provinces sitting on the board. Zambian women who aspire to politics are identified then provided leadership development and practical courses such as campaign skills, public speaking, and dealing with the media. The group then promotes the most qualified women among the members of their chosen political parties, lobbying for them to get adopted as candidates. Those selected receive campaign support such as resource mobilization and the creation of media strategies. After elections, the Lobby works on retention strategies for the women elected to office.

The Lobby conducts civic education to dispel myths and encourage women to support and vote for each other. Women are urged to vote with their own minds, and told they don’t have to automatically follow the electoral choice of their husband, father, or village chief. To counter the idea that only men are true leaders, the Lobby does leadership training for young women in Grades 10, 11 and 12. There are leadership clubs in some 45 schools, supplemented by boys’ network clubs that help support female empowerment.

Regarding the upcoming elections, ZNWL said Zambia is enduring a period of “political poverty,” filled with vote buying, commercialized elections, a polarized media, and an electoral commission not believed to be autonomous from the government and ruling party.

6) Zambia Centre for Dispute Resolution (ZCDR)

The Zambia Centre for Dispute Resolution, co-located with the Law Association of Zambia, provides alternative dispute resolution services (i.e. mediation and arbitration) in Zambia. The center deals with a wide range of cases going through the court system,
including contracts, labor laws, and social and land issues. The center has the capacity to train people in mediation, and would be available to help support electoral dispute resolution. An interviewee said the center could definitely play a role in that but hasn’t been invited to. “Most of our politicians don’t know we exist — they only think of the traditional court system,” he said. Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) has gained traction in recent decades in countries throughout the world to help combat court case backlog and expand citizens’ access to justice. ADR provides a fast and fair alternative to battling out cases in court, and can be used to help deal with election-related conflict in an expeditious manner.

7) Zambia Land Alliance (ZLA)

The Zambia Land Alliance is a network of NGOs advocating for fair land policies and laws. The alliance began as a committee in 1997 to coordinate activities of member NGOs. The vision of the group is to help create a Zambia “in which the rural and urban poor have secured access, ownership and control of land for development.” They do this through lobbying and advocacy, research, awareness raising, networking, and community partnership.

Tensions over land continue to build in Zambia, creating “long-term conflict issues” and triggers for potential violence, ZLA says. Zambia’s poor are most likely to suffer from loss of land through customary land rights not being recognized, or large-scale land acquisitions pushing them off their land in order to conduct mining, tourism (particularly game ranching) or agriculture (particularly for production of bio-fuel crops like Jatropha).

Under the Zambian Land Act of 1995, all land is vested in the Zambian president, who also appoints the lands commissioner (the person in charge of land acquisitions). The ZLA has been pushing for reforms including the creation of an independent body to administer and apportion land, consultation with local communities when allocating land, and formalization of customary land and mining rights. They succeeded in getting several provisions into the Draft Constitution later rejected by Parliament.

8) The Media Institute of Southern Africa (MISA) - Zambia

The Media Institute of Southern Africa in Zambia is an NGO dedicated to promoting freedom of expression, media diversity, and legal protections for journalists. MISA-Zambia, in existence since 1996, is part of the broader MISA organization, based in Namibia, which also includes 10 other chapters in southern Africa.

MISA has faced attacks from both the ruling party and the opposition in response to public comments about the elections. “The environment has gone so bad – this year is the worst in terms of the pressures,” an interviewee said. MISA observed there is a lot of dissatisfaction in Zambia, especially among young voters, which has the current government feeling threatened. Many of the urban and unemployed youth have been drawn to the opposition, which has promised to create jobs, reduce taxes, and improve economic conditions, MISA said.

MISA believes the Zambian media has not been meeting its responsibility to cover the entire electoral process, including scrutiny of the candidates and intelligent coverage of the issues. The state-run media is merely reproducing government propaganda – verbatim press releases will apparently get dumped under the generic byline of “special
correspondent” – with many reporters fearful of rocking the boat. Private-run media has also become excessively partisan, MISA said.

9) Southern African Center for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (SACCORD)

The Southern African Center for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes was formed in 1999 as a regional organization inspired by ACCORD in South Africa. It focuses on peacebuilding and conflict management; accountability and good governance; and human rights and elections. SACCORD participated in election monitoring in 2001, 2006 and 2008, and is among NDI’s group of eight election monitors for 2011. SACCORD is also currently working on building a violence index to predict flashpoints for possible conflict in Zambia.

SACCORD is deeply concerned about the cleavages developing in Zambian society, particularly as related to increased identification along tribal lines. Zambia’s history as a peaceful nation, while clearly a positive characteristic, also leads to complacency and a lack of rigorous analysis of potential for significant conflict, SACCORD said. “Nobody pays serious attention to the possibility of electoral violence in this country,” an interviewee said. “The way things could eventually erupt will shock a lot of people.”

SACCORD pointed to a number of worrying trends and potential triggers, including the desperation of the ruling party to stay in power; the desperation of the PF due to this being Michael Sata’s “last chance” for the presidency; abuses of state resources; tolerance of corruption and vote buying; an inflammatory media; and police officers loyal to the ruling party who may not apply their power evenly in the case of violence or disturbances. Increasingly hostile rhetoric is also a concern. An interviewee said a senior person in the current government told him that “over our dead bodies will the opposition win – as a responsible government we can’t let someone like Sata in.” Similarly, a senior PF member told him that, “This time, we will not take this lying down. If this election is stolen from us we won’t restrain our cadres from claiming what is rightly ours.”

SACCORD said it is seeing “much more intolerance and intimidation” than ever by the ruling party this year. “We have moved 20 years into our multi-party democracy, yet we seem to have come full circle back to where we started,” the interviewee said.

SACCORD believes that proper results management and dealing with electoral conflicts as quickly as possible will be keys to preventing serious conflict. Given the lack of confidence in the state judiciary, an interviewee said discontented people may think, “if this is just going to court, we won’t get justice, so we are better off taking to the streets.”

c. Faith-Based Organizations

Faith-based organizations are among the leaders of Zambian civil society, and have extensive reach in both urban and rural areas throughout the country. Reports estimate that at least 80 to 85% of the Zambian population belongs to some form of Christianity, and many of the largest CSOs have a Christian foundation. The Roman Catholic Church is the largest single denomination in Zambia, with other well-established groups including the Protestants, Anglicans, Baptists and Methodists. Additionally, there are groups practicing Islam, Hinduism, Judaism, Baha’ism and traditional indigenous religions in Zambia.
1) Christian Coalition

The Christian Coalition is a political advocacy group focused on getting Christians more involved in Zambian government and bringing more integrity to public office. Politics in Zambia historically have been seen as “a dirty game,” according to an interviewee, and the Christian Coalition fights this notion by teaching that it’s possible for Zambians to be politicians and “good Christians.”

The Coalition, which was formed in 2004, participates in voter education by organizing youth forums to discuss democracy, practice critical thinking when evaluating political candidates, and engage in constructive debate. The projects are focused in Lusaka, Luapula, and, most aggressively, Copperbelt Province. To combat the problem of youth manipulation in the electoral environment, the Coalition emphasizes to youth that it’s not their job to prop up the candidates but rather the candidates’ job to win their support based on the issues.

The Coalition also aims to try to “pacify the political environment,” promoting the idea that government should be seen as “one team” and that the best thing for Zambians to do is to work together and help, instead of antagonize, whichever party is in power. He bemoaned how partisan he feels the media as well as civil society organizations have become, and criticized some Catholic priests he said have been wrongfully bringing politics to the pulpit.

On the “Christian Nation” debate, the Coalition supports keeping this clause in the Zambian Constitution.

2) Caritas Zambia

Caritas Zambia, an organization under the Catholic Bishops’ Conference, engages with social, political and economic issues affecting the lives of Zambians. Programming focuses on three areas: governance and human rights, sustainable livelihoods, and economic and environmental justice.

In the area of governance and human rights, Caritas works with Parliament, promotes Zambians’ increased participation in democracy, and provides legal education to communities so they can protect themselves against abuses, such as by police, tribal chiefs, and each other. An interviewee said the police, who suffer from very limited training in human rights and community policing, are known for corruption, intimidation, assault, and unlawful arrest, especially in rural areas.

In the election sphere, Caritas provides voter education and election monitoring. Their voter education programs focus on teaching citizens about their right to vote and helping them evaluate candidates based on integrity and political records.

The Catholic Church in Zambia has faced mounting criticism from the MMD and others in this pre-election period for its vocal opposition to current government policies. Caritas said the government is simply threatened by the Church’s tendency to speak the truth. “The Catholic Church has a very strong voice on social issues: We urge people to question why they are poor, and to analyze political decisions, corruption, and abuse of power,” the interviewee said. The Church in Zambia has also argued against the “Christian Nation” clause in the Constitution, as it “infringes on the rights of others,” Caritas said.
3) Evangelical Fellowship of Zambia
The Evangelical Fellowship of Zambia is a mother body for the evangelical faith, with a membership of 250 evangelical denominations. The Fellowship’s goal is to foster unity among all these communities in Zambia while also working on social issues such as poverty reduction, HIV/AIDS intervention, and tracking the government on the Millennium Development Goals. The Fellowship collaborates closely on social issues with other Christian and Catholic groups in Zambia.

On the election front, the Fellowship conducts election monitoring and voter education. They train election monitors, sponsor seminars and workshops about the elections, use the media to encourage Christians to vote, and provide election information to church leaders who then go back to speak with their congregations about the issues. The Fellowship also utilizes their extensive network of volunteers throughout the country to do door-to-door voter education.

The Fellowship is also working to help create a more peaceful environment around the upcoming elections by encouraging dialogue between the political parties and urging all church leaders to continue preaching peace to their congregations. “Whatever the church leader says, the people believe,” an interviewee said. “They have tremendous positive influence.”

On the “Christian Nation” debate, the Fellowship is firm in its support for keeping the clause in the Constitution. “Zambia is a Christian nation – that is our strength,” an interviewee said.

4) The Jesuit Centre for Theological Reflection (JCTR)
The Jesuit Centre for Theological Reflection, launched in 1988, is a research, education and advocacy team that promotes study and action on issues linking Christian faith and social justice in Zambia and Malawi. The center encourages gender equality, empowerment of local communities, and increased resources for the poor. They concentrate on urban and rural development, faith and justice, economic policy (including public finance laws), and community outreach.

Under the faith and justice program, JCTR works to link public policy to values. In the election space, the Center writes about electoral issues, helps with monitoring and logistics, and conducts workshops on leadership qualities.

The JCTR believes the environment has not been created for free and fair elections in Zambia due to the failure of the Draft Constitution (JCTR supported the effort though opposes inclusion of the “Christian Nation” clause and the death penalty); mismanagement of public resources; campaigning before the official launch date; failure to fully implement the electoral code; and a lack of democracy within political parties.

Coupled with the grave economic situation, these factors are all potential triggers of significant conflict and even violence, an interviewee said. “We are generally a peaceful nation, but we can’t keep assuming that this will always be the case,” she said. “People are getting very tired of the lack of economic development. The government really senses a threat this year, and could incite some violence by unleashing its cadres.”

d. Media Organizations
The Zambian media environment is highly polarized and may serve as a crucial trigger for potential conflict. Public media outlets controlled by the state provide blatantly biased coverage favoring the ruling party, while the privately run media has gone to the other extreme in favoring the opposition. Both types of media are blamed for negative, divisive, and inflammatory reporting that has contributed to a tense and sensitive electoral environment. One factor contributing to this is the lack of sophisticated reporting by the Zambian media, in particular lack of issue-based coverage in favor of personal attacks on particular candidates.

Reporters in Zambia face significant pressures on their freedom of speech and expression. Zambian authorities make use of several laws, including libel and security laws, to intimidate journalists. Defaming the president is a criminal offense. Self-censorship is rampant, in response to such punishment for those who dare to produce independent or free-thinking journalism. Moreover, and again tied to the economy, many journalists often file these stories if for no other reason than to retain their job.

In addition to the lack of access to objective news sources throughout the country, there is a general lack of access to news sources other than radio once outside the urban “line of rail” connecting Livingstone to the Copperbelt. Community radio stations, which are often donor-driven, provide programming in English as well as local languages, and often include a wider range of voices. Yet one observer said these stations also face significant control by the current government, which has threatened to rescind their licenses if they give too much coverage to the opposition.

C. Electoral Environment Factors

In assessing the conflict dynamics involving the stakeholders above, three additional factors must be considered: 1) location; 2) electoral phase; and 3) intensity.

1. Locations and Electoral Phase

a. Pre-Election Phase

In recent by-elections, Pre-Election Phase conflict has occurred in the following constituencies: Serenje, Mufumbwe, Chifubu, Milanozi, Chilanga and Mpulungu. In Western Province, the issue of unfulfilled autonomy for this region as promised in the 1964 agreement has provoked protests that have recently resulted in deaths and the arrest of more than 200 people. The area is the least developed in the country and the people feel disenfranchised with rising disdain for the MMD and government. In the Southern Province, there were clashes with the police recently that were not political but, because of the heavy-handed rules of engagement employed by the ZPS, public resentment of the police remains palatable. The elections could be a platform for this resentment to re-emerge in further protests and clashes. The MMD dominates in the Eastern Province, so confrontation there should be minimal. The large urban areas of Lusaka and Copperbelt Provinces are predominantly in PF hands, but the MMD can be expected to campaign aggressively in those locations creating vulnerabilities for conflict.

Below the level of the constituency, specific venues are at risk. For example, in the Pre-Election Phase cadres are vying for control over the local bus stations and markets. These
areas are lucrative sources of revenue for the cadres who will extort money from vendors to pay their enforcers. They also have the greatest number of people moving through them so political canvassing and advertising will reach many people in such locations. Currently, MMD cadres, resulting from greater financial resources held by the party and larger numbers of enforcers, have taken control of these areas. Clashes between MMD and PF cadres are also possible in these venues.

b. Election Day Phase

Election Day is expected to be largely peaceful with the prospect of conflict linked to locations of electoral malpractice or perceptions of malpractice as cited above; or the closeness of contests in given constituencies and attempts to disrupt voting or suppress turnout in opponents’ stronghold polling stations.

Another vulnerability for potential Election Day clashes is where the contests may be close or where electoral malpractice may occur on Election Day, in turn provoking Post-Election Phase conflict in both cases. To determine the first type of risk location, results from the 2008 presidential election have been used as a measure of “closeness of contest.” The table below shows those constituencies where the spread was less than 5 percentage points between the first and second; and the second and third place candidates. The third column shows locations where electoral malpractice has been observed, which may increase likelihood of conflict in reaction to this malpractice. Electoral malpractice and conflict have implications for Election Day security, but more so, for Post-Election Phase conflict resulting from perceived or actual electoral malpractice.

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<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Constituency – First and Second Place Closeness (Pre-Election)</th>
<th>Constituency – Second and Third Place Closeness (Pre-Election)</th>
<th>Constituency - Malpractice Locations (Post-Election)</th>
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<td>Chisamba Katuba Keembe Mumbwa Muchinga</td>
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### Electoral Peacebuilding in Zambia – Assessment Final Report

**Creative Associates International**

**July 2011**

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Given the finality of the polling stations count and the public posting of these results, conflict during ballot tabulation during the evening hours of Election Day in the “close contest constituencies” should also be noted as possible and as having occurred in past elections.

**c. Post-Election Phase**

In addition to the malpractice locations cited above, the ZPS has designated the following areas a high risk in the Post-Election Phase:

- Lusaka - Matero Compound (both parties represented here), Garden Compound (police no go area), Chawana Compound, and Bauleri Compound.
- Copperbelt - Ndola and Kitwe

### 2. Intensity

This study employs the system for coding the levels of electoral conflict developed by the academics Scott Straus and Charles Taylor, where electoral conflict can be coded a scale of 0 to 3, with 0 representing no conflict and 3 representing the most serious violence involving 20 or more deaths. The Zambia experience can be coded as 1. As described by Straus and Taylor, Code 1 is represented by “violent harassment, indicated by police breaking up rallies, party supporters fighting, street brawls, opposition newspapers being confiscated and limited short-term arrest of political opponents.”

### D. Electoral Threat Profile Summary

Threats to a peaceful election appear to be motivated by the closeness of the presidential contest and the integrity of the electoral process. Related to these factors are enabling vulnerabilities such as the lack of political finance regulation, a weak political party legal framework, the use of state resources for political purposes, police public order management, and ineffective resolution of disputed electoral outcomes, creating a grievance-rich environment to motivate conflict by different stakeholders.
1. **Pre-Election Phase**

The primary threat for the pre-election phase is posed by use by political parties of youth ‘cadres’ to intimidate and harass competing party voters, supporters, and representatives. Parties are also likely to deploy these cadres to disrupt campaign events as well as informal gatherings of competing parties. Although use of these tactics by the UPND cannot be ruled out, the most likely perpetrators are the MMD and PF.

PF strongholds in Lusaka and Copperbelt may be inflicted with conflict from MMD cadres. And, restive residents in the Western Province may leverage the visibility of the electoral campaign to press their demands for autonomy through street actions. The performance of the ZPS in public order management will be a key factor in whether these street actions or others are managed or expand into rioting and looting.

In this Phase, the likely targets of conflict include candidates, political party supporters, election observers, journalists, and security forces.

2. **Election Day**

The primary threats for Election Day are disruptions of voting at polling stations perceived as strongholds for a particular party. These disruptions could be perpetrated by the MMD, PF, or UPND, although the first two are the more likely drivers of Election Day conflict. The overarching motives involving the closeness of contests and electoral malpractice could also provide conflict in locations where the constituency results are uncertain or malpractice is observed.

In this Phase, the likely targets of conflict include poll workers, political party supporters, election observers, and journalist

3. **Post-Election Phase**

Threats during the Post-Election Phase will be motivated by electoral outcomes, the ZPS public order management performance, and the fairness of adjudication of disputed outcomes. Two Post-Election Phase scenarios can be framed. A PF win could provoke the MMD to send its cadres into PF strongholds, such as Lusaka and Copperbelt, to assault PF supporters. By contrast, an MMD victory by a close margin could spur the PF into mass street protests that could expand into rioting and looting, largely depending upon the profile and effectiveness of the ZPS response.

In this Phase, the likely targets of conflict include government officials and facilities, ECZ officials and facilities, and commercial establishments as well as political party supporters and security forces

4. **Tactics and Weapons**

The tactics employed by the political party cadres include physical assault, threats of sexual assault, intimidation, property damage, and extortion. Vote buying is common and should be considered as a form of intimidation. The weapons used include clubs, rocks, fists, and by one account axes. Handguns are rarely used, although candidates have been shot during prior electoral cycles.
5. **Intensity**

Although a number of homicides are possible, widespread loss of life has not occurred in the past and is not anticipated in this election. However, physical assaults in the dozens are likely and sexual assault cannot be ruled out. Thousands of voters may be affected by intimidation and vote buying schemes. Depending upon the scale of Post-Election Phase violence, property damage and commercial losses resulting from looting or arson can be anticipated.

**V. Current Initiatives in Electoral Peacebuilding**

This section describes on-going peacebuilding initiatives by state stakeholders, non-state stakeholders, and members of the international community. Each section references how peacebuilding initiatives may serve to mitigate forms of conflict outlined above.

**A. State-Based Initiatives**

1. **Electoral Commission of Zambia**

Under funding from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), technical assistance and capacity building is being provided to the ECZ and the Department of National Registration of the Ministry of Home Affairs. It is a four-year (2009 – 2012), $22.9 million (USD) initiative. The assistance package is intended to improve the following:

- Institutional capacity of the ECZ;
- Implementation of a continuous voter registration;
- Digitalization of the civil registry;
- Review of the legislative framework;
- Facilitate participation of women in electoral processes;
- Enhance effective media monitoring mechanisms;
- Enhance civic, voter education, and domestic observation programs; and
- Enhance the capacity of inter-party dialogue.

In addition, Conflict Management Committees are undergoing new training in mediation skills and dispute adjudication.

2. **Zambia Police Service**

The ZPS is responsible for the preservation of peace; the protection of life and property; the detection of crime; the arrest and prosecution of offenders; and community education and liaison on issues of crime and safety. According to its mission statement, the ZPS is committed to “upholding and applying the law fairly and firmly to all” and “respects individual human rights while recognizing the community’s expectations and obligations.” The ZPS is lead by the Inspector General of Police, and underneath the police commissioners are directors in charge of support service and crime prevention; administration; information technology and communication; human resource
development; medical services; and criminal investigations. The ZPS has a presence in all nine Zambian provinces.

The ZPS has faced accusations of human rights abuses and corruption. A 2010 Human Rights Watch report, for instance, stated that police brutality and torture were routinely being used to extract confessions in prisons across the country. The establishment of more robust grievance mechanisms, to provide open and accessible channels for Zambians across the country to report any type of police abuse, is highly recommended. These mechanisms need to be secure and appropriate for both urban and rural, as well as male and female, constituents. By their own admission the police are undermanned, poorly trained and inadequately equipped to carry out their duties. If these issues were addressed it would go a long way to improving performance and addressing the criticisms raised by international organizations.

The ZPS have established an election training program to retrain police in rules of engagement and also involve political party, ECZ, media, civil society, and church representative in electoral conflict prevention. Its courses include Public Order Management and the Electoral Code of Conduct. At this writing, the training had been given to two teams, one from Lusaka and one from Kitwe. These teams were then to deliver the training to individuals in their regions. Some training is being delivered in collaboration with the European Union (EU) on police response in critical situations. The goal of this training is to ensure that police responses do not inflame the situation but, rather, serve to de-escalate hostilities. One element of this training was focused on monitoring the election results as announced and analyzing them to identify possible “hot spots” where the resources would be best deployed.

In addition, the ZPS is establishing a communications center to act as a point to receive all electoral-related incident reports or complaints from the public on security issues relating to the conduct of the polls countrywide. The center will be equipped with toll free numbers for citizens to report complaints.

B. Non-State-Based Initiatives

1. Political Parties

a. National Democratic Institute

The National Democratic Institute (NDI) is implementing a 15-month program that contains three main programmatic components: (1) Party Agent Training; (2) Women Candidate Leadership Schools; and (3) Election Observation. Through the Party Agent Training activity, works with the MMD, PF and UPND to help the parties develop a national strategy for party agent monitoring. NDI provides guidance on developing this strategy to each individual party and then conducts Training of Trainer (ToT) exercises with representatives from each of the three parties present. The ToTs first occurred in Lusaka (at the national level) and will occur at the Provincial level in late July. Also though this activity NDI will help the parties provide manuals and other materials to 7,500 total party agents. In addition to its elections capacity building focus, the modality of the program – bringing representatives of each party together for the ToT sessions – is meant to address the increasingly polarized (inter-party) environment surrounding the
electoral contest. Through the Women Candidate Leadership Schools activity NDI conducted two four day training activities (one each in Lusaka and the Copperbelt region) for a broad range of women leaders including named candidates, CSO leaders and business women. The trainings provide women with skills related to running a campaign as well as other more general leadership skill sets including how to perform fundraising or manage an advocacy campaign.

The Election Observation activity has two main components. First, NDI helped form a coalition of seven CSOs and one faith based organizations to provide three levels of training (ToTs at the national and provincial level, followed by CSO-led training at the constituency level) that will enable the coalition to deploy up to 9,000 domestic monitoring during the election. Although somewhat based in NDI’s standard domestic monitoring approach of forming coalitions, the specific modality was also selected to in this case mitigate polarization that is occurring within civil society – Zambian CSOs are already partisan in nature yet the high-stakes electoral contest has increased this markedly. The second component involves performing some form of Parallel Vote Tabulation (PVT) with the CSO coalition during the election. The originally intended modality involved the PVT being imbedded in a larger observation mission, with the CSO coalition at the lead of the effort. For two reasons indicative of the political climate, though, NDI has been forced to revise this plan. First, the PVT in general has become highly politicized, due according to some the MMD’s fears of losing the election. Given the projected closeness of the race between MMD and the PF, the MMD may view the PVT as a threat to its ability to achieve victory. As a result, NDI has received substantial pushback from the MMD – including opposition to its registration in-country – in part as a result of its intention to conduct the PVT. Second, the fragmentation of and polarization within the CSO coalition generated doubt that they could manage the count in a transparent manner; that is, NDI felt too many spoilers existed that could derail or taint the process. As a result of these two factors, NDI is exploring other implementation modalities for the PVT, which due to the political sensitivities it is now referring to as “Sample-Based Observation” (SBO). These potential new approaches, to be finalized, include using a select few of the CSOs in the coalition or recruiting a new CSO.

b. Zambia Centre for Inter-Party Dialogue

The Zambia Centre for Inter-party Dialogue (ZCID) was formally founded in 2006 as a trust with the overall goal of enhancing the capabilities of political parties, enhancing dialogue between parties, and further institutionalizing laws and regulations related to political party registration, finance and operations in the constitution. The ZCID is comprised of professional staff and a Board that consists of representatives from all political parties, with and without representation in Parliament. The ZCID implements two main program activities. First, through the “Cross-Party Program,” ZCID facilitates meeting and dialogue between parties on “issues of national interest” including but not limited to constitutional revisions and development policy. Second, through the “Bilateral Support Program,” ZCID provides support to individual parties in the form of training and assistance in strategic planning, as well as small grants, to enhance their overall institutional capacity. Due to the lack of formal political party finance guidelines, one way in which ZCID has attempted to instill the norms of proper financial stewardship in grant recipients is through requiring documentation of expenses and staggering
funding in tranches. Moreover, ZCID attempted to bring parties to consensus on content of and procedures for passing a new constitution; however, these efforts largely failed, due primarily to “partisan disagreements.”

c. Other Initiatives

Other initiatives by CSOs and faith-based organizations can be cross-referenced in the previous Stakeholder Analysis section.

VI. Electoral Peacebuilding Framework

The Electoral Peacebuilding Framework provides recommendations for short-term measures that can be taken to address potential conflict related to the 2011 elections cycle as well as structural reforms for longer-term electoral peacebuilding.

A. Recommendations Specific to the 2011 Electoral Contest

A pre-election agreement among political parties, CSOs, and faith-based organizations supporting peaceful electoral practices can be leveraged to dampen conflict and provide a national platform for mediating major electoral disputes, such as the electoral outcomes. However, the situation lacks an overarching “honest broker,” that is, an individual, organization, or group of organizations capable of bringing together and reconciling the differences between the opposing sides. Such an agreement could be internationally negotiated by the African Union (AU) or the Southern African Development Community (SADC) or led by domestic stakeholders. In either case, it is intended to provide a platform to initiate other measures to prevent, manage, or mediate electoral conflict not found in the current peacebuilding activities. The creation of the agreement should be accompanied by public statements from all political leaders and the president supporting peaceful elections.

Other activities of the Electoral Peacebuilding Framework can be considered and are described below.

1. State-Based Initiatives

a. Electoral Commission of Zambia

Measures should be taken to more effectively obtain behavioral compliance with the Electoral Code of Conduct and to communicate the improved ECZ capacities to the political parties and voting public. Two specific activities should be undertaken. First, the Political Party Liaison Committee (PPLC) should be strengthened to provide communications and transparency in ECZ decisions and actions. This Committee can also adopt a protocol for an agreed upon role in enforcing the provisions of the Electoral Code of Conduct and serve as the host for political debates. The PPLC can serve as a conflict prevention and mediation instrument during all three Phases of the electoral cycle. Second, the ECZ should adopt a program of strategic communications with the voting public in order to convey information about the procedural improvements that
have been made and for responses to mis-information and dis-information. The ECZ should receive institutional and technical support to develop the capacity to generate and implement such a plan. The dividends for an effective strategic communications program are paid in inhibiting Post-Election Phase conflict generated by a lack of confidence in the veracity of the outcomes.

Also important to managing Post-Election Phase conflict is the manner in which the results of the elections have been announced, reflecting the physical time that it takes to relay the outcomes from polling station to tabulation center to headquarters depending upon the location within the country. The resulting changes in the rankings of the presidential candidates has created uncertainty and provoked street actions by supporters of the losing candidate. The ECZ has instituted a results management system employing an electronic transfer of results and postings to the ECZ web site. However, the ECZ should also announce to the public the likely sequencing of results received by Province. As a message for the strategic communication program, the ECZ should explain the reporting protocols to the public and create realistic expectations on how patterns of candidate’s votes will accumulate.

The ECZ also reports that further assistance is required to disseminate voter education messages via the electronic media and community radio stations. The ECZ should receive institutional and technical support to develop the capacity to generate such messages.

In order to provide the ECZ with greater confidence of their own improvements, a capacity review could be conducted by the Association of African Administrators (AAEA). Following a positive assessment, the AAEA should make a public statement conveying to the Zambian voters a good report card on the capacity and procedures of the ECZ. In order to bolster confidence of ECZ administrators and provide peer guidance for their Post-Election Phase challenges, election administrators from the AAEA or other reputable election commissions could also be present at the ECZ on Election Day.

As noted above, youth are actively recruited as the agents of conflict. In order to take these individuals off of the streets and integrate them into the process of electoral administration, the ECZ should consider a campaign to recruit youth as poll workers. This model was recently employed in Nigeria, where the Nigerian National Youth Corps were employed as poll workers. In Somaliland, university students have been employed as voter registrars and poll workers.

With respect to electoral dispute, there is no single repository of information about the disputes adjudicated by the DCMCs. For example, in a research attempt to examine and profile the 76 complaints received in 2008, it was discovered that these complaints records all remained at the District-level and could not be assembled into a single repository for the purposes of this report. The NCMC should develop a national database of complaints so that these matters and be profiled and patterns of complaints mapped.

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has developed a database framework for monitoring electoral which could be employed by the NCMC for documentation and analysis purposes. This framework involves the following entries: 1) Activity; 2) Election-Related Violation; 3) Legal Provision; 4) Defendant; 5) Who Can Complain; 6) Where; 7) Deadline for Complaints; 8) Deadline for Consideration; 9) Appeal; and 10) Sanction. Such a database would allow the NCMC and DCMCs to
identifies patterns of complaints and engage in preventative actions or deploy their adjudication assets accordingly.

b. Zambia Police Service

The ZPS is currently receiving some training pertinent to public order management and elections. However, the extent and effectiveness of these measures is uncertain. In particular, reports indicate that prior to initiation of the training, the ZPS was not consulted on specific training needs. Though the training should continue, the capacity of the ZPS to manage public order issues is nonetheless weak. The existing training seems inadequate to address this core shortcoming and address potential problem areas for the 2011 elections. Accordingly, although a complete training needs analysis should be carried out, to ensure short-term effectiveness the ZPS should receive additional training and capacity building in the following areas:

- Training to the police on public order, specifically in areas of crowd control, identifying different types of crowd, identifying and isolating leaders, crowd management use of force continuum, non-lethals options, rules of engagement, conflict prevention and intervention and proper use of equipment;
- Training in intelligence gathering and analysis, so as to identify potential areas of conflict at an early stage;
- Training on rapport-building techniques between police and stakeholders; and
- Provision of the correct equipment fit for purpose and sufficient to equip all police officers. As an example to justify such training, recently the ZPS was issued with Kevlar vests. However, there has never been an incident where a police officer has been shot at, which indicates that this provision and associated use of government resources is waste of money on redundant equipment;

In addition to receiving training and guidance in the areas listed above, there are four further activities that can be taken to assist the ZPS in their election-related duties.

First, the police should receive assistance to develop a layered response plan to unrest that can be escalated as the level of violence against them increases. This assistance should include a Rapid Response Capacity for deployments to manage conflict as it erupts.

Second, the ZPS should develop an integrated election security plan and receive technical assistance to develop the plan. The plan should employ the electoral threat profile described above to deploy enforcement assets and manage conflict.

Third, a Joint Election Security Committee (JESC) should be established involving the ZPS, ECZ, intelligence services, and Conflict Management Committees, and the relevant courts. The JESC provides an institutional platform for a coordinated and integrated response to conflict by the principal state stakeholders. The ACE Electoral Knowledge Network suggests an expanded list of potential participants in security coordination committee activities to include senior election managers; security forces – national and international police and military; civil emergency and rescue services; political party agents; civil society organizations monitoring the election; conflict resolution specialists; women’s groups; and traditional leaders. Under such an arrangement, the election
management body retains the management lead and receives advice from the other representatives on the JESC. Such a configuration of enforcement organizations is illustrated in the diagram below.

And fourth, the call center can be designated as a Joint Election Operations Center (JEOC) to house the activities of the JESC. The call center for JEOC should develop an incident database to record and analyze the data collected. Below is an example of the format for such a database as employed by the Electoral Violence Education and Resolution (EVER) program of the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location of Violence</th>
<th>Polling Station, Registration Office, Election Commission office, Other Election Office/Facility, Political Party Office, Media Office, Private Home, Street/Public Area, Vote Counting Center, Authorized public campaign location, Non-election state office or property, Other.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Type of Violence</td>
<td>Murder, Attempted murder, Kidnapping or attempted kidnapping, Physical harm or torture, Sexual assault, Threat of physical harm, Intimidation or psychological abuse, Insult/verbal harassment, Theft, Vandalism, Jail or arbitrary detention, Blackmail, Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victim of Violence</td>
<td>Domestic or external agent of state, Political party or candidate, Election worker, Election monitor, Journalist and media, Voter, Election ballot, material or process, Election office, Political party office, Private property, Non-election state office or property, Bystander, Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perpetrator of Violence</td>
<td>Domestics or external agent of state, Political party or candidate, Militia, Private security actor, Insurgent, Criminal element, Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consequences of Violence</td>
<td>Number of people killed, Number of people wounded, Number of people kidnapped, Voter registration disrupted, Interference with voting and voters left area, Disrupted vote count, Damage or destruction of election property, Damage or destruction of other property, Complaint filed with Electoral Commission, Cancelled election, Postponed election, Rerun election, Other.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2. Non-State Based Initiatives

a. Political Parties

The main political party-based threat to electoral peace is the use of youth cadres to intimidate, harass, and assault voters. Two initiatives should be carried out in an attempt to prevent deployment of youth cadres to perpetrate intimidation and violence.

First, faith-based organizations, CSOs, and other respected interlocutors should implement a public campaign to “name and shame” the organizers and the perpetrators of violence. The goal of this campaign is to deter parties from employing youth as tools of violence. Second, CSOs and faith-based organizations should receive assistance to implement a radio-based information messaging campaign that contains two key components – (1) radio spots urging political parties not to employ youth as a tool for violence; and (2) radio spots raising awareness of youth of the negative consequences of their involvement in such acts.

A proposed role for the PPLC was discussed above to develop the Committee into an instrument for information and exchanges between parties and the ECZ; as a platform for political party mediation activities; and as an enforcement mechanism for the Code of Conduct.

b. Civil Society Organizations

A philosophical and sometimes partisan divide among members of the CSO community in Zambia has led to heightened tensions in this electoral period. There are, generally speaking, two camps of CSOs: 1) those who view themselves as an extension of the government and their mission is to fill in any gaps in official “service delivery,” and 2) those who have placed themselves in a watchdog stance to critique the government and promote reform. In some cases, these groups are clearly aligned with specific political parties and promoting partisan interests; in others, the groups may be perceived as partisan but are mainly just adhering to their philosophical preference. Though some of the differences are acute, there is significant common ground among all of the CSOs interviewed when it comes to overall mission to support, educate, protect, and improve the lives of Zambians. This common ground needs to be nurtured and expanded upon to create a less divisive environment among these non-state actors, which could have a positive impact on the overall electoral environment as these actors work together to prevent escalating tensions as well as effectively manage natural electoral conflict that will arise.

The activities of these CSOs relevant to the elections are described in the Stakeholder Analysis section. Thematically in keeping with other proposals, the activities of CSOs to monitor, educate, and mediate should be coordinated and geographically mapped in order to identify the type and reach of CSO services during the election period.

c. Faith-Based Organizations

The recommendations for CSOs mentioned above also apply for faith-based organizations in Zambia. However, faith-based organizations are in a stronger position to provide moral leadership on the political party cadre issue and to promote fair and
transparency campaign and political finance activities. Additionally, collaboration with the major faith-based organizations is recommended to utilize their vast nationwide networks of volunteers to help support voter education and the promotion of the “peaceful elections” message.

d. Media Organizations

There is an urgent need for increased technical, ethical, and “peacebuilding” training for Zambian journalists at both public and private media institutions. Nearly every stakeholder interviewed mentioned the polarizing role played by the media, and when the question of what might create potential violence in the election period was posed, irresponsible reporting by the media was repeatedly cited. Media organizations can play a positive role in rumor control and correcting mis-information and dis-information. These organizations should adopt a protocol on the announcement of electoral results that is coordinated with the ECZ’s results management program.

Training should reach as many reporters and editors as possible, and focus on teaching writing, investigating, and interviewing skills while also weaving in modules on freedom of expression, press responsibilities, and techniques for de-escalating conflict. Ideally, some of this training would occur during this current electoral cycle. One-on-one mentoring by international journalists outside Zambia should also be encouraged, especially during the election season to provide technical and other support. It is also recommended that aid agencies support Zambian media associations already focused on issues involving freedom of speech and legal protections for journalists. The Media Institute of Southern Africa (MISA-Zambia) is deemed a suitable partner for collaboration in these endeavors.

Capacity building specifically for community radio stations is also recommended. Earlier this year, a South African-based media consultant delivered a one-day workshop titled “Zambia Community Radio Ethics in Elections” for Chipata-based radio stations in Eastern Province. Supporting similar endeavors, particularly in districts likely to face close races, is encouraged.

Long-term changes are additionally required to address structural vulnerabilities in Zambia’s media landscape. Progressive legal and ownership mechanisms must be implemented over time to diminish the power of the state to interfere in editorial operations and unduly control and influence media content.

e. Traditional Leaders

Zambia’s traditional chiefs are respected leaders across the country and continue to exert significant influence over their constituents. Levels of coercion and actual control over voting patterns are uncertain in the current system of free elections, but research has shown that voters from chiefdoms will indeed consider which politician has the most established relationship with their chief. This underlies possible vulnerabilities including political manipulation as well as potentially weak senses of autonomy and independence by voters themselves. As such, the following could be implemented: anti-corruption campaigns to delineate what type of quid-pro-quo is acceptable (or not); stronger enforcement of the electoral code as pertaining to issues of bribery and undue influence; and increased voter education in rural areas to ensure voters in chiefdoms are fully aware
of their voting rights. Additional research on the role and impact of traditional leaders in elections is recommended, as well as programming to strengthen democratic tendencies as well as leadership and conflict resolution skills among the traditional chiefs themselves.

Traditional leaders can play positive roles in electoral education, Get-Out-The-Vote activities on Election Day, and in mediation of Post-Election disputes.

3. Electoral Peacebuilding Framework Activity Summary Matrix

A summary matrix showing the state and non-state program activities to prevent, manage, or mediate electoral conflict is shown below. Although these activities may occur in different Phases of the Electoral Cycle, Preventative activities will have their emphasis in the Pre-Election Phase, Management activities are focused on the Election Day, and Mediation activities are initiated in the Post-Election Phase.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stakeholder</th>
<th>Prevention</th>
<th>Management</th>
<th>Mediation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>State</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Regulatory</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral Commission of Zambia</td>
<td>Inclusive voter registration initiative</td>
<td>Electoral results management</td>
<td>International advisor presence at ECZ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Merit selection of poll workers</td>
<td>Strategic communications program</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Recruitment of youth as poll workers</td>
<td>International advisor presence at ECZ</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Improved training of poll workers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strategic communications program</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Management Committees</td>
<td>Electoral dispute adjudication training</td>
<td>Electoral dispute adjudication</td>
<td>Electoral dispute adjudication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Electoral dispute database</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Security</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia Police Service</td>
<td>Improved training and rules of engagement</td>
<td>Effective public order management</td>
<td>Effective public order management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Join Election Security Committee</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Joint Election Operations Center</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Electoral incident database</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### B. Structural Reforms

In addition to the Framework activities outlined above aimed specifically at the 2011 elections, the following structural reforms can be undertaken to reduce the vulnerabilities of electoral conflict in future electoral cycles.

- Amend the presidential system into two-rounds of balloting in order to assure that the successful candidate is supported by a majority of voters.
- Amend the electoral system to reduce the “winner-take-all” dimension of FPTP and allow for more representation by women and smaller parties.
- Institutionalize the recruitment of youth as voter registrars and poll workers by establishing a quota system for their involvement and recruitment activities in schools.
• Introduce political finance regulations to require disclosure of sources and expenditures; prohibition on foreign sources; prohibitions on the use of state resources; spending ceilings for political campaigns; and provide public funding for qualifying parties.

• Create and enforce penalties for vote buying that include both the voter and those providing the payments.

• Conduct public hearings on boundary delimitation and establish clear and transparent criteria to guide the drawing of new district lines.

• Diversify the appointment process for the ECZ membership, with the president naming the chair and one member, the National Assembly naming one member, and civil society and faith-based organizations naming the balance of the membership.

• Amend the electoral dispute resolution mechanism to permit petitions to be filed and adjudicated before the government is seated.

VII. Conclusions

Electoral conflict appears as a contradiction in any otherwise peaceful Zambian society. While the intensity of electoral conflict has been low, there remain underlying vulnerabilities that keep such conflict a persistent concern. These vulnerabilities have both a behavioral and institutional dimension that must be addressed in order to be eliminated. First, over the course of time, political behaviors such as the cadre tactics, a subordinate role for women in governance, and vote buying have become acceptable, to some degree, with the Zambian polity. Social marketing programs to encourage and incentivize changes in behaviors are necessary to make these practices unacceptable in the public mind.

While state institutional fragility is a larger question in Zambia, the focus on the capacities of the ECZ and ZPS are the key electoral security stakeholders. With these organizations there are persistent concerns about impartiality and performance. The existing capacity building programs are essential to both correct the public image and build-up the legitimate performance abilities of these organizations.

As demonstrated in this report, there are many activities currently underway that should reduce electoral conflict. However, these disparate efforts should be linked with a loosely integrated and coordinated approach to assure that there is sufficient program topical coverage and reach throughout the Electoral Cycle. With such an approach in Zambia, the prospect of peaceful elections is increased, credibility of the election is enhanced, and the quality of governance is improved.
Annex One – Team Biographies and Organizational Profiles

i. Creative Associates International

Creative Associates International (Creative), a women-owned professional and technical services firm, is a leading implementer of democracy and capacity building projects in complex conflict and post-conflict settings. It has been providing USAID with evaluation and assessment expertise for more than 30 years, and also brings extensive on-the-ground experience in electoral education, integrity and administration and a strong roster of long-term and short-term technical experts exceptionally versed in electoral administration.

Jeff Fischer, Team Leader and Election Security Specialist

Jeff Fischer currently serves as a Senior Advisor for the Electoral Education and Integrity Program at Creative. Through Creative, Mr. Fischer led the development of the Electoral Security Framework – Technical Guidance Handbook for Democracy and Governance Officers.

Mr. Fischer has held three internationally appointed positions in post-conflict electoral transitions. In 1996, he was appointed by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to serve as Director General of Elections for the first post-conflict elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In 1999, Mr. Fischer was appointed by the United Nations (UN) as Chief Electoral Officer for the Popular Consultation for East Timor. And, in 2000, Mr. Fischer received a joint appointment from the UN and OSCE to head the Joint Registration Taskforce in Kosovo and served as the OSCE’s Director of Election Operations in Kosovo. Additionally, Mr. Fischer served as a senior advisor to the UN and Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq for the three electoral events conducted during the 2005 electoral cycle.

Since 1987, Mr. Fischer has participated in electoral assistance, observation, or conference projects in over 50 countries and territories in the Americas, Europe, Middle East, Africa, and Asia. Much of this participation was through his 16 year association with the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) as Executive Vice President, Senior Advisor, and in various consulting roles. Mr. Fischer has also served as a municipal and state election official in the United States as both a Commissioner on the Kansas City (Missouri) Election Board (1985 – 1989) and the Missouri Campaign Finance Review Board (1990-1992).

Mr. Fischer has been a Visiting Lecturer in International Affairs at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University teaching a policy seminar on Elections in Fragile States (2006–2010). Mr. Fischer also taught a graduate-level course in the Democracy and Governance Studies Program at Georgetown University (Fall 2010) on International Electoral Policy and Practice.

Patrick Quirk, Elections and Evaluation Specialist

Patrick Quirk is Technical Manager for the Electoral Education and Integrity Practice Area at Creative. Mr. Quirk brings seven years of experience in designing, implementing and evaluating elections, electoral security and media development projects in more than 13 countries including Bolivia, Nicaragua and Somaliland. Mr. Quirk has extensive
experience designing, organizing and implementing electoral assessments. Most recently, he performed two assessments in Somaliland related to the 2010 Presidential elections: (1) an August 2008 Quality Control Assessment of the National Electoral Council’s (NEC) preparations for the 2008-2009 voter registration process; and (2) a July 2009 assessment of the procedures used to develop the Final Voter’s List (FVL). For each assessment Mr. Quirk coordinated in-country logistics, developed the assessment methodology and drafted the final report. Additionally, Quirk organized and implemented a USAID-funded post-electoral assessment following the 2009 Presidential elections in Honduras. Quirk contributed to the design and writing of the Electoral Security Framework Handbook for USAID that describes a methodology for threat assessment, program responses, program management, and metrics. Currently pursuing a Ph.D., Mr. Quirk holds M.A. Degrees in International Affairs and Political Science from American University and John Hopkins University, respectively.

ii. Pax Mondial, Limited

Pax has successfully supported international development operations throughout Africa, delivering security consultancy, intelligence assessments, and risk management services for USAID providers in countries including Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda, Sudan, Ghana, Egypt, Morocco, Libya, Guinea, and Madagascar. Pax staff members understand the unique needs and interests of USAID, and are fully committed to the high standards that USAID projects demand. Additionally, Pax has provided medical, mine action, and construction services across the continent.

John Mclellan, Evaluation and Security Specialist

John Mclellan is a security management professional with extensive international security experience in crisis management, investigations, training and mentoring of staff, transportation and logistics and brings more than 16 years of experience with the Scottish Police Service, where he focused on Investigative Interview techniques training and HOLMES major enquiry system. He was also involved there in election monitoring and controlling ballot boxes after the closure of polling stations. Mr. Mclellan was seconded to the OSCE mission in Kosovo in the immediate aftermath of the war and was part of the first police contingent deployed to establish up and develop a police training school. He was then sent as part of the UN investigative team to East Timor to carry out enquiries into the atrocities that occurred there during the 1999 conflict. As the Corporate Security Manager for the largest gold mine in Central Asia, Mr. Mclellan was responsible for steering the company safely through a period of major civil disorder that resulted in the ousting of the Kyrgyz president in 2005. Mr. Mclellan has passed Advanced Scottish Police exams qualifying him for promotion beyond the rank of inspector. He is a qualified internal auditor, an International Police Instructor, qualified public order and search team officer as well as a negotiator in siege and conflict situations.

Vanessa Arrington Bassett, Senior Conflict Specialist

Vanessa Arrington Bassett is a conflict resolution specialist with extensive experience in conflict and post-conflict countries in the Middle East and Latin America. A certified mediator and Harvard-trained negotiator, she specializes in international conflict management. She served as a mediator with the Boston municipal and district courts and is currently certified with the Virginia Supreme Court. Additionally, Ms. Arrington has
more than a decade of journalism experience, primarily working as a foreign correspondent with the Associated Press in complex conflict environments including Iraq, Egypt, Colombia, Cuba, Bolivia, Peru and Argentina. She has a Bachelor of Arts in Political Science and Communication from Stanford University and an MPA from the Harvard John F. Kennedy School of Government.
Annex Two - Institutions and Organizations Interviewed

**Election Commission**
Electoral Commission of Zambia (ECZ)

**Political Parties**
Advancing Democracy and Development Party (ADD)
Forum for Democracy and Development (FDD)
Movement for Multiparty Democracy Party (MMD)
The National Restoration Party (NAREP)
Patriotic Front Party (PF)
United Party for National Development (UPND)

**Civil Society Organizations**
Zambia Centre for Inter-party Dialogue (ZCID)
Institute for Human Rights and Democratic Governance
National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, Zambia (NDI)
Forum for Leadership Search
Foundation for Democratic Progress (FODEP)
Anti-Voter Apathy Project (AVAP)
Zambia National Women’s Lobby
Zambia Center for Dispute Resolution
Zambia Land Alliance
SACCORD
Federation of Free Trade Unions (FFTU)
Conservation Farming Unit

**Faith-Based Organizations**
Christian Coalition
Caritas Zambia
Evangelical Fellowship of Zambia
Jesuit Centre for Theological Reflection
**Media Organizations**
Media Institute of Southern Africa (MISA)

**Development Agencies and Multilaterals**
Advisor to the ECZ.
Embassy of the Netherlands, Zambia
United Nations Development Program (UNDP) – Elections Sector Personnel
British High Commission
European Union (EU) Delegation
Irish Aid

**Security Sector and Officials**
Zambian Police Service (ZPS)
United States Embassy
G4S
Armcor
United Nations Development Program (UNDP) – Security Sector Personnel
Catholic Relief Services (CRS)

**Meetings Held in Ndola, Copperbelt Province**
NGO Get Involved Zambia
FQML
Annex Three – Acronyms

ACC - Anti-Corruption Commission
ADD - Advancing Democracy and Development Party
AVAP - Anti-Voter Apathy Project – “Making Every Vote Count”
CRS - Catholic Relief Services
CSOs - Civil Society Organizations
DCMC - District Conflict Management Committee
DEO - District Electoral Officer
ECZ - Electoral Commission of Zambia
CoC - Electoral Code of Conduct
EU - European Union
FFTU - Federation of Free Trade Unions
FDD - Forum for Democracy and Development
FLS - Forum for Leadership Search
FODEP - Foundation for Democratic Process
MMD - Movement for Multiparty Democracy Party
NCMC - National Conflict Management Committee
PVT - Parallel Vote Tabulation
PF - Patriotic Front Party
SACCORD - Southern African Center for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes
MISA - The Media Institute of Southern Africa – Zambia
NAREP - The National Restoration Party
TIZ - Transparency International – Zambia
UNDP - United Nations Development Program
UNIP - United National Independence Party
UPND - United Party for National Development
ZLA - Zambia Land Alliance
ZCDR - Zambia Centre for Dispute Resolution
ZNWL - Zambia National Women’s Lobby
ZCID - Zambia Centre for Inter-party Dialogue
ZPS - Zambian Police Service
Annex Four – Media Organizations

State Owned

- Zambia Daily Mail
- Times of Zambia
- Sunday Times of Zambia

News Agency

- Zambia News Agency (Zana)

Television

- Zambia National Broadcasting Corporation (ZNBC)

Radio

- Zambia National Broadcasting Corporation (ZNBC)

Privately Owned

Newspapers

- Post Newspapers Zambia

Radio

- Radio Phoenix
- QFM – Lusaka
- Radio Choice – Lusaka
- Breeze FM – Chipata, in Eastern province
- Radio Icengelo – Church-owned
- Yatsani Radio – Catholic
- Radio Christian Voice

Online

- Zambian Watchdog

Other

- Lusaka Times – An “electronic news platform”
- The New Nation – Weekly tabloid
- The Supreme Times
Annex Five – Mapping

This annex is divided into two sections. First, an overview of and instructions for the Ushahidi platform in general and USAID’s account in particular are provided. Section, the Annex provides maps developed through Ushahidi by Creative specific to and relevant for the 2011 election.

A. THE USHAHIDI PLATFORM

i. General Description

The Ushahidi platform contains an interactive and dynamic map that shows the exact geo-location of each of the constituencies mentioned in the reports. This is actually the added value of platforms such as Ushahidi: to emphasize accurate location data and help the detection of warning signals and their localization on a dynamic map, which is able to show conflict scenarios at the very micro-level and in near real-time. This in turn holds the potential for faster and more targeted responses.

The Ushahidi map is composed of five different parts: the base map [1], the zoom bar [2], the dots on the map [3] representing the reports, the layers button [4], and the hyperlink to a full screen view of the map [5].

To zoom in and out the user can use the Zoom bar on the left side of the map.

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7 Main source used: “USHAHIDI GUIDE. A STEP-BY-STEP GUIDE ON HOW TO USE THE USHAHIDI PLATFORM”.
8 The Layer button is the blue button on the right side of the map, and the one that changes the base layer from one type of map to another, i.e.: options Google, Yahoo, and OpenStreetMap (OSM).

Electoral Peacebuilding in Zambia – Assessment Final Report
Creative Associates International
July 2011
ii. The Reports
The way reports are clustered is by proximity; the more one zooms out, the more reports get aggregated, while the more you zoom in, the more reports will separate one from another and appear as a single dot.

By clicking on a marker, an info window will appear showing the user the title of that report [6].

If the user clicks on a clustered dot, the list of titles of all reports in that area will appear [7], while by clicking on the title, the platform will forward the user to the report itself, where it will be possible to read the entire description of the report [8].
The complete description of the report includes, among other things:

1. Visualization on the map
2. Location of the incident
3. Category/ies associated with the report
4. Description
5. Additional Reports related to that event and/or to other events reported in the nearby.
iii. The Categories

On the right side of the Map there are listed the categories that act as data/information filters. As such, each category indicates a typology of information and this may vary according to the issue that the user intends to monitor.

Some of the categories included in the Zambia deployment have sub-categories that help refine the search and keep a closer eye on specific areas/issues, and in general provide more nuanced ways of looking at the incidents and at the situation in the country from different angles.

For the sake of displaying several categories but keeping the site design simple, the sub-category will not appear automatically but will appear by clicking on the main category they belong to [9].

Note that the category section works in combination with the map. This means that by clicking on “ALL CATEGORIES” users will see all the reports included in the Ushahidi platform, while clicking on a certain category will display only the reports related to that specific category. The same applies to the sub-category. In the current deployment, users can see only one category or subcategory at the time.

iv. Search

The search option is on the top of the toolbar and allows the user to look for specific reports into the Ushahidi platform. By typing into the box the key word the system will give back all the reports that contain that word. In the same way it is possible to look for report related to a specific category or to a specific place.
v. USAID Ushahidi Account and Access

Creative has created an account for USAID to access all maps listed above and be able to produce maps for its own planning purposes surrounding the 2011 Zambian elections.


Step Two: Enter information in ‘email’ and ‘password fields’.

Email: zambiaelections2011@yahoo.com

Password: creativemapping

Step Three: Utilize Ushahidi tools as outlined above and access specific maps as outlined in the section below.

B. Maps for 2011 Zambian Elections

This section provides maps, developed by Creative using the Ushahidi platform and account listed above, specific to and relevant for the 2011 election. The maps presented in this section are screen shots of a general view for the listed categories. All maps are available at http://zambiaelections2011.crowdmap.com, using the log-in instructions listed above. For each of the maps, to view locations of a specific data point – for example, a particular incident of voter intimidation – follow the instructions included in the description preceding each map.

1. Closeness of Contest

As one potential predictor for future conflict, this map uses information from the 2008 presidential election to show those constituencies where contests were decided within five percentage points – between first and second place as well as second and third place. To view the precise location of a particular contest, select the + on the zoom scale on the left of the screen. Doing so will enable you to zoom to the level of street in the given city.
2. Incident by Province

This map shows a summary of incidents of electoral conflict disaggregated by province. To access the map via your Ushahidi account, select on the right column “incidents by province.” To view the location of incidents in a specific province, select the province name in the drop down menu on the right hand column. To view the precise location of a particular incident in a specific province, select the + on the zoom scale on the left of the screen. Doing so will enable you to zoom to the level of street in the given city.
3. Electoral Integrity

As one potential predictor for future conflict, this map shows those areas in which disputes were filed during the 2008 elections. To access the map via your Ushahidi account, select on the right column “hotspots” and then “electoral integrity”. To view the precise location of a given dispute location, select the + on the zoom scale on the left of the screen. Doing so will enable you to zoom to street level in the given city.

![Electoral Integrity Map](image1.png)

4. Type of Perpetrator

This map shows incidents as disaggregated by perpetrator. To access the map via your Ushahidi account, select on the right column “type of perpetrator.” To view the precise location of a particular incident, select the + on the zoom scale on the left of the screen. Doing so will enable you to zoom to street level in the given city.

![Type of Perpetrator Map](image2.png)
5. Type of Incident

This map shows incidents as disaggregated by type of incident. To access the map via your Ushahidi account, select on the right column “type of incident.” To view the precise location of a particular incident, select the + on the zoom scale on the left of the screen. Doing so will enable you to zoom to street level in the given city.
6. Type of Victim

This map shows incidents as disaggregated by type of victim. To access the map via your Ushahidi account, select on the right column “type of target/victim.” To view the precise location of a particular incident, select the + on the zoom scale on the left of the screen. Doing so will enable you to zoom to the level of street in the given city.