ELECTORAL SECURITY ASSESSMENT

AFGHANISTAN

May 2012

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Table of Contents

Executive Summary .......................................................................................................... 2
Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 10
I. Electoral Security Assessment ......................................................................................13
   A. Contextual Analysis .................................................................................................. 13
   B. Historical Conflict Factors ...................................................................................... 20
   C. Stakeholder Analysis .............................................................................................. 24

II. Electoral Security Planning: Program Objectives and Planning ............................. 29

III. Electoral Security Programming ..............................................................................32

VI. Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) ..........................................................................37

V. Conclusion ..................................................................................................................40

Annexes

Annex I – Schedule of Meetings
Annex II – List of Acronyms
Annex III – Electoral Security Cordon Concept and Electoral Threat Mapping
Executive Summary

The Electoral Security Framework, employed by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), provides policy-makers, electoral assistance providers, and electoral and security practitioners with a toolkit to profile electoral conflict as well as to plan and program for preventing, managing or mediating these conflicts. In March 2012, Jeff Fischer and Patrick Quirk of Creative Associates International used this Framework to conduct an assessment in Afghanistan that focused on all electoral cycles since 2004 to recommend strategies and programmatic approaches for an electoral security framework for the 2014-2015 electoral cycle. The following problem statement and development hypothesis arose from this assessment:

**Problem Statement:** Afghanistan lacks domestic capacity to strategically deploy assets as well as patrol and secure polling stations from insurgents and local powerbrokers who use electoral violence in key regions throughout the country. As election assistance from international forces, such as perimeter patrols and ballot transport, is scheduled to decline prior to the 2014-2015 electoral cycle, the upcoming contest is in danger of experiencing more violent incidents than prior elections.

**Development Hypothesis:** If Afghanistan is better able to plan and deploy assets, and the international community is able to fill key gaps prior to the anticipated draw down, then fewer incidents of electoral violence should occur.

The Electoral Security Framework includes the following four components:

- **Assessment:** This step is divided into three major analytical pieces: a) Contextual Analysis; b) Historical Conflict Factors; and c) Stakeholder Analysis
- **Planning:** Examine donor constraints, US Government priorities, local capacity limitations, and other planning elements.
- **Programming:** Determine specific areas of programming objectives and associated activities.
- **Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E)** – Establish illustrative indicators for recommended programming.

**Electoral Security Assessment**

Three major elements were studied during the course of the assessment: 1) Contextual Analysis; 2) Historical Conflict Factors; and 3) Stakeholder Analysis. Based on this analysis and key assessment findings and considerations of local planning restraints, programming recommendations are being provided.

**1) Contextual Analysis**

In Afghanistan, electoral violence is rooted in a four-decade legacy of conflict and the militarized politics which result from it. Coupled with an on-going insurgency
perpetrated by various forces, this continued climate of conflict, availability of arms, and prevalent culture of impunity coalesce to form an unstable platform upon which political competition is conducted.

The weakness of state- and non-state institutions enables or exacerbates the use of violence to achieve political gain in the Afghan context. A weak political party system in which such organizations are characterized by clientelism and economic vehicles for leaders is further aggravated by structural pressures produced by the Single Non-Transferrable Vote (SNTV) electoral system. Deterred by the electoral system from further coalescing into party organizations and without accountability to members for their actions, individuals (whether or not seen as members of parties) leverage means outside politics, including violence such as intimidation and assassination of rivals, to pursue political gain. The lack of political finance regulations (or inability to enforce existing guidelines) enables business, criminal, and foreign interests to resource political campaigns as well as permits incumbents to use state resources for political purposes with impunity. Finances can easily be diverted to fund the intimidation or elimination of rivals.

The administrative and judicial aspects of Afghanistan’s election infrastructure create vulnerabilities for electoral conflict. Concerns about the impartiality and competence of the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) are widely shared. The integrity of some poll workers has been compromised and deficiencies in voter registration and identity card distribution have given rise to mistrust of announced electoral outcomes. This mistrust serves as a potential trigger for electoral conflict. The current system of electoral dispute resolution is fragmented, politicized, and ineffective at adjudicating complaints about electoral malpractice. This contributes to frustration amongst voters and candidates alike. At the same time, the arrest and prosecution of perpetrators is uncommon and creates an environment of impunity that incentivizes those that may use violence to achieve governance and its spoils.

The ethnic divides among Afghanistan’s predominant traditional group affiliations and identities plays out in the electoral context through identity-based voting. Groups marginalized in particular areas are subject to harassment and coercion and, in some cases, are at higher risk for disenfranchisement. Women candidates are particularly vulnerable to attack as some see their political activism as counter to traditional Afghan cultural norms.

During the past two electoral cycles, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP) were the principal security forces providing fixed, mobile, and Quick Reaction Forces (QRFs) for electoral security. In the 2014-2015 electoral cycle, election security will transition mainly to the ANA and ANP with reportedly some rotary aircraft to remain available for ISAF to provide transport of election-related materials and commodities. Though forces charged with election security responsibilities have increased in number and capacity, the resulting potential electoral security gap posed by ISAF’s exit may be regarded as an
opening that insurgents and political rivals will exploit, using violence to disrupt and
discredit the process or gain political advantage.

2) **Historical Conflict Factors**

Incidents of electoral violence in Afghanistan increased from the 2004 and 2005 contests
to those held in 2009 and 2010 during each phase of the electoral cycle (see below). This
trend parallels the trajectory in insurgent-initiated violence since 2001, implying that
electoral violence is to some degree a reflection of other societal violence. The principal
perpetrators of electoral violence are insurgents, political rivals and, in some locations,
the ANP. Insurgents and political rivals share a similar range of tactics - from
intimidation to assassination - employed to suppress turnout, coerce voters’ candidate
selections, or force the withdrawal of a candidate from the election. However, motives
driving the use of these tactics may differ by type of perpetrator—political rivals seek to
gain political leverage and obtain control over public offices, while insurgent forces seek
to delay, disrupt, or derail the electoral process which they portray as a Western-imposed
mechanism inconsistent with their country’s traditions and culture.

In the Pre-Election Phase, perpetrators of intimidation of voters are insurgent groups, in
particular the Taliban. They use a range of tactics to suppress electoral participation and
de-legitimize the election including threatening death or cutting off fingers stained with
electoral ink. Although some intimidation of voters was reported in 2004, the phenomena
increased prior to the 2005 election and then increased further prior to the 2009 and 2010
elections. Intimidation of candidates during this phase is again perpetrated principally by
insurgent groups, who use night letters (messages sent during the night often in the form
of paper posted to doors or entryways that threaten the recipient), and by political rivals
and local powerbrokers, local warlords, and in some cases government officials. Since
2004, political rivals and local powerbrokers have increasingly engaged in intimidation of
rival candidates to coerce the withdrawal of a candidate or a voter’s selection reportedly
employing individuals to engage in armed clashes with rival candidates’ campaign staff
or using rifles and handguns to attack rival candidate campaign transport convoys. Both
insurgent forces and political rivals/powerbrokers target candidates for assassination.
Election staff and workers are also targets of electoral violence. The Taliban and
insurgent groups, motivated by a desire to disrupt the election by intimidating or killing
officials involved in its administration, have threatened, kidnapped and killed individuals
associated with the IEC as well as international assistance organizations proving support
to the process.

Election Day in Afghanistan has also experienced violence. The most common forms of
violence are attacks on polling centers and election workers by insurgents and political
rivals. Targeting polling centers increased markedly on Election Day in 2009 and 2010
and the range of tactics expanded from firing RPGs and armed assaults to include more
widespread use of suicide- and car-bombings. However, attacks onto polling centers are
also employed by political rivals to evacuate voters from a center so that acts of electoral
malpractice can be accomplished by election workers without witnesses present.
Post-Election violence takes three principal forms. First, candidates and their supporters reportedly intimidate election workers to commit acts of deception through deliberately miscounted vote totals or ballot box stuffing. Second, supporters of losing candidates mobilize in the form of street actions to protest what they view as illegitimate results triggered by perceptions and evidence of electoral malpractice. These street actions range in form and intensity from marches that end peacefully to mob actions against regional counting centers. The third type of Post-Election violence can be viewed as a continuation of insurgent-initiated violence on Election Day. Though the extent to which these forms of violence are directly related to the election is a matter of some speculation, the periods following electoral events have seen spikes in insurgent-initiated violence.

3) **Stakeholder Analysis**

The state stakeholders can be considered in the categories of regulatory, security, and judicial while non-state stakeholders include political parties, civil society organizations, and media organizations. The international community is also a non-state stakeholder in electoral security. The principal regulatory stakeholder is the IEC, the body mandated to administer the election. The security stakeholders established a working group to coordinate electoral security administration involving the Ministry of Interior (MOI), Ministry of Defense (MOD), National Directorate of Security (NDS), the ANA, and ANP. Electoral justice is rendered through the Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC); however, prosecution for crimes of electoral violence are uncommon.

While political parties are considered as stakeholders in electoral security, it is also apparent that the “institutions” of parties are organizations characterized by clientelism and vehicles for individuals to pursue political and financial power. These factors have two implications for electoral conflict. First, lacking mechanisms for transparency and accountability and as instruments controlled by their leaders with no internal democracy, political parties can become organizational platforms to receive resources then leveraged to employ electoral violence. And second, political parties do not offer any safety factor for candidates whereby some degree of protection – real or perceived – is afforded to candidates by being part of an organized group. In an electoral conflict context, civil society organizations (CSOs) provide election monitoring, civic and voter education, and advocate for benefits to disadvantaged groups such as women candidates. Media organizations can play a complex role in electoral security. Among those interviewed, opinions were split between a reasonable level of confidence in the private media to report accurately and a view that many private media organizations are not independent and are captive of business or political interests. However, there was a consensus from those interviewed that the state broadcasting system was an instrument of the executive and did not disseminate news in a balanced and fair manner.

The principal international stakeholders in electoral security are ISAF, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), and non-governmental providers of electoral assistance such as IFES. These international stakeholders established coordination mechanisms among and between themselves and domestic stakeholders in electoral assistance and security programming.
Electoral Security Planning

Based on the profile above, Creative recommends the following four strategic program objectives for the 2014/2015 electoral cycle:

• Enhance Capacity of Electoral Security Administration.
• Introduce Programming for Political Violence against Women in Elections (PVAWE).
• Encourage IEC and ECC Reforms.
• Strengthen Political Party Systems and Finance Reforms.

USAID should be interested in pursuing these programming objectives because electoral conflict and malpractice are principal factors in de-legitimizing elections as instruments to peacefully and fairly achieve governance.

The institutional framework for roles and responsibilities of the international community should be preserved with a special focus on capacity building in electoral security administration and introducing disincentives to engage in electoral violence. Mentoring and assistance gaps in electoral security assistance may emerge because of the absence or reduction in force of IFES and ISAF from the institutional framework.

Constraints on USAID are political, security, and financial in nature. The political constraints involve the bilateral relationship between Afghanistan and the United States. Differences in opinions on aspects of conducting the war and a series of violent incidents have created tensions in the relationship between the two countries. Security factors constrain the geographical reach of programming and create uncertainties about implementation timelines. And third, USG interest in program investment in Afghanistan is on the decline. In establishing electoral program priorities for 2014-2015, USAID may have fewer financial resources than it had in the past.

Electoral Security Programming

Based on these strategic program objectives Creative recommends the following programming in the associated four areas.

1) Enhance Capacity of Electoral Security Administration.

Planning and Operations

• Institutionalize the electoral security administration planning and operations template among the MOI, ANP, ANA, NSA, and IEC for some level of activity in non-election periods and a “surge” capacity during electoral cycles.
• Establish an Office of Electoral Security Administration at the IEC.
• Employ the electoral incident data collected in the 2009-2010 electoral cycle to inform risk mapping for 2014-2015 and create and maintain an incidents database.
• Foster the coordination of state and non-state stakeholders in incident reporting and documentation for the incidents database.
• Enhance the conflict management and mediation training for poll workers.

Security and Protection Criteria
• Maintain the ISAF methodology for declaring a polling center as “insecure,” resulting in cancelling, delaying, or suspending voting because of this designation.
• Develop an objective set of criteria for declaring a political candidate at risk for violence and the protocols for providing ANP protection for these candidates.
• Provide an introductory training course for the ANP and ANA assigned to election duty on international electoral policy and practice and electoral conflict analysis and response methodologies.

Traditional Leaders
• Engage traditional leaders in Alternative Dispute Resolution and the prevention of electoral conflict.

Conflict Monitoring and Documentation
• Deploy electoral monitors with a focus on conflict incident documentation and uniform reporting using new media and make such reporting available to the state electoral security stakeholders for planning and enforcement responses.
• Deploy electoral monitors to focus on additional yet related areas to conflict including political finance, media, and electoral dispute monitoring.

2) Introduce Programming for Political Violence against Women in Elections (PVAWE)
• Identify electoral conflict incident patterns by gender, where possible, and map the attacks on women candidates, voters, monitors, journalists, and security officers to identify the characteristics of the threat environment.
• Establish a Women Candidate Protection Network to provide a platform for support, communications, and victim’s services for women candidates.
• Monitor incidents of domestic violence against women political activists during the electoral cycle.
• Disseminate civic education messages to counter the practice of family voting by male members of the family and promoting the participation of women in elections.

3) Encourage IEC and ECC Reforms
• Encourage members and groups in parliament to develop a consensus agenda on electoral reform supported by the international community.
• Diversify the IEC appointment process to include appointing authorities other than the president and approval by parliament as the confirmation step.
• Improve recruitment and training of poll workers to enhance job performance and professional ethics.
• Assure that the distribution of polling centers (and closures for security reasons) does not disadvantage any particular ethnic community.
• Explore moving some ballot tabulation points in remote areas to provincial centers to offer more transparency, accuracy, and security in ballot tabulation. Special provisions must be made to protect the ballots while in transit from the polling center to the provincial centers.
• Examine options for “advanced voting” in order to reduce the dependence on the target-heavy polling centers on Election Day; or a “rolling” Election Day around the country to allow security forces to geographically concentrate their electoral security assets regionally and not nationally.
• Clarify and strengthen the electoral justice system to provide a clear mandate for adjudicating disputes and hearing appeals.

4) Strengthen Political Party Systems and Finance Reforms

• Encourage the de-conflicting of formal and informal dialogue among political parties through workshops, panel discussions, and other collaborative events.
• Facilitate Codes of Conduct and peace pacts among political parties.
• Introduce laws and regulations to establish and strengthen political finance disclosure (receipts and expenditure), limits, and prohibitions.
• Conduct training programs to enhance the capacity of the IEC to enforce political finance regulations and prevent vote buying; or establish an independent Political Finance Regulator dedicated to that mandate.

Monitoring and Evaluation (M & E)

The M&E section puts forth a framework for the evaluation of the electoral conflict prevention programs outlined above that consist of two basic components: baseline data and custom indicators. The baseline data collected are intended to measure the level of incidents of conflict in order to both profile the nature of the conflict and assess whether its intensity is responsive to program strategies and activities. Custom indicators are proposed for prescribed programming and for measuring the impact of recommended electoral security programming on governance, rule of law, and civil society sectors.

Conclusion

Conflict and violence are becoming embedded in the Afghan electoral process because of a range of security, political, economic, and social vulnerability factors. These factors create susceptibilities to and incentivize the use of violence to destabilize and discredit the process (as perpetrated by insurgent forces) as well as to achieve political gains (as perpetrated by political rivals and powerbrokers). Without taking strategic and
operational measures to counter it, electoral violence will likely continue into the 2014-2015 electoral cycle given its effectiveness at influencing electoral outcomes through direct means of suppressing participation or indirect means by providing a cover of violence to conceal the stealing of votes.

The program strategies and activities put forward in this assessment alone will not de-conflict the 2014-2015 electoral cycle. These vulnerabilities are too numerous and elusive for a comprehensive security solution to be expected by the next elections. Nevertheless, these measures, if implemented, can facilitate measurable results in the reduction of election-related deaths, violent incidents, injuries, intimidation, and destruction of property.
Introduction

From March 7 through 25, 2012, Creative Associates International (Creative) conducted an electoral security assessment in Afghanistan under funding from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) through its Elections and Political Processes Indefinite Quantity Contract. The team was composed of Jeff Fischer and Patrick Quirk from Creative. The purpose of the assessment was twofold: 1) to analyze and profile the electoral conflict vulnerabilities, history, and stakeholders since 2004; and 2) to recommend strategies and programmatic approaches for a framework to prevent, manage, or mediate electoral conflict and violence in the 2014-2015 electoral cycle.1

This assessment seeks to address the following Problem Statement and Development Hypothesis:

**Problem Statement:** Afghanistan lacks domestic capacity to strategically deploy assets as well as patrol and secure polling stations from insurgents and local powerbrokers who use electoral violence in key regions throughout the country. As election security assistance from international forces, such as perimeter patrols and ballot transport, is scheduled to decline prior to the 2014-2015 electoral cycle, the upcoming contest is in danger of experiencing more violent incidents than prior elections.

**Development Hypothesis:** If Afghanistan is better able to plan and deploy assets, and the international community is able to fill key security gaps prior to the anticipated draw down, then fewer incidents of electoral violence should occur.

The security and political environment in which the assessment was conducted should be noted as an example of the volatility which might be expected throughout the upcoming electoral cycle. Immediately prior to assessment start-up in Afghanistan, the Koran-burning incident occurred where United States (US) military personnel mistakenly destroyed copies of the holy book and two US military officers were shot and killed by an Afghan assailant inside the Ministry of Interior (MOI). On the day that the assessment team arrived in Kandahar, a US army soldier reportedly killed 16 civilians resulting in new tensions and uncertainties in the security alliance between Afghan and US forces. The volatility resulting from these events was further exacerbated by sporadic protests and calls by the Taliban for revenge attacks on NATO and US citizens. Additionally, the electoral mandate for the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), the lead electoral assistance organization, was in debate during the course of the assessment, creating some uncertainty about the future strength of the international “footprint” in the electoral assistance. However, shortly after the assessment, the UNAMA mandate was extended through March 2014, preserving the UN’s role as an

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1 Because of security issues during the period of the assessment, conducting interviews in Kandahar was not possible. To ensure the report reflects insights from relevant stakeholders outside of Kabul, Creative distributed interview questions via email to stakeholders who the team was unable to reach in person. Insights from respondents are reflected in the content of this report. A list of interviews conducted is shown as Annex I.
“active partner” with state and non-state electoral stakeholders. The International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) had provided electoral security planning and organizational assistance for prior electoral events. However, during the assessment, their electoral assistance/security program came to closure. And, in the days following the assessment team’s departure from Kabul another US-Afghan security incident occurred where members of the Afghan army shot and killed three US servicemen.

Projecting into the 2014-2015 electoral cycle, two de-stabilizing factors should be considered. First, the profile of the Taliban may evolve into what can be termed a “triple-hatted” role - as an armed force, illicit parallel local governance structure and, potentially, electoral stakeholder. It should be noted that “reformed” Taliban have already contested as candidates without incidences of violence surrounding their campaigns. Nevertheless, non-reformed Taliban and insurgents coming from neighboring countries can be expected to view elections as targets to promote political instability through electoral violence. Second, this evolution will roughly coincide with the attrition of the generation of Afghan political and social leaders who participated in the revolution, putting pressure on the emergence of a new generation of governance leaders to assume responsibility for the legitimate public institutions in Afghanistan.

These factors combine to place the 2014-2015 elections at risk for conflict. In an electoral security context, this risk creates three fundamental issues: 1) an increased reliance on the Afghan National Police (ANP) and Afghan National Army (ANA) for electoral security; 2) a resulting potential electoral security gap that insurgents and political rivals can exploit using violence to disrupt and discredit the process or gain political advantage; and 3) an unabated culture of impunity for perpetrators of electoral violence. The reduction in ISAF QRFs and assets for electoral logistics must be quantified for next cycle of electoral security planning to be completed.

Electoral violence can occur in the Pre-Election, Election Day, or Post-Election Phases of the electoral cycle. The principal perpetrators of electoral violence are insurgents, political rivals and, in some locations, the ANP. Insurgents and political rivals share a similar range of tactics—including, but not limited to, assassination and intimidation—employed to suppress turnout, coerce voters’ candidate selections, or force the withdrawal of a candidate from the election. However, motives driving the use of these tactics may differ by type of perpetrator. For example, political rivals seek to gain political leverage and obtain control over public offices while insurgent forces seek to delay, disrupt, or derail the electoral process itself. To accomplish their objectives, insurgents have employed female suicide bombers in burqas to destroy polling centers whereas political rivals have employed violence as a “cover” to empty polling centers to allow ballot box stuffing to occur. Reported ANP actions describe them using intimidation tactics against voter to support a local powerbroker. In these locations, while police employed strong-armed tactics, these forces did not exhibit the overt violence employed by insurgents and political rivals.

Targets of electoral violence should be disaggregated between human and property. Human targets include candidates and their families/supporters, election workers, the
ANP, journalists, observers, and voters. While both men and women candidates have been the targets of violence, women candidates face special threats due to lack of financial resources to invest in personal protection, inconsistent police responses to protection requests, societal attitudes by some groups that women should not be candidates, and domestic abuse at times motivated by their political activism. Targeted election workers are domestic and international advisors as well as assistance technicians. The ANP has been injured in some attacks on polling centers. Journalists and observers have reportedly been threatened and ordinary voters risk violence on Election Day as polling centers are subject to attack.

Property targets include transport vehicles carrying sensitive electoral materials such as ballots or voter registries to polling centers and the polling centers themselves. Incidents of vehicle attacks and stolen ballots have been reported. In addition, insurgents have blocked roads that provide access to polling centers.

Locations of violent incidents should be disaggregated according to two perspectives—geography and specific conflict point. Geographically, the incidences of violence reflect the mapping for general insecurity in the country and are particularly predominant in the south and southeast. An example of conflict mapping is shown in Annex II. And, although a range of electoral facilities have been attacked, polling centers remain the main conflict point of direct and indirect attacks resulting in reduced opportunities to vote. According to Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) records, Afghanistan had 6,835 polling centers for the 2010 elections and approximately 900 remained closed on Election Day due to security concerns.

The problem statement and development hypothesis for this assessment were determined by applying the methodology found in the Electoral Security Framework. The structure of this Afghanistan Electoral Security Framework report is based upon this methodology:

1. **Assessment**: This step is divided into three major analytical pieces: a) Contextual Analysis; b) Historical Conflict Factors; and c) Stakeholder Analysis.

2. **Planning**: Examine donor constraints, US Government priorities, local capacity limitations, and other planning elements.

3. **Programming**: Determine specific areas of programming objectives and associated activities.

4. **Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E)** – Establish illustrative indicators for recommended programming.

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I. Electoral Security Assessment

The first step in the Framework development is to assess and profile the electoral threats and conflict dynamics.

A. Contextual Analysis

The Contextual Analysis identifies those security, political, economic, and social factors which create vulnerabilities for electoral violence to be triggered.

1. Security Factors: Conflict Environment

Afghan society has experienced nearly continuous conflict for over forty years that can be divided into three phases. First, the 1979 Soviet invasion resulted in nine years of warfare and the jihadist insurgency which evolved into the Taliban. Second, as the Taliban insurgency assumed the role of governance, the brutality of its regime left a legacy of violence and oppression. As a resistance to the Taliban, localized “warlords” emerged who employed armed conflict to both fight the Taliban and secure geographical strongholds for themselves. The third was the US-led coalition which invaded Afghanistan in 2001 resulting in the displacement of the Taliban from their role of “national” governance in Kabul, driving them into an insurgent position and the resulting continuous stream of violence. This violence may also be exacerbated by forces inside neighboring countries, Pakistan and Iran, seeking to de-stabilize the Afghan government. As a result, the Afghan electoral process inherits this legacy of conflict and the militarized politics born from it. This continuing climate of conflict, the availability of arms, and the culture of impunity combine into an unstable platform upon which political competition is conducted.

2. Security Factors: Security Forces

During the past two electoral cycles, ISAF, the ANA, and the ANP were the principal security forces providing fixed, mobile, and QRFs for electoral security. The security setup for Election Day can be generally described as a three cordon concept. The outer cordon consisted of ISAF providing special assets and QRFs. The middle cordon was ANA providing a general, environmental security presence. The inner cordon was provided by the ANP protecting polling centers and other electoral property. An illustration of this electoral security concept is shown as Annex III.

In the 2014-2015 electoral cycle, election security will transition mainly to the ANA and ANP with reportedly some rotary aircraft to remain available for ISAF to provide transport of election-related materials and commodities. The ANP is anticipated to take the operational lead in electoral security administration. While a planning and coordination template has been established among the MOI, Ministry of Defense (MOD), ANA, ANP, and IEC, the scale of the upcoming electoral security requirements must be assessed in light of the ANP’s projected force numbers and capacities.
Additionally, reports of politicized police in rural areas under the control of local powerbrokers reduce the legitimacy of the police forces as impartial protectors of electoral stakeholders. In past elections, ISAF has assisted the IEC and Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) in identifying areas where the security environment did not permit elections to be conducted. As a result, polling centers were closed in those areas and the local electorate was essentially disenfranchised in community-wide numbers. Such security-related closures in the Pashtun-dominated south and southeast hold the potential to trigger electoral violence if the local perceptions are that the motive is not security but it is to dilute Pashtun political strength through disenfranchisement.

3. **Security Factors: On-Going Insurgencies**

Since the 2004 election, the Taliban and other insurgencies have employed various forms of violence in the Pre-Election, Election Day and Post-Election Phases of all electoral contests. As an insurgent group contesting the Afghan government’s sovereignty, the motivation of Taliban-initiated electoral violence (as disaggregated from its attacks more generally) is to decrease the legitimacy and credibility of the electoral process which is portrayed as a Western-imposed mechanism inconsistent with their country’s traditions and culture.

To discredit the process, the Taliban has used a range of tactics to prevent individuals from going to the polls, candidates from running, and election workers from fulfilling their roles. These tactics have included attacks on polling stations with Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs) and Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) placed along roadways leading to polling centers, creating conditions where campaigning and voting become impossible for many.

Further, to decrease turnout through voter intimidation, the Taliban issue “night letters” and verbal threats (in-person, by telephone, and SMS text) to individuals warning them not to vote. Similar threats are employed to force candidates to withdraw from an election, as are physical assaults, kidnappings, and, in some cases, assassination. Tactics used by insurgents against election officials range from physical assaults to suicide attacks on electoral facilities. International electoral assistance staffs are also targeted by insurgents including an attack on a UN guest house in 2009 and the kidnapping of civic education consultants working for IFES in 2010.

4. **Political Factors: Regime Type**

According to the Polity IV Project’s 2011 Global Report, Afghanistan’s regime type is categorized as an “anocracy” where power is vested in a group of elites rather than public institutions. A perception of this anocratic state is that it is “Highly Corrupt,” rating 1.5 out of 10 on Transparency International’s 2011 Corruption Perception Index scale (with 0 representing the perception that a country is highly corrupt). Additionally, according to the Political Rights Score and Civil Liberties Score under Freedom House’s 2011 Freedom in the World Survey, Afghan citizens are afforded a low level of freedoms; in both cases, Afghanistan scored a 6 on a scale of 1 to 7, with 7 representing the lowest
level of freedom. These indicators combine to create a portrait of governance involving weak and corrupt institutions incapable of genuinely protecting its citizens and their electoral rights.

5. **Political Factors: Electoral, Political Party, and Executive Systems**

The Single Non-Transferrable Vote (SNTV) electoral system is widely disparaged by political parties as a means by which the executive dilutes the effectiveness of the legislative branch of government. The ACE Electoral Knowledge Network describes the SNTV system as follows, “Under SNTV, each voter casts one vote for a candidate, but unlike [majoritarian] systems, there is more than one seat to be filled in each electoral district. The candidates with the highest vote totals fill these positions. SNTV can face political parties with a challenge…If the party puts up three candidates, the danger of ‘vote splitting’ makes it even less likely that a party will win two seats.”

International IDEA describes SNTV as a “multi-member district, candidate-centered system in which voters have one vote.” The political impact on vote-seeking strategies carried out under an SNTV system suppresses the significance of political parties in elections.

The lack of a viable political party system inhibits parties from playing their traditional “Western” role of interest articulation between citizens and government and the aggregation of different opinions and interests under a common institutional banner. The ability of parties to play roles in de-conflicting political dialogue and in enhancing legislative effectiveness is also reduced. Political parties are characterized by clientelism and have become economic vehicles for leaders and without accountability to members for their actions. As a result, electoral violence is a viable means which can be used by these party elites.

Absent an incumbent president contesting for re-election in the 2014-2015 cycle, the two-round executive election system should also be taken into consideration for its potential to trigger post-election violence. No second round presidential election has been contested under Afghanistan’s new system. In the 2004 election, Hamid Karzai won just over 55 percent of the voting, not requiring a second round balloting. In 2009, the challenger Dr. Abdullah Abdullah withdrew from the second round, effectively giving the re-election to President Karzai. With no prior experience from which to identify vulnerabilities, whether a second round of presidential voting would be more conflictive than the first round remains a matter of speculation. As a result, the potential for conflict in the Afghan presidential election second round remains uncertain.

6. **Political Factors: Political Finance System**

Afghanistan lacks effective regulations establishing transparency, accountability, prohibitions, and limits for political finance. The regulations that do exist are weakly

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enforced, when at all. However, this *de facto* lack of regulation creates permissive conditions for illicit funding from business, criminal, and foreign interests to resource political campaigns. This opaqueness also enables incumbents to use state resources for political purposes with impunity.

Although the IEC promulgated the *Regulation on Campaign Finance Disclosure by Wolesi Jirga Candidates* in 2010, these requirements have not proven effective at preventing illicit funds from rousing political campaigns and for candidates to use these resources to finance electoral conflict and malpractice. The current regulation empowers the IEC as the Political Finance Regulator (PFR) and requires candidates to disclose their capital assets at the time of registration. During the campaign, the disclosure of contributions and expenses must be submitted to the IEC. When violations are identified by the IEC, the names of the violators are sent to the Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC) for resolution. Despite this regulatory and institutional framework, illicit campaign finance practices continue to be widely reported. The campaign finance monitoring project of the Free and Fair Elections Foundation of Afghanistan (FEFA) is one such source for these reports.5

From an administrative standpoint, illicit practices cited include campaigning before the start of the official campaign period and understating expenses in official disclosure reports. FEFA reports also indicate that candidates favored by local incumbents have access to state resources such as vehicles and facilities. However, such abuses were also observed at many levels of government including at the cabinet level by ministers, deputy ministers and heads of departments as well as by other government officials, police officers, heads of district councils, teachers, heads of educational zones, and officials at the Secretariat of the Wolesi Jirga. Police officers have been employed to obstruct the movement of rival candidates. Additionally, FEFA identified broadcasting fairness by the state-owned Radio/Telephone Afghanistan’s (RTA) as a violation because of partiality in broadcast coverage for some candidates over others.

Both direct and indirect vote buying has been reported. Direct vote buying takes the form of voters selling an identity card for cash ranging from $5.00 to $10.00 (USD). The purpose of obtaining the identity card includes suppressing the vote by disenfranchising an opposition candidate’s supporters, as well as employing the card for voter impersonation purposes, or both. In another reported scheme, voters are paid 500 Afghans upon showing a photograph on their mobile telephone of their vote cast for a paying candidate. Candidates indirectly buy votes through investing in community benefits and services such as donations to mosques, repairing roads, scholarship funds for university students, and electricity subsidies. Election officials and poll workers also reportedly receive cash payments in exchange for stuffing ballot boxes with pre-marked ballots, deliberately miscounting or miscalculating the candidate totals, or otherwise validating the victory of a paying candidate.

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These political finance practices are relevant to electoral violence in several respects. First, where the ANP are engaged for political purposes, politicization compromises electoral security by resulting in selective enforcement and arrest. Second, vote buying reflects a dynamic of coercion between candidates and voters which ranges from low intensity (vote buying as ‘carrot’) to high intensity (intimidation as ‘stick’). And, third, access to illicit funding provides candidates or parties with opaque resources for the purchase of agents, weapons, and logistics for electoral violence.

7. **Political Factors: Judicial System**

Two dimensions inherent to Afghanistan’s judicial system are relevant to electoral conflict and violence. The first dimension is electoral dispute resolution and the roles played by the ECC, IEC, a special court, and the Supreme Court. The second dimension is prosecution of crimes for electoral violence by the conventional courts.

On the first dimension, a fair, timely, and transparent mechanism for adjudicating electoral complaints is an important instrument to de-conflict disputes, particularly in the Post-Election Phase of the electoral cycle. In general, without such mechanisms, unsuccessful candidates and their supporters will seek opportunities for recourse through street actions and protests which can quickly escalate into rioting and property destruction.

The current system of electoral dispute resolution seems intentionally fragmented, politicized, and ineffective at both adjudicating complaints about electoral malpractice as well as being perceived as a strong enforcement institution serving to prevent malpractice from occurring. The process for filing complaints can be confusing, as the temporary mandate and profile of the ECC has shifted during its existence. Starting out as an internationally-driven adjudicative and sanctioning body, the ECC then transitioned to a nationally-driven temporary body. In the last electoral cycle, President Karzai intervened in the ECC’s affairs and established a special court for electoral dispute adjudication. The Supreme Court upheld the decision. Additionally, the appointment of provincial ECC members has moved from a UN-sponsored function to the responsibility of the president’s appointed provincial governors. These shifts of mandate have reduced the role of the ECC in effectively mediating electoral disputes.

The arrest and prosecution of the perpetrators of electoral violence (insurgents or political rivals) is uncommon, but for different reasons. For insurgents, without state presence in their principal strongholds (or with meager capacity in urban areas that are also targeted) insurgents escape capture for electoral violence. Political rivals and local powerbrokers evade prosecution by leveraging their control over local police forces to prevent investigations or judicial institutions to dismiss the cases.

8. **Political Factors: Electoral Administration System**

The IEC is the body mandated to conduct national and sub-national elections in Afghanistan. A range of domestic electoral stakeholders consulted through interviews
openly and consistently questioned the impartiality and competence of the IEC during the 2009 – 2010 electoral cycle. A central and repeated criticism raised was the appointment process for Commissioners, which was viewed as controlled by the executive. Under the current constitutional interpretation, the executive has sole appointment and confirmation authority for the IEC under Article Sixty-Four, 13, which states: “Appointing, retiring and accepting the resignation and dismissal of judges, officers of the armed forces, police, national security as well as high ranking official according to the provision of law…” The resulting influence wielded by the president over his appointees creates legitimate concerns about the IEC’s structural and the Commissioner’s behavioral independence from the executive office.

With regard to the electoral process more broadly, various deficiencies exist that serve as potential triggers for conflict. First, individuals lack confidence in the integrity of the electoral register and process for issuing voter identity cards resulting in widespread voter impersonation. Second, individuals question the integrity of some poll workers, who are seen as vulnerable to bribes and other forms of coercion in exchange for stuffing ballot boxes or miscounting votes. These two factors contribute to general mistrust in the impartiality and competence of the IEC, with such mistrust serving as potential trigger for electoral conflict.

9. Economic Factors

Research by Oxford economist Paul Collier and performed in preparation of USAID’s Electoral Security Framework suggest that economic factors, including measures of Per Capita Income, Gross Domestic Product (GDP), and the GINI Index could indicate vulnerabilities to electoral violence. According to the US Government, Afghanistan’s estimated Per Capita Income for 2011 was $1,000, ranking it 212th out of 225 countries and placing it well below the risk threshold of $2,700 per year as benchmarked by Collier. Similarly, countries with GDPs under $100 billion per year may be more susceptible to violence; Afghanistan’s estimated annual GDP for 2011 was $29.99 billion placing it in the risk category. As a measure of income inequality, a score over 40 on the GINI Index reflects high levels of inequality and may also contribute to resource-related grievances which transform into electoral conflict. As opposed to the other two measures, the most recent GINI Index for Afghanistan fell below the risk threshold at 29.4 (2008). While the World Bank found in mapping poverty rates in Afghanistan that the “most poverty-afflicted areas are not those in conflict,” taken together, these economic factors can create vulnerabilities for violence stemming from poverty, income disparity, and lack of employment opportunities.

10. Social Factors: Ethnic Cleavages

With approximately 80 per cent of the Afghan population dwelling in dispersed, rural areas which are mainly divided along ethnic, tribal, and familial lines, traditional group affiliations are a pronounced component of Afghan society. Despite the Afghan constitution’s ban on political parties based on ethnic or religious sect, politics in today’s Afghanistan to a large extent still mirrors the country’s traditional ethnic divides.
expressed through identity voting. Most political parties and voting blocs are aligned by tribal, familial, and/or geographic influences. This strength of identity over ideology in politics is further enhanced by Afghanistan’s SNTV electoral system, which forces voters to elect a person rather than a party.

While some pan-ethnic, ideal-based parties have formed since the fall of the Taliban, such as the Truth and Justice Party and the Hope and Change Party, most voting blocs remain influenced by tribal, familial, and/or geographic divides. For example, Afghan President Hamid Karzai is a descendent of the Durrani tribal confederation, one of the two main factions under the Pashtun majority ethnic group in Afghanistan. Though Karzai has attempted to co-opt some opposition groups and rival tribal, ethnic and community leaders for political gain by appointing them to high-level government positions, the majority of his closest advisors, cabinet appointees, as well as parliamentary supporters are Pashtun from Karzai’s home province of Kandahar and neighboring Helmand province. Similarly, his main political opposition is made up mostly of ethnic minority Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hazaras; though the ethnic divisions among these groups also poses as an obstacle to a strong, unified opposition.

Historic ethnic tensions became increasingly pronounced in the context of electoral conflict during the 2010 parliamentary elections. The main focal point of tensions arose between the majority Pashtun population (Sunni) and the minority Hazara (Shi’a); in Afghanistan’s southern provinces. Taliban insurgents (many drawn from the Pashtun population) have strongholds in the South leading to a number of polling stations in the region being closed due to security concerns. Additionally, the insurgents used intimidation tactics to keep Pashtun voters from going to the polls on Election Day. As a result, the Hazara won a disproportionate number of seats in parliament relative to their size within the population; the Pashtun population, Afghanistan’s majority ethnic group, felt disenfranchised from the voting process and increasingly marginalized from the political system. In any case, the long term stability of electoral outcomes may depend, in part, on the perceptions of equity in elected representation along ethnic lines, particularly by the Pashtun community.

This strength of identity over ideology in politics is further enhanced by Afghanistan’s SNTV electoral system, in which voters elect a person rather than a party. Additionally, the way the SNTV system is set up if parties run more than one candidate, they may actually decrease their chance of gaining a seat in the legislature. Regardless, as was the case toward the beginning of Karzai’s administration, the long term acceptance of electoral outcomes may depend, in part, on the perceptions of equity in elected representation along ethnic lines, particularly by the Pashtun community.

11. Social Factors: Women

Women are potential targets of electoral violence in both a direct and indirect context as well as in both open and closed spaces. In 2010, women candidates were the direct target of assassinations, intimidation, and the kidnappings of supporters or family members to force their withdrawals from the election. Women candidates have been the subject of
character assassination campaigns portraying them as “prostitutes” and framing women candidacies in general as “un-Islamic.” Women may also be indirect targets of electoral violence if their polling center is attacked while they are voting. “Family voting” is a form of voter coercion where the male head of household casts votes for the other (especially female) eligible family members. It is a practice reportedly common in Afghanistan elections. In examining electoral violence against women in a more general context, the space where the violence occurs – open or closed – should be identified as relevant to a full understanding of the problem. Women candidates and voters may be attacked in open spaces, but women may also suffer condemnation and abuse for their political activism in closed spaces as inflicted by family or community members.

B. Historical Conflict Factors

Incidents of electoral violence in Afghanistan increased from the 2004 and 2005 contests to those held in 2009 and 2010 during each phase of the electoral cycle. This trend parallels the trajectory in insurgent-initiated violence since 2001, implying that electoral violence is to some degree a reflection of other societal violence.

Pre-Election Phase

In the Pre-Election Phase, perpetrators of intimidation of voters are insurgent groups, in particular the Taliban, who use a range of tactics to suppress electoral participation and de-legitimize the election. Although some intimidation of voters was reported in 2004, the phenomena increased prior to the 2005 election and then increased further prior to the 2009 and 2010 elections. In the campaign period6 of the 2009 cycle, such intimidation was widespread, with the Taliban operating in various provinces, in particular Helmand and Kandahar, threatening voters with death or cutting off fingers showing electoral ink. The same forms of intimidation were reported in 16 provinces prior to the 2010 contest. The Taliban has also destroyed roadways and bridges to hinder travel to polling centers on Election Day.

Perpetrators of intimidation against candidates are again principally insurgent groups, yet also include political rivals and local powerbrokers, local warlords, and in some cases government officials. Women candidates are particularly vulnerable to threats and physical assault, and since the 2005 cycle they have been increasingly targeted with various forms of violence. Insurgents are motivated to discredit the process through forcing candidate withdrawals and reducing turnout, whereas political rivals seek to limit the field of electoral contestants to increase probability of their victory. Elders and local

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6 The pre-election phase in general can be divided into three sub-phases that bring unique profiles of violence: the nomination phase, the challenge phase, and the campaign period. This structure is used by FEFA in their observation report on the 2010 elections. The nomination phase includes the period in which individuals present themselves as candidates, where the challenge period represents the period during which vetting of candidates took place – individuals and organizations submit challenges to veracity of candidacies the ECC, which in turn decides whether the challenges are valid. The campaign period is the timeframe in which candidate’s campaign and run until Election Day.
*shuras* also engage in forms of political influence by selecting a particular candidate and then holding meetings with other potential contestants to dissuade them from becoming candidates or encouraging their withdrawals.

In 2004, the Taliban attempted to assassinate then candidate Hamid Karzai while he was campaigning in Gardez. In 2009, between April 25 and August 1, the Taliban assassinated 13 candidates and ambushed a convoy of Afghan President Hamid Karzai’s campaign workers, using light weapons and RPGs. One person was killed and two were wounded. The Taliban continued to use the same armed tactics of assassination during the 2010 election. However, in addition to these armed tactics, the Taliban also issued night letters in several districts in Khost, Logar, and Paktika provinces warning candidates not to run or they would be killed, and threatening voters not to vote. Some letters were specifically targeted against women candidates in Logar province. In Herat, the Taliban kidnapped ten campaign workers of Fauzia Gilani, a woman running for parliament – five of the workers were released but the other five were later found dead. Women candidates have also been vulnerable as targets of intimidation and assaults by rival candidates.

Since 2004, political rivals and local powerbrokers have also increasingly engaged in intimidation of rival candidates to coerce the withdrawal of a candidate or a voter’s selection. Powerbrokers and candidates have reportedly employed individuals to engage in armed clashes with rival candidate campaign staff, using rifles and handguns to attack rival candidate campaign transport convoys, as well as rival candidates themselves. For example, in the central province of Ghor, rival candidates engaged in a gun-battle against one another during the 2010 parliamentary campaign period. Local powerbrokers also use verbal threats and other inducement to force the withdrawal of un-favored candidates.

Election staff and workers are also targets of electoral violence. Perpetrators are the Taliban and insurgent groups, whose motive is to disrupt the election by intimidating or killing officials involved in its administration. Tactics used by insurgents against election officials include physical assaults (using fists) as well as suicide attacks on electoral facilities. Staff of the Joint Election Management Body (JEMB), as well as that of international electoral assistance organizations, were widely targeted prior to the 2004 contest, in particular during the period of voter registration. For example, in August 2004, the Taliban killed three female election workers in a bomb attack close to Jalalabad. Similar attacks led to killings of more than 30 election workers during the election. In 2009, the Taliban kidnapped individuals working on a civic education campaign for an international organization. In 2010 such attacks on election workers were reported in the provinces of Badghis, Farah, Helmand, Nangarhar, and Paktika. Election workers also received night letters warning them to not participate in the electoral process.

**Election Day**

Election Days in Afghanistan have also experienced violence. The most common forms of violence are attacks on polling centers and election workers by insurgents and political rivals. Voters are often victims in both targets of attack. In 2004 only a few minor attacks
by insurgents were reported. However, the frequency and strength of insurgent-initiated attacks increased for Election Day in 2005, where the Taliban fired rockets at polling centers and planted mines on roads leading to some polling sites; 19 incidents related to attacks on polling stations were reported and 17 other incidents, including assaults on convoys carrying blank ballots to polling stations, were also reported. On the same day, two voters were killed and three injured in Kunar province and two electoral staff were assaulted in Paktia province.

Targeting polling centers increased markedly on Election Day in 2009 and 2010, and the range of tactics expanded from firing RPGs and armed assaults to include more widespread use of suicide-bombing and car-bombings. On Election Day in 2009, the Afghanistan government reported 73 direct attacks against polling centers in 15 provinces, mainly in northern and southern Afghanistan. In Baghlan in 2009, the Taliban stormed the town, killing the police chief and stopping all voting. In Kunduz, the Taliban initiated 20 attacks on Election Day, including firing rockets at polling stations there. In some areas the Taliban took direct control of polling centers and shut down their operations. Contrary to government reports, however, other sources indicate that violence in 2009 on Election Day in these northern areas was perpetrated by militias without affiliation to insurgent forces (including the Taliban), with some reports indicating ANP involvement. In total and according to UNAMA, 31 people were killed on Election Day in 2009, including 11 IEC workers, 18 members of the ANP and eight ANA personnel.

In 2010, the Taliban again attacked polling centers, with the total number of attacks nationwide increasing to 500 from 4797 in 2009. Polling centers were bombed in Kunar, Khost, and Kandahar provinces. The Taliban fired RPGs in Kabul and Jalalabad as well as onto polling centers in the following provinces: Kunar, Nimroz, Helmand, Ghazni, and Paktika. Aside from destroying polling centers, and similar to the aforementioned events in 2009 in Baghlan, the Taliban captured polling stations in the provinces of Badghis, Helmand, Laghman, and Kunduz. In total and according to reports, 14 people were killed on Election Day in 2010. For insurgents, attacks on polling centers are intended to suppress participation and discredit the election. However, attacks on polling centers are also employed by political rivals to clear a center of voters so that acts of electoral malpractice can be accomplished by election workers without witnesses present.

Candidates, their staff, agents and supporters also verbally intimidate voters on Election Day to cast their ballot for a specific candidate. In 2005, for example, reports indicated that such intimidation occurred in 10 percent of observed polling stations. During the same election, ANP officers in some areas also intimidated voters to cast ballots for a specific candidate. Chiefs of police were also observed pressuring voters.

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7 This number is according to reporting by FEFA. However, ISAF force reports indicated that the number of attacks in 2009 was 280 and increased to 380 for the 2010 contest.
Post-Election Phase

Post-Election violence takes three principal forms. First, supporters of losing candidates mobilize in the form of street actions to protest what they view as illegitimate results triggered by perceptions and evidence of electoral malpractice. These street actions range in form and intensity from marches that end peacefully to mob actions against regional counting centers. Following the release of first round results in 2009, for example, supporters of Dr. Abdullah Abdullah took to the streets to protest what they viewed as a flawed election and invalid electoral results of a first-round Karzai presidential victory.

Second, candidates and their supporters reportedly intimidate election workers to commit acts of deception through deliberately miscounted vote totals or ballot box stuffing. Election workers face threats of violence against them and their families should they not change tally sheets to benefit a particular candidate. Perpetrators of this form of violence also include security forces who reportedly enter polling stations during counting and intimidate workers to bias the results.

The third type of Post-Election violence can be viewed as a continuation of insurgent-initiated violence on Election Day. Again motivated to discredit and disrupt the electoral process, the Taliban use rocket attacks, suicide bombs, and car bombs on facilities associated with the election in particular and international community in general. The extent to which these forms of violence have directly related to the election is a matter of some speculation; however, the period following electoral events have seen spikes in insurgent-initiated violence. This form of Post-Election violence increased markedly in 2009 and 2010. The month of August following the 2009 elections was the deadliest since the U.S. invasion began in 2001 for coalition forces, with 51 U.S. and 77 foreign troops being killed. After release of preliminary election results, on August 25, the Taliban detonated multiple vehicle bombs in a district of Kandahar City that housed UN facilities, killing 43 people and wounding 65 more. On September 12, the scheduled day for release of preliminary results, the Taliban initiated attacks across the country that killed 66 people.

The intensity of the violence can be measured by the following coding system developed by Straus and Taylor.
Electoral Incident Coding

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>No reported electoral violence before or after a vote</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>The first level of violence is violent harassment, indicated by police breaking up rallies, party supporters fighting, street brawls, opposition newspaper being confiscated, and limited short-term arrests of political opponents</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>The second level of violence is violent repression, as indicated by long term high-level arrests of party leaders, the consistent use of violent intimidation, limited use of murders and assassinations, and torture</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>The third level is a highly violent campaign, in which there are repeated, coordinated physical attacks leading to 20 or more deaths</td>
<td></td>
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Under these metrics, Afghanistan can be considered in the Code 3 category.

C. Stakeholder Analysis

1. State Stakeholders

a. Independent Electoral Commission (IEC)

The IEC is a constitutional body mandated to administer all national and sub-national elections in Afghanistan. The process by which Commission members are appointed (exclusively by the president) and the questionable integrity of some poll workers combine to reduce public confidence in IEC impartiality and, by implication, the value of elections as instruments to achieve governance. While new leadership has been installed at the IEC and a five-year strategy plan and agenda for reform have been developed by the IEC, electoral administration for the 2014-2015 electoral cycle will have a different set of dynamics compared with 2004-2005 and 2009-2010. These new dynamics include the reduction of ISAF assets for logistical purposes and a lighter international “footprint” in electoral assistance, with the UN playing an advisory and mentoring role and non-governmental organizations, such as IFES, having recently closed their electoral assistance/security programs.

Performance problems reported at the polling station level have included malpractice in the form of ballot box stuffing, knowingly recognizing false voter identification cards, and deliberately manipulating voting totals. Mis-practice included lack of knowledge of polling procedures and arithmetic mistakes on vote tally sheets. Delays in the announcement of election results were also cited as concerns due to suspicion that the delays were the result of count manipulation.

The IEC participated in a planning and coordination committee for electoral security that was led by the MOI, MOD, and National Security Agency (NSA). This committee

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collaborated with ISAF and established a three-cordon security concept with ISAF providing QRFs and other special functions; the ANA providing a general atmosphere of security; the ANP providing point and mobile security (poll workers managing minor disputes within the polling stations could be considered a fourth security cordon). Provincial Security Officers (PSOs) stationed at the IEC’s provincial offices coordinated electoral security at the provincial level. Though present for Election Day, the temporary staff status of PSOs (they are on temporary contracts and released following a given election cycle) creates a lack of continuity in electoral security administration at that level. Four or five provinces were then combined under Regional Security Officers (RSOs) who reported to the IEC headquarters.

b. Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC)
The mandate of the ECC and has shifted since the 2004-2005 electoral cycle. As previously noted, this shift has re-shaped the ECC from an internationally-driven body with robust sanction capacity, to that of a politically-appointed and weakened, judicial panel. Further, the ECC is a temporary body reestablished for each electoral cycle. Clarity surrounding the mandate for electoral disputes has been further challenged by the actions of President Karzai in establishing a special court for electoral disputes during the last electoral cycle with the Supreme Court upholding the president’s authority to create such a special court. As a result, the electoral disputes process lacks clarity and remains vulnerable to executive interventions, thereby reducing its role in de-conflicting electoral challenges and complaints.

c. Afghan National Security Force (ANSF)
The Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) is divided into various elements, two of which – the ANP and ANA – have substantial roles in planning and provision of electoral security. The ANP had a force of approximately 126,000 individuals as of May 2011, which is projected to grow to 160,000 by 2014, in advance of the next electoral cycle. During 2009 and 2010, the ANP was tasked to protect approximately 5,900 polling centers and also provide mobile patrols, escorts, candidate security, protection of IEC facilities, and QRFs for incident control. With eight officers assigned to each polling center, 56,000 ANP were required for polling center protection alone.

With the ANP providing this inner line of security for fixed locations, the ANA focuses on ‘perimeter’ security – performing patrols reportedly in all 34 provinces to thwart more general threats and in particular those from insurgents. The ANA, where necessary, coordinates and performs patrols with ISAF forces and deploys province-specific QRFs, which respond to requests from the ANP to assist in quelling threats or disturbances surrounding polling or counting centers. Since 2005, the ANA has also maintained a National Military Command Center with staff that monitors and responds to communications from units in the field and deploys assets accordingly.

The ANSF (ANA and ANP) coordinated election security planning and the associated asset deployments with the IEC and ISAF as well as the National Directorate of Security (NDS). Using risk-level maps, the ANSF informed the IEC which polling stations it would be able to secure with ANP staff as well as ANA deployment for perimeter
security. Based on this feedback from the ANSF and associated coordinating bodies, the IEC then made decisions on which polling center were to be closed for security reasons.

While the Electoral Security Working Group template for inter-agency coordination is sound, the ANP is reported to lack specific training in electoral security planning, threat profiling, and administration. An ANP representative in Kabul expressed concerns about his unit having sufficient equipment and forces to fully secure the next electoral cycle. Moreover, the reports of police resources being used for political purposes compromises the integrity of law enforcement and may result in politically-driven protection or neglect.

2. **Non-State Stakeholders**

a. **Political Parties**

While political parties are considered as stakeholders in electoral security, it is also apparent that the “institutions” of parties are personalistic and clientielistic vehicles for individuals to pursue political and financial power. As such, political parties do not widely self-identify with fixed ideologies or policy positions. Political parties are also “electoralist” in performance, that is, tending to become active during an electoral cycle but dormant during non-election periods. This dampens parties’ abilities to serve as a continuous communication bridge between government and people; and to de-conflict political rhetoric.

Public perceptions further disadvantage the position of political parties in the Afghan electoral context. Both the history and efficacy of political parties has created a barrier of mistrust and neglect by elites and popular opinion to develop a viable political party system. The electoral system (SNTV) further dampens the strength of parties because of the personalistic form of voting pattern which it fosters.

These contours of Afghanistan’s political party structure have two implications for electoral conflict. First, lacking mechanisms for transparency and accountability and as instruments controlled by its leaders with no internal democracy, political parties can become organizational platforms to receive resources then leveraged to employ electoral violence. And second, political parties do not offer any safety factor whereby some degree of protection – real or perceived – is afforded to candidates by being part of an organized group.

b. **Civil Society Organizations (CSOs)**

In an electoral conflict context, CSOs provide election monitoring, civic and voter education, and advocate for benefits to disadvantaged groups such as women candidates. Organizations such as FEFA deployed short-term and long-term monitors engaged in incident reporting and documentation. Reporting was conducted through SMS texting and with direct reports channeled to their web site. Incident documentation was done using mobile telephone cameras and videos. While FEFA does not see itself as an agent to document electoral conflict and malpractice on behalf of the IEC, it reported some of the evidence it collected to the IEC for investigative follow-up. Organizations such as
Afghanistan Youth National and Social Organization (AYNSO) and the Women’s Socio-Economic and Environmental Protection Organization (WSEEPO) provide focused services on youth and women, respectively. AYNSO provided training and education for youth to engage in the electoral process. WSEEPO focused assistance and protection measures on women candidates. Further, with funding from USAID, Democracy International is supporting the Electoral Support Organization of Afghanistan (ESOA), a new civil society network established to form a broader coalition of CSOs that will work to enhance civil society’s advocacy for electoral reform. This new organization will be helpful in supporting the calls for electoral reform by political parties and other electoral stakeholders.

c. Media Organizations

Media organizations can play a complex role in electoral security. During the 2009-2010 election cycle, the media played an important role in disseminating voter education information – including airing Afghanistan’s first televised presidential debates and encouraging people to vote. However, the Afghan media has also played a role in exacerbating tensions during the Pre-Election Phase. Opinions were split among those interviewed between a reasonable level of confidence in the private media to report accurately and a view that many private media organizations are not independent and are captive of business or political interests; there was, however, a consensus from those interviewed that the state broadcasting system was an instrument of the executive and did not disseminate news in a balanced and fair manner. In 2009, the head of media at the IEC criticized the state-owned media for giving into government pressure and providing too much coverage on President Karzai.

Further, while media is a resource to disseminate information to voters during the election cycle, insurgents also use it as a tool to amplify the magnitude of the intimidation they seek to instill. As a result, during the 2009 presidential elections, the Afghan government tried to ban journalists and the media from reporting on violent attacks occurring on Election Day in the hopes that this would result in a higher voter turnout. While the move itself was decried by Afghan and Western stakeholders alike as unconstitutional, the sentiment behind the ban reflects the volatile role that the media plays in the context of electoral security.

On the other hand, media organizations and journalists have reportedly also been the target of electoral intimidation including the posting of night letters at broadcasting stations instructing them on what and what not to report, as well as the destruction of broadcasting equipment by the Taliban. Additionally, some journalists who chose to continue reporting on Election Day violence in 2009 despite the government ban, claimed they were beaten by government security forces over their coverage.

3. International Community

a. International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)

During 2009-2010 electoral cycle, ISAF provided training, planning, logistical support, rotary aircraft for transport of ballots to dangerous areas, and other in extremis forces and
equipment as required. By one report, ISAF provided logistical support for 25 percent of election materials delivered, mainly into the most volatile areas.

During prior elections, ISAF has focused principally on Election Day and security of polling centers; however, it recognizes that an electoral cycle approach which extends before and after Election Day is required. For the 2014/15 cycle, then, security operations will begin as soon as the elections are called – at least 90 days before Election Day. In 2009, ISAF established a coordination structure at the regional and provincial levels Operational Coordination Center – Provincial (OCCP) and Operational Coordination Centers - Regional (OCCR). ISAF reports that 80 percent of the polls have already been identified for the 2014 – 2015 electoral cycle.

b. Inter-Governmental and Non-Governmental Organizations

Both UNAMA and a range of international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) have provided assistance to Afghan state and non-state stakeholders for various areas related to electoral process. Although others have been involved, UNDP and IFES, in particular, following the IEC’s establishment in 2005, have been the principal assistance providers of traditional electoral assistance and electoral security planning for the JEMB and IEC.

Since planning for the 2004 election began, UNAMA has provided electoral assistance to the JEMB and IEC. In 2006, based on recommendations from the JEMB and Post-Elections Strategy Group (PESG), three key areas were identified for international assistance in support of the IEC for the 2009 and 2010 elections: 1) capacity building of the IEC at all levels; 2) reviewing the electoral legislation; and 3) conducting a civil and voter registration pilot project. The third was later amended to include support to a full voter registration exercise. In 2008, the UN Security Council through resolution 1806 requested that UNAMA serve as the international electoral assistance lead to the IEC and a principal coordinator of other donors, organizations, and agencies providing other technical assistance. To fill this expanded role, UNAMA in 2009 established the Electoral Support Unit (ESU), which worked closely with the other principal service providers for the electoral processes that year and in 2010 – UNDP and its “Enhancing Legal and Electoral Capacity for Tomorrow (ELECT) program” and IFES and its USAID-funded Support to the Electoral Process (STEP) project.

The ELECT program is a $370 million initiative funded by various donor countries to provide a wide range of electoral assistance services to the IEC. UNDP worked closely with IFES, which in 2008 received the USAID-funded STEP project, a $70 million endeavor aimed to “build the capacity of the IEC of Afghanistan and to ensure the legitimacy of voter registration and the electoral process” for the 2009 and 2010

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9 The following countries and agencies contributed funds: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Croatia, Denmark, European Union, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway States, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, UK, UNDEF, and USA

elections. IFES provided support in three main areas for the 2009 election. First, STEP provided short-and long-term “topic-specific experts” to work with (and to train) IEC staff in their respective areas of responsibility—security, voter registration, boundary delimitation, and electoral commodity procurement, among other areas.

Working together, the UNDP and IFES for the 2009 and 2010 cycles provided support in Pre-Election Phase preparations (training IEC staff, voter registration, electoral legal framework, election planning, etc.), election operations and logistics (identifying polling stations, deploying ballot boxes and papers), and assistance with Post-Election Phase dispute adjudication (establishing and training the dispute resolution committee). In addition to assistance to the electoral process in general, both UNDP and IFES provided assistance particularly related to electoral security. A UNDP logistics advisor mentored and provided guidance to the IEC staff person charged with organizing electoral security preparations. As part of STEP, IFES provided an electoral security advisor to support the relevant IEC staff person in developing electoral security policies and procedures and coordinating training for other IEC staff in electoral security and implementation.

II. Electoral Security Planning: Program Objectives and Planning

This programming seeks to address the following Problem Statement and Development Hypothesis.

Problem Statement: Afghanistan lacks domestic capacity to strategically deploy assets as well as patrol and secure polling stations from insurgents and local powerbrokers who use electoral violence in key regions throughout the country. As election assistance from international forces, such as perimeter patrols and ballot transport, is scheduled to decline...
prior to the 2014-2015 electoral cycle, the upcoming contest is in danger of experiencing more violent incidents than prior elections.

**Development Hypothesis:** If Afghanistan is better able to plan and deploy assets, and the international community is able to fill key gaps prior to the anticipated draw down, then fewer incidents of electoral violence should occur.

**A. Mitigating Factors**

There are three mitigating factors that can be leveraged in electoral security planning and assistance programming to reduce the vulnerabilities for violence. First, a two-year capacity-building window exists in which electoral security administration stakeholders can increase staff numbers as well as improve their skills and effectiveness at planning and prevention. As a result, the calendar for planning an electoral security program intervention for 2014-2015 should begin by mid-2012. Second, the fundamental electoral security coordination mechanism among the MOI, MOD, NSA, and IEC is sound and should be further institutionalized. And third, considerable data on electoral violence, such as election monitor incident reports, have been collected by both the state security stakeholders and non-state stakeholders such as FEFA. Such data should be consolidated, analyzed, and mapped for electoral security planning in 2014-2015.

**B. Strategic Program Objectives**

Based on the profile outlined above, Creative recommends the following four strategic program objectives to reduce conflict in the 2014-2015 electoral cycle:

1. **Enhance Capacity of Electoral Security Administration.** In order to mitigate the capacity gaps in electoral security administration created by the reduction in ISAF assets and any diminished presence from the international electoral assistance community, electoral security administration should be enhanced by building the planning and operation capacity of the MOI, MOD, NSA, and IEC in this area of responsibility.

   This objective is intended to improve electoral conflict prevention and enhance the protection of stakeholders.

2. **Introduce Programming for Political Violence against Women in Elections (PVAWE).** Special programming should be introduced to protect women candidates and voters, provide women candidates with more campaign resources, and provide victims’ services for women, their families or supporters, who have been the targets of intimidation or violence.

   This objective is intended to increase the safe and genuine participation of women in elections and governance.
3. **Encourage IEC and ECC Reforms.** Reforms should be encouraged in IEC and ECC appointments and operations to enhance their independence from the executive; to control and prosecute electoral malpractice; and to clarify the mandates for electoral justice.

This objective is intended to improve the impartiality and competence of the IEC and re-establish a viable, independent electoral dispute resolution mechanism.

4. **Strengthen Political Party Systems and Finance Reforms.** Greater measures should be undertaken to strengthen political parties and to bring transparency and accountability into the political financing of candidates and political parties and in the use of state resources for political purposes.

This objective is intended to promote the role of political parties as brokers of opinion and mediators of conflict and to reduce their roles as perpetrators of electoral violence.

Taken together, these strategic objectives can produce the following cumulative impact:

- Enhanced conflict prevention and protection of electoral security stakeholders,
- Increased empowerment of women in elections and governance
- Reduced the triggers to electoral conflict emerging from electoral malpractice and injustice; and
- Dis-incentives to political rivals to employ electoral violence.

USAID should be interested in pursuing these programming objectives because electoral conflict and malpractice are principal factors in de-legitimizing elections as instruments to peacefully and fairly achieve governance.

The institutional framework for roles and responsibilities of the international community should be preserved, with special focus on capacity building in electoral security administration and introducing disincentives to engage in electoral violence. Mentoring and assistance gaps in electoral security assistance may emerge because of the absence or reduction in force of IFES and ISAF from the institutional framework.

While the coordination approach with UNDP as the lead agency should also remain intact, electoral security assistance will have to be folded into UNDP’s ELECT Program or the international community will have to engage other organizations to provide this assistance. In order to assure consistency in approach, the committee of state electoral security stakeholders should be programming recipients including the ANP, MOI, ANA, IEC, and ECC. This range of domestic partners may require the international community to divide and coordinate its assistance by sector – security, electoral, and judicial. Within the USG, the programs activities proposed below reflect democracy and governance, conflict management, rule of law, and civil society areas of project focus.

Constraints on USAID are political, security, and financial in nature. The political constraints involve the bilateral relationship between Afghanistan and the United States.
Differences in opinions on aspects of conducting the war, and a series of violent incidents, have created tensions in the relationship between the two countries. In dealing with an issue of such sensitivity as elections and violence, USAID must overcome the fallout from these differences and maintain an effective working relationship with domestic partners.

Security factors constrain the geographical reach of programming and create uncertainties about implementation timelines. USAID planning must recognize the impact of the volatile security environment on its capacity to have a consistent strength and reach for some electoral assistance programs.

USG interest in program investment in Afghanistan is not on the rise. In establishing electoral program priorities for 2014-2015, USAID may have to do so with fewer financial resources than was previously anticipated. Such reductions create a new dynamic between USAID and the UN in order to both achieve coordination with the electoral assistance stakeholders, but also maintain the flexibility to focus on needs which fulfill USAID goals and objectives.

In the following sections, planning and programming for electoral security and conflict prevention is presented and organized by strategic objectives. Proposed programming is then listed, organized by stakeholder and electoral phase, in a program matrix.

### III. Electoral Security Programming

#### A. Electoral Security Administration

The objective of electoral security administration programming is to strengthen the capacity within Afghanistan to prevent conflict and protect electoral stakeholders, events, materials, and facilities by state and non-state stakeholders. In support of this objective, the following program activities can be considered.

**Planning and Operations**

- Institutionalize the electoral security administration planning and operations template among the MOI, ANP, ANA, NSA, and IEC for some level of activity in non-election periods and a “surge” capacity during electoral cycles.

- Establish an Office of Electoral Security Administration at the IEC.

- Employ the electoral incident data collected in the 2009-2010 electoral cycle to inform risk mapping for 2014-2015 to create and maintain an incidents database.

- Foster the coordination of state and non-state stakeholders in incident reporting and documentation for the incidents database.
• Enhance the conflict management and mediation training for poll workers.

Security and Protection Criteria

• Maintain the ISAF methodology for declaring a polling center as “insecure,” resulting in cancelling, delaying, or suspending voting because of this designation.

• Develop an objective set of criteria for declaring political candidates at risk for violence and the protocols for providing ANP protection for these candidates.

• Provide an introductory training course for the ANP and ANA assigned to election duty on international electoral policy and practice and electoral conflict analysis and response methodologies.

Traditional Leaders

• Engage traditional leaders in Alternative Dispute Resolution and the prevention of electoral conflict.

Conflict Monitoring and Documentation

• Deploy electoral monitors with a focus on conflict incident documentation and uniform reporting using new media and make such reporting available to the state electoral security stakeholders for planning and enforcement responses.

• Deploy electoral monitors to focus on additional yet related areas to conflict including political finance, media, and electoral dispute monitoring.

B. Political Violence against Women in Elections (PVAWE)

The PVAWE program objective is to provide a special focus on the vulnerabilities of women electoral stakeholders and to take special measures to protect and empower their electoral engagement. In fulfillment of this objective, the following program activities can be considered.

• Identify electoral conflict incident patterns by gender where possible and map the attacks on women candidates, voters, monitors, journalists, or security officers to identify the characteristics of the threat environment.

• Establish a Women Candidate Protection Network which provides a platform for support, communications, and victim’s services for women candidates.

• Monitor incidents of domestic violence against women political activists during the electoral cycle.
• Disseminate civic education messages to counter the practice of family voting by male members of the family and promoting the participation of women in elections.

C. Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) Reforms

The objective of this program is to leverage the current climate in the Wolesi Jirga and among political parties for electoral reforms, and to identify the core issues that enhance electoral integrity and reduce the vulnerabilities for conflict. In fulfillment of this objective, the following program activities can be considered.

• Encourage members and groups in parliament to develop a consensus agenda on electoral reform supported by the international community.

• Diversify the IEC appointment process to include appointing authorities other than the president and approval by parliament as the confirmation step.

• Improve recruitment and training of poll workers to enhance job performance and professional ethics.

• Assure that the distribution of polling centers (and closures for security reasons) does not disadvantage any particular ethnic community.

• Explore moving some ballot tabulation points in remote areas to provincial centers to offer more transparency, accuracy, and security in ballot tabulation. Special provisions must be made to protect the ballots while in transit from the polling center to the provincial centers.

• Examine options for “advanced voting” in order to reduce the dependence on the target-heavy polling centers on Election Day; or a “rolling” Election Day around the country to allow security forces to geographically concentrate their electoral security assets regionally and not nationally.

• Clarify and strengthen the electoral justice system to provide a clear mandate for adjudicating disputes and hearing appeals.

D. Political Party System and Finance Reforms

The objective of this program is to foster more capacity for political parties to de-conflict political dialogue and reduce the opportunities for licit or illicit funding to be used for the purposes of violence or coercion. In fulfilling this objective, the following program activities can be considered.

• Encourage the de-conflicting of formal and informal dialogue among political parties through workshops, panel discussions, and other collaborative events.
Facilitate Codes of Conduct and peace pacts among political parties.

Introduce laws and regulations to establish and strengthen political finance disclosure (receipts and expenditure), limits, and prohibitions.

Conduct training programs to enhance the capacity of the IEC to enforce political finance regulations; and prevent vote buying, or establish an independent Political Finance Regulator dedicated to that mandate.

E. Electoral Security Program Matrix

The matrix below summarizes the Electoral Security Framework described by activity, phase, and stakeholder.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Stakeholder</th>
<th>Prevention (Pre-Election Phase)</th>
<th>Management (Election Day Phase)</th>
<th>Mediation (Post-Election Phase)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IEC</td>
<td>Electoral Security Administration Capacity Building and Victim’s Services</td>
<td>Electoral Security Administration Capacity Building and Victim’s Services</td>
<td>Electoral Dispute Resolution Reform and Re-Structuring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Political Finance Regulation Reform and Capacity building</td>
<td>Political Finance Investigation and Sanctions</td>
<td>Electoral Disputes Resolution Capacity Building</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Establish and Maintain an Electoral Incident Database and Mapping</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Establish Network of Contingency Counting Centers</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Consider “Advanced Voting” Options</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conflict Mediation Training for Poll Workers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan Wolesa Jirga – Electoral Reform Pertinent to Electoral Conflict</td>
<td>Enhance sanctions on political finance violations, including criminalizing acceptance of illicit</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CREATIVE ASSOCIATES INTERNATIONAL. This document includes data that shall not be disclosed outside the Recipient and shall not be duplicated, used, or disclosed – in whole or in part.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Non-State Stakeholder</th>
<th>Political Parties</th>
<th>Civil Society Organizations</th>
<th>Traditional</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ANP</td>
<td>Electoral Security Capacity Building and Planning</td>
<td>Polling Center Fixed and Mobile</td>
<td>Counting Center Fixed and Mobile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lessons Learned among ANP Units in Different Parts of the Country</td>
<td>QRFs/Anti-Riot</td>
<td>QRFs/Anti-Riot</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Middle/Outer Security Cordon</td>
<td>Middle/Outer Security Cordon</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANA</td>
<td>Electoral Security Capacity Building and Planning</td>
<td>Management (Election Day Phase)</td>
<td>Mediation (Post-Election Phase)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lessons Learned among ANA Units in Different Parts of the Country</td>
<td>Peace Pacts</td>
<td>Peace Pacts</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Logistical Support to the IEC</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-State Stakeholder</td>
<td>Pre-Election Phase</td>
<td>Election Day Phase</td>
<td>Post-Election Phase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Parties</td>
<td>Political Party System Strengthening</td>
<td>Monitoring Electoral Conflict</td>
<td>Monitoring Electoral Conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Political Finance Accountability and Compliance</td>
<td>Monitoring Political Finance</td>
<td>Monitoring Political Finance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ethical Campaigning Pacts</td>
<td>Monitoring Electoral Dispute resolution</td>
<td>Victim’s Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Monitor Media and New Media and Elections/Crime</td>
<td>Victim’s Services</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Victim’s Services</td>
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<tr>
<td>Civil Society Organizations</td>
<td>Monitoring Electoral Conflict</td>
<td>Monitoring Political Finance</td>
<td>Monitoring Electoral Conflict</td>
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<td>Monitoring Political Finance</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Monitoring Electoral Dispute resolution</td>
<td>Victim’s Services</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Monitor Media and New Media and Elections/Crime</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Victim’s Services</td>
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<tr>
<td>Traditional</td>
<td>Mediation and</td>
<td>Mediation</td>
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</table>
IV. Monitoring and Evaluation (M & E): Evaluation Framework for USAID Program

The development of an M & E framework for the evaluation of electoral conflict prevention programs can consist of three basic components: baseline data; program targets; and custom indicators.

A. Baseline Data

This data must be harmonized into a common structure. In doing so, the following entry fields can be considered:

- Date of Incident (Electoral Cycle Phase);
- Time of Day of Incident;
- Targets or Victims – political candidates, their family members and supporters, election official, police, journalists, voters, or others;
- Number of Victims Involved by each Tactic (Disaggregated by Gender);
- Spoilers or Perpetrators – political candidates, family members or supporters, criminals, police, voters, or others;
- Type of Incidents/Tactics – multiple homicides, individual homicide, physical assault, sexual assaults, kidnapping, destruction of physical property, destruction of sensitive electoral materials, riots and street actions; and
- Location – Department, Municipality, Point of Conflict.

B. Program Targets

1. Rule of Law and Human Rights

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GJD – 1.1 Constitutions, Laws and Human Rights</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indicator Title:</strong> Number of Retributive and Restorative Justice Institutions Created or Supported with USG Assistance</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Custom Indicators**

- Clarify the mandate of the Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC) and the roles of other institutions in electoral dispute resolution.
- Promote victim’s compensation as elements of judgments concerning electoral crimes from Afghan authorities.
### GJD – 1.1 Constitutions, Laws and Human Rights

**Indicator Title:** Number of Campaigns Supported by USG to Foster Public Awareness and Respect for Rule of Law

**Custom Indicator**
Engage CSO partners in developing civic education campaigns to promote the rule of law by fair and peaceful elections

### GJD 1.3 – Justice System

**Indicator Title:** Number of Communities Assisted in Crime Prevention with USG Support

**Custom Indicator**
Employing the conflict profile baseline data, map the impact of electoral violence prevention programs by type of victim or target

### GJD 1.3 – Justice System

**Indicator Title:** Number of Individuals/Groups Who Receive Legal Aid or Victim’s Assistance with USG Support

**Custom Indicator**
The number and compensation that victims of electoral violence receive from the courts through state or non-state assisted legal services

### 2. Good Governance

### GJD 2.6 – Governance and the Security Sector

**Indicator Title:** Number of Government Officials Undergoing USG Assisted Security Sector Governance Training

**Custom Indicator**
Number of participants in electoral security training programs from the ANP, MOI, ANA, and other Ministries

### 3. Political Competition and Consensus Building

### GJD 3.1 – Consensus Building Processes

**Indicator Title:** Number of Groups Trained in Conflict Mediation/Resolution Skills with USG Assistance

**Custom Indicator**
Number of election workers trained by the IEC in conflict mediation/resolution in voter registration sites and polling stations

### GJD 2.3 – Elections and Political Processes
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator Title: Number of Domestic Election Observers Trained with USG Assistance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Custom Indicators</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of domestic observers training in electoral conflict incident monitoring and reporting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of domestic observers trained in media monitoring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of domestic observers trained in political finance monitoring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of domestic observers trained in electoral dispute resolution monitoring</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**GJD 3.2 – Elections and Political Processes**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator Title: Number of People Reached by USG Assisted Voter Education</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Custom Indicators</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of voters reached by media type with messages for IEC to discourage vote buying and other political malpractice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of voters reached by media type with messages to discourage vote selling and voter complicity in electoral crimes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**GJD 3.2 – Elections and Political Processes**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator Title: Number of Laws or Amendments to Ensure Credible Elections Drafted with USG Technical Assistance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Custom Indicators</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal framework for political finance is strengthened and sanctions increased for violations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**GJD 3.2 – Elections and Political Processes**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator Title: Number of Electoral Administrative Procedures and Systems Strengthened with USG Assistance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Custom Indicators</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reforms enacted in the appointment of IEC Commissioners and instances of electoral malpractice by election workers is reduced.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conduct training for political finance system administration and regulation enforcement including vote buying</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**GJD 3.4 – Political Parties**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator Title: Number of USG-Assisted Political Parties Implementing Program to Increase the Number of Candidates and Members Who are Women, Youth and from Marginalized Groups</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Custom Indicators</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of women candidates for presidential, parliamentary, and provincial council offices and political party leadership</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**GJD 3.5 – Political Parties**
### Indicator Title: Number of Organizations Receiving USG Support to Promote Development of and Compliance with Political Finance Regulations and Legislation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Custom Indicator</th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of participants in USG-funded workshops on compliance to political party regulations and political finance reforms</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**GJD 4.1 – Strengthen Democratic Civic Participation**

### Indicator Title: Number of USG Assisted Civil Society Organizations that Engage in Advocacy and Watchdog Functions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Custom Indicators</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of CSOs monitoring and advocating on electoral crimes and conflict</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of CSOs monitoring and advocating on media fairness</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of CSOs monitoring and disclosing political finance data</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of CSOs monitoring electoral crimes and disputes and advocating against impunity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**GJD 4.2 – Media Freedom and Freedom of Information**

### Indicator Title: Number of Journalists Trained with USG Assistance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Custom Indicator</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of journalists trained in workshop on standards for coverage of electoral violence</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### V. Conclusion

Conflict and violence are becoming embedded in the Afghan electoral process because of a range of security, political, economic, and social vulnerability factors. These factors create susceptibilities and incentivize the use of violence both to destabilize and discredit the process (as perpetrated by insurgent forces) as well as achieve political gains (as perpetrated by political rivals and powerbrokers). Without taking strategic and operational measures to counter it, electoral violence will likely continue into the 2014-2015 electoral cycle given its effectiveness at influencing electoral outcomes through direct means of suppressing participation or indirect means by providing a cover of violence to conceal the stealing of votes.

The 2014-2015 electoral cycle will be a watershed process for Afghanistan because of the significant and rapid reduction of its “sovereignty gap” in security and electoral administration. While Afghan institutions will possess more *de facto* sovereignty in governance, this authority may exceed the capacity of the institutions to fulfill their mandate. Should remedial measures not be taken, the effects of this gap in capacity may be felt in the area of electoral security as the ANP and ANA assume new leadership roles and the IEC works with a new and lighter international “footprint” in its assistance.
The program strategies and activities put forward in this assessment alone will not de-conflict the 2014-2015 electoral cycle. These vulnerabilities are too numerous and elusive for a comprehensive security solution to be expected by the next elections. Nevertheless, these measures can facilitate measurable results in the reduction of deaths, violent incidents, injuries, intimidation, and destruction of property. And, if elections are considered “safer” by candidates and voters, then the credibility of the process is enhanced with the stakeholders.
Annex I – Schedule of Meetings

Afghanistan Electoral Assessment: Meeting Schedule
Creative Associates International

Friday, March 9, 2012 – Assessment Team arrives in Afghanistan.

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Saturday, March 10th (Kabul)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Time</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>11:00 am – 12:00 pm</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>12:00 – 1:00 pm</td>
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<tr>
<td>2:00 – 3:30 pm</td>
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March 11th: Creative was scheduled to conduct interviews in Kandahar from March 11th – 13th. Due to security incident on March 11th in Kandahar, all interviews were cancelled, and the team had to immediately return to Kabul. As the team was unable to conduct in-person interviews in Kandahar, Creative submitted questions via e-mail to numerous stakeholders in Kandahar as well as Herat. Interview questions were distributed to all individuals listed in the meeting schedule (as reflected for March 12).

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Monday, March 12th (Kandahar)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Meetings – Kandahar</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Camp Nathan Smith (CNS)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>**Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team (KPRT)**¹²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Time</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>9:00 – 10:00 am</td>
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<td>10:00 – 11:00 am</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

¹² These meetings were scheduled but cancelled as a result of the shooting incident in Kandahar.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Contact</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11:00am – 12:00pm</td>
<td><strong>KPRT Leadership</strong>&lt;br&gt;- Deborah Kingsland, KPRT Director (Department of State)&lt;br&gt;- David Sias, KPRT Chief of Staff (Department of State)&lt;br&gt;- Matthew Flynn, Senior Development Officer (USAID)&lt;br&gt;- CDR Heath Sarvis, KPRT Military Commander (US Navy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12:15 – 1:15pm</td>
<td>Lunch with <strong>KPRT Governance Sector Team</strong>&lt;br&gt;- Eamon Walsh, Sector Team Lead (Department of State)&lt;br&gt;- MAJ Gregory Campbell, Counter Narcotics (US Army)&lt;br&gt;- Sergio Garcia, Counter Narcotics (INL)&lt;br&gt;- Stephen Glaser, Political Officer (Department of State)&lt;br&gt;- Billy Woodward, Governance Advisor (USAID)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1:30 – 2:30pm</td>
<td><strong>Kandahar Provincial Elections Officer</strong>&lt;br&gt;Najibullah Haqparat, Acting Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2:30 – 3:30pm</td>
<td><strong>Gender Meeting</strong>&lt;br&gt;- Roqia Askzai, Kandahar Director of Woman’s Affairs <em>(unconfirmed)</em>&lt;br&gt;- Meena, KPRT Gender Advisor/Translator&lt;br&gt;- Jessica Brandt, Field Program Officer (USAID)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3:30 – 5:00pm</td>
<td><strong>IRI and NDI</strong>&lt;br&gt;- Engineer Abdul Majeed, Regional Program Manager, IRI&lt;br&gt;- Mohammad Akbar Ziarkash, Regional Program Manager, NDI</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**_*_***

**Tuesday, March 13th Kabul**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Contact</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2:00 – 3:30 pm</td>
<td>Oskar Lehner, Senior Technical Advisor&lt;br&gt;Daniel Hinchcliff, Field Coordination Specialist&lt;br&gt;&lt;strong&gt;ELECT Project, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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**Wednesday, March 14th (Kabul)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Contact</th>
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</tbody>
</table>
12:15 – 1:30 pm  Sean Gralton, Political Party Assessment Team Leader  
**USAID/Afghanistan SUPPORT Project**  
Checchi and Company Consulting

2:00 – 3:00 pm  Abdullah Ahmadzai, Chief Electoral Officer  
Mohammad Hashim, Deputy Chief Electoral Officer  
**Independent Electoral Commission**

4:00 – 5:00 pm  Waqif Hakimi  
**Jamiat Islami Party**

5:30 – 6:30pm  Antonio Ribeiro, Deputy Chief of Party  
**STEP Program**  
International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES)

**Thursday, March 15\(^{th}\) (Kabul)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Contact</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 9:30 – 11:00am   | Mr. Ciarán Carey, Political Advisor to the NATO Senior Civilian Representative  
                  | Paul L. Negley, Senior Governance and Development Advisor  
                  | **COMISAF Advisory and Assistance Team (CAAT)**  
                  | **ISAF**                                                             |
| 11:00am – 12:00pm| Sayd Noorullah Sadat  
                  | **Leader, Afghanistan Islamic Movement (Junbesh Islami)**             |
| 2:00 – 3:00pm    | General Mohhamad Dawod Amin  
                  | **Deputy Police Commander, Kabul**                                   |
| 3:30 – 5:00 pm   | Aziz Rafee, Managing Director  
                  | **Afghan Civil Society Forum (ACSF)**                               |
| 7:00 – 8:00pm    | Geoff Odlum, Deputy Political Counselor  
                  | **U.S. Embassy**                                                   |

**Friday, March 16\(^{th}\) (Kabul) – Writing Day**

**Saturday, March 17\(^{th}\) (Kabul)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Contact</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 10:00 – 11:00am  | Sharifullah Ibrahimi, Chief Secretary  
                  | **Independent Commission for Overseeing the Implementation of Constitution (ICOIC)** |
| 2:00 – 3:00pm    | Rohullah Qarizada, President  
                  | **Afghanistan Independent Bar Association (AIBA)**                   |
| 3:00 – 4:00pm    | Anwarulhaq Ahadi  
                  | **Afghanistan National Party (Hezb-e-Afghan Millat)**                |
**Sunday, March 18th (Kabul)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Contact</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12:00 – 1:00 pm</td>
<td>Baktash Siawash</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Parliament Member</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2:00 – 4:00 pm</td>
<td>Jandad Spenghar, Executive Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Free and Fair Election Foundation of Afghanistan (FEFA)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4:00 – 5:00 pm</td>
<td>Sayd Hosein Anwari</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Afghanistan Islamic Movement Party (Hezb-e-Harakat Islami Afghanistan)</strong></td>
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</table>

**Monday, March 19th (Kabul)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Contact</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9:00 – 10:00 am</td>
<td>Merajudin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Qarabagh Radio</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10:00am – 12:00pm</td>
<td>Mohammad ImalMarjan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Office of IT Director</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Ministry of Communication</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1:00 – 2:00 pm</td>
<td>Shafi Jalali, Head of Public Outreach Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Independent Election Commission of Afghanistan</strong> (Media Commission of the IEC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3:00 – 4:00 pm</td>
<td>Sebghatullah Sanjar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Afghanistan Republic Party (Hezb-e-JomhoriKhahan)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Tuesday, March 20th (Kabul) – APPF Transition – Writing Day**

**Wednesday, March 21st (Kabul)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Contact</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2:00 – 3:30 pm</td>
<td>Arash Barak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Managing Director</strong></td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td><strong>AYNSO</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>4:00 – 5:00 pm</td>
<td>Nick Maroukis</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td><strong>Director for Security Planning</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>ISAF – 2008/2009 Elections</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Thursday, March 22nd (Kabul)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Contact</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11:00am – 12:00pm</td>
<td>Shahira Sadat, Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Women’s Socio-Economic and Environmental</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time</td>
<td>Protection Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1:00 – 2:00pm</td>
<td>Mr. Ahmad Behzad, MP Wolesi Jerga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3:00 – 4:00pm</td>
<td>Haji Mohammad Mohaqiq, <em>Afghanistan People’s Islamic Unity Party (Hezb-e-Wahdat Islami Mardum Afghanistan)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4:30 – 5:30pm</td>
<td>Exit Brief with USAID Country Team</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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**Friday, March 23rd (Kabul) – Writing Day**

*___*

**Saturday, March 24th (Kabul)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Contact</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Depart Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Respondents to Creative’s e-mail questionnaire included:

Nisar Ahmad Tokhi  
Provincial Officer  
Performance Based Governance Fund (PBGF II)  
The Asia Foundation - Kandahar Afghanistan

Matt Podolak  
Kandahar City DST Lead

Zia ahmad zia  
Herat provincial electoral officer
### Annex II – List of Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ANA</td>
<td>Afghan National Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANP</td>
<td>Afghan National Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANSF</td>
<td>Afghanistan National Security Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil Society Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECC</td>
<td>Electoral Complaints Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELECT</td>
<td>Enhancing Legal and Electoral Capacity for Tomorrow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESOA</td>
<td>Electoral Support Organization of Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESU</td>
<td>Electoral Support Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEFA</td>
<td>Free and Fair Election Foundation for Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GIRoA</td>
<td>Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IEC</td>
<td>Independent Electoral Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IED</td>
<td>Improvised Explosive Device</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFES</td>
<td>International Foundation for Electoral Systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INGO</td>
<td>International Non-Governmental Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISAF</td>
<td>International Security Assistance Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JEMB</td>
<td>Joint Election Management Body</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOI</td>
<td>Ministry of Interior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDS</td>
<td>National Directorate of Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSA</td>
<td>National Security Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCCP</td>
<td>Operational Coordination Center – Provincial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCCR</td>
<td>Operational Coordination Center – Regional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PESG</td>
<td>Post-Elections Strategy Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSO</td>
<td>Provincial Security Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PVAWE</td>
<td>Political Violence against Women in Elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QRF</td>
<td>Quick Reaction Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPG</td>
<td>Rocket Propelled Grenades</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSO</td>
<td>Regional Security Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNTV</td>
<td>Single Non-Transferable Vote</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STEP</td>
<td>Support to the Electoral Process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMA</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WSEEPO</td>
<td>Women’s Socio-Economic and Environmental Protection Organization</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ANNEX III – Electoral Security Threat Mapping and Cordon Security Concept
Election Threat Areas

New united front: “Council of United Holy Warriors” (Shura Ittihad-ul-Mujahideen)

Low
Medium
High
SECURITY CONCEPT – MoI PC Security

**Tier 1**
- Mol & NDS
  - Point Security
  - Dist/Prov QRF
  - Convoy Escort
  - NDS & MOI Intel
  - Candidate Sec
  - Riot Control

**Tier 2**
- MoD
  - Shaping Operations
  - Prov/Regional QRF
  - Convoy Escort

**Tier 3 & 4**
- ISAF
  - Shaping Operations
  - Airlift E-Materials
  - In Extremis Support/QRF

**POLLING CENTRE**
SECURITY CONCEPT – Joint Effect

**Mol & NDS**
- Point Security
- Dist/Prov QRF
- Convoy Escort
- NDS & MOI Intel
- Candidate Sec
- Riot Control

**MoD**
- Point Security
- Prov/Regional QRF
- Convoy Escort
- Shaping Operations

**ISAF**
- Shaping Operations
- Airlift E-Materials
- In Extremis Support/QRF

**Tier 1**
- Polling Centre

**Tier 2**

**Tier 3 & 4**